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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the diversification 
of a major oil company into the. petrochemical business and 
then through thorough analysis to recommend the appropriate 
corporate strategies to be followed by the petrochemical subsidi- 
ary of such a company in the 1980's and the 1990's. 
The petrochemical industry has undergone great changes 
during the last decade. In the early 1970's it entered a new 
era of maturity, however due to the misplannings of the late 
1960's extending to the early 1970's the industry was suddenly 
faced with significant overcapacity which has persisted to the 
present date and is expected to last well into the 1980's. The 
1974 oil crisis caused a further decline in the growth of demand, 
hence exacerbating the situation. 
During the seventies the industry has had to operate under 
increasing material prices, unlike the past, which when coupled 
with the problem of overcapacity and the resulting deterioration 
of prices, has caused considerable decline in the financial 
ability of the companies to finance their capital expenditure 
programmes through internal cash generation (which was the case 
in the industry's 'golden era'). This situation is threatening 
the long term viability and survival of the petrochemical 
businesses. 
A System Dynamics model for a hypothetical petrochemical 
subsidiary of a major oil company has been constructed which 
embodies all the policies inherent in such a system. The 
dynamic behaviour of the model closely resembles that expected 
from the real system such as the declining financial ability, 
which is mostly due to the inflationary conditions. 
Through thorough analysis, the impact of varying infla- 
tion level on the performance of the system was explored, and 
the need for adopting suitable accounting policies which would 
take account of the replacement costs of assets, during periods 
of high inflation, was proposed. 
The adoption of a number of policies led to a certain 
degree of improvement in the financial performance of the system, 
and these are recommended concerning the corporate strategy of 
the company for the next two decades. 
Finally it was discovered that due to the low level of 
growth of demand (compared to the past), the large economic sizes 
of the petrochemical plants and the market share consensus, the 
companies will have to go into joint ventures in the future. 
PREFACE 
This thesis should be of interest to management scientists 
and decision-makers within the petrochemical industry, as well 
as the academics. It demonstrates how the System Dynamics 
modelling technique could be applied to strategic corporate 
planning issues and help to illuminate the trouble areas. For 
those readers not familiar with the technique, Forrester's (1962) 
'Industrial Dynamics' and Coyle's (1977) 'Management System 
Dynamics' are highly recommended. 
Chapter 1 describes in detail the evolution of the petro- 
chemical industry together with its characteristics and most 
pressing problem. Those familiar with the industry can omit 
this chapter. 
In chapter 2 the reasons for the diversification of the 
oil companies into the petrochemical business and their strategies 
are discussed. In doing so the forward integration of 10 major 
oil companies into the chemical field are explored. Industrial- 
ists may also omit this chapter. 
In chapter 3 other studies of relevance to this present work 
are discussed together with the definition of the problem, the 
aim of the research, the method of approach, the boundary of the 
system, the nature of the organization, our 'confidential' contacts 
with a number of companies, the geographical boundary of operation 
and finally the chemical products selected for the study and the 
choice of feedstocks. 
In chapter 4 the equation formulation of the most important 
relationships of the model are discussed, full listings of which 
are given in appendices A and B. The equations are written 
according to DYSMAP notation (Coyle, 1977). 
Chapter 5 discusses the validity of the model together 
with its dynamic behaviour. 
In Chapter 6a thorough analysis of the poor financial 
performance of the system is carried out and certain recommenda- 
tions are made. The robustness of the model is also examined 
and hence those parameters which are of a sensitive nature are 
identified. A number of policies which lead to a certain 
degree of improvement in the financial performance of the system 
are also discussed and recommended as elements of future corporate 
strategy for the company. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the overall conclusions together with 
recommendations made for future areas of research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE 'PETROCHEMICAL 'INDUSTRY 
2 
1.1 Historical Perspective 
The development of the petrochemical industry falls 
within three eras, the 1900-1936,1936-1973 and the post 1973. 
From the 19th century to about 1936, a coal-based basic organic 
chemical industry developed in the U. S. and-Europe. The 
organic chemicals required during this era were mainly in the 
form of dyestuffs intermediates, solvents, alcohols and carb- 
oxylic acids. By around 1920 the first small quantities of 
petroleum-based petrochemicals were manufactured for the 
automotive industry in the form of anti-freeze, paints and 
various additives. Later, plastics, synthetic rubbers, 
synthetic fibres and syndets came to the market, however 
their total raw material requirements were small. The basic 
organic chemicals were produced mainly from coal by-products 
and from acetylene derived from calcium carbide and/or 
molasses. 
The second world war strongly influenced major develop- 
ments in the U. S. in petroleum-based chemical activities 
(especially concerning the production of styrene and butadiene 
for the manufacture of polymers and synthetic rubbers, ethylene 
for polyethylene and cyclohexane for adipic acid for nylon) in 
order to meet a wartime demand far in excess of that which the 
traditional coal and agriculture sources could supply. 
Among the countries with an important chemical industry 
only the U. S. was at that time a petroleum producer, hence 
there was no incentive to use oil as raw material. However, 
in the late 1940's the change from coal to petroleum occurred 
in the European chemical industry due to (Taylor, 1977): - 
3" 
the growth in demand during the war for gasoline and synthetic 
products substituting for scarce natural products; the new 
oil supplies of the middle East; the huge expansion of the 
oil refining industry in Europe in the post-war period by the 
U. S. oil multinationals; the relative ease of transformation 
of petroleum hydrocarbons into basic chemicals compared with 
the use of alternative carbon sources; and economic reasons 
concerning the comparative lower cost of oil. 
The growth of this industry has since been very remarkable 
with. world production of petrochemical products increasing 
ýxom just a few hundred tons in 1920 to 3.5 million in 1950 
and to about 70 million tons in 1976, with an average annual 
growth of more than 14 percent during the 1970-1976 period 
(UNIDO/ICIS, 1978). The rapid growth of the industry especi- 
ally during the 1950«1970 period, at about 2.5 times the GDP 
growth in the same period, was due to an almost explosive 
growth. in demand for polymer materials together with the 
inadequate competitiveness of the traditional materials either 
quantitatively or economically. In order to appreciate the 
magnitude of this rapid development, figure 1.1 demonstrates 
as an example the production of the industry's three main 
products, ethylene, propylene and benzene in the U. K. in 1950 
and shows the growth in demand through to 1974. 
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Fig. 1.1 Key Organic Chemical Production in 
UK 1990-1974 
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Source_ Chemistry and industry, A. W. Taylor, The 
Petrochemical Industry - some perspective 
views, 1 January 1977. 
It can be observed that the industry expanded rapidly, 
especially during the last fifteen years for reasons mentioned 
earlier. This rapid expansion was also significantly assisted 
by the availability of petroleum based raw materials. The 
raw material for plants in Europe was a light naphtha, then 
in surplus supply. In-the U. S. LPG was mainly used as feed- 
stock. 
The cracking of naphtha for ethylene yielded a range of 
co-products involving costly purification and separation 
processes (these plants were more complex than those in the 
U. S., based on LPG} which consequently increased the production 
cost of the olefins. The imbalance between the manufacture 
of co-products and the demand as chemicals for the major 
products led to: - efforts for up-grading the worth of the 
co-products from their value as fuel; the development of 
integrated petrochemical complexes and the maximum increase 
in plant sizes commensurate with technical risk and the reduc- 
tion of investment cost per ton of product. 
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The development of the large ethylene plant was absolutely 
necessary if Europe and Japan were to become cost competitive 
with the U. S. production, based on the simpler and artificially 
low costed feedstocks (natural petroleum gases). In order 
to-appreciate the magnitude of this development, it can be 
noted that in the 1950's a large naphtha-based ethylene plant 
produced 50000 tons/year. However, by the end of the 1960's 
the large ethylene plants were producing 500000 tons/year in 
one single train (Taylor, 1977) and currently the production 
of olefins and particularly that of ethylene is the major 
operation of this industry. 
The evolution of the large scale modern petrochemical 
complexes was facilitated by the adaptation of the technology 
of large scale oil refining which decreased investment costs 
per ton of product, and by the spreading of overheads and 
semivariable costs. This trend which was more visible during 
the 1960's led to the provision of capacity ahead of demand in 
order to reap the benefits from large-scale operations. 
However, the consequence of this strategy was that either in 
a down-turn in demand or in anticipation of full plant capacity 
utilization of a new large plant, prices were lowered to unprofit- 
able levels. 
However this era of rapid development, during which profit- 
ability was overlooked in anticipation of larger gains in the 
future, came to an end in the early 1970's. At some point 
during this period the petrochemical industry entered a new era 
in which the factors which had favoured the industry during the 
past two decades began to diminish in their effects. The 
emergence of new producers in Eastern Europe and in the develop- 
ing countries highlighted the overcapacity in the developed 
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countries at a time when the faster substitution phase of 
most petrochemicals other than plastics was tailing off; the 
feedstock costs stopped going down and started to move up 
instead, thus increasing the weight of variable costs over 
fixed costs; the benefits of plant economies of scale reached 
their peak at least for the foreseeable futures (currently a 
growing number of experts, such as L. A. Carmichael, the 
director of process economics, believe that maximum economies 
of scale for ethylene plants have levelled off at about 1.2 
to 1.5 billion lbs/year (Davis, 1978) ); the laws of diminish- 
ing returns began to apply to technical innovation developments 
due, in part, to "non-productive" research such as on pollution 
abatement and toxicology. As a result of these changes the 
growth rates of the industry began to slow down (even without 
the steep price rises of oil in 1973). In terms of the growth 
curve of the industry it can be said that some time during this 
period the petrochemical industry passed through a transition 
from adolescence into maturity. 
The sudden quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 affected the 
slow-down of the industry further. However, the immediate 
effect of the 1973 oil crisis was to promote a world-wide boom 
in petrochemicals in the first half of 1974 as downstream 
customers of petrochemicals stockpiled in advance of the next 
price rise. After that, the important and promising petro- 
chemical business developments that had been built up with the 
developing countries, virtually collapsed (Von der Hyde, 1978). 
In 1973 there were demands for new investments in the 
industry due to the very strong market demand for petrochemical 
products, which lasted up to the middle of 1974. In the 
7" 
developed countries, with high consumption, price increases and 
shortages towards mid 1974 led to changes in buying habits, 
savings on materials and substitution for better cost- 
performance materials. Due to the same reasons their exports 
to the. developing countries did not continue to grow. 
The petrochemical industry regarded the following year of 
recession, 1975, as a realistic adjustment to the changed world 
market situation. Consequently there were hardly any suggest- 
ions of new investments in the industry. The industry also 
realized the impact of the end-user on the demand for petro- 
chemical products. During this period, because of product 
surpluses and differences in production costs in the various 
regions, petrochemicals were subject to price pressures from 
the market at a time when production costs increased due to 
lower plant capacity utilization rates. 
Towards the end of 1975 the petrochemical market situation 
started to recover and this continued in certain areas into 
1976. However, later in that year it became apparent that 
the recovery was to be short-lived and by Autumn 1977 the 
world market receded strongly back to the bottom levels of late 
1974. 
Later, in July 1978 some positive signs of market recovery 
in the more depressed areas of Western Europe and Japan started 
appearing. In order to appreciate the severity of the depres- 
sion throughout these two regions, the ethylene capacity on the 
ground or under construction amounted to some 17 million tons, 
compared to a demand of 11 million tons in 1978 in the former 
region (Champion, 1978) and the ethylene production totalled 
only 3.9 million tons compared with a capacity of 6 million 
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tons in 1977 in Japan (Davis 1978). These large overcapacities 
were partly due to the planning pitfalls that stem from the 1960's. 
During its period of most rapid growth, the 1960's, the petro- 
chemical industry was badly served by forecasts of market 
demand based on: - the optimistic acceptance of exponential 
market growth predictions that led to overcapacity; and the 
double counting of export markets as this industry became more 
international. 
However., more recently some improvements in the planning 
of capacity and a more realistic approach to the estimation 
of future demand for petrochemical products have been adopted. 
On the whole, the petrochemical industry seems to have learnt 
from past mistakes and the consequences of earlier recessions 
have not occurred again. However, in order for the petro- 
chemical industry to get back in balance and remain there, it 
is absolutely essential that the individual firms involved in 
this business adopt a more disciplined approach to new invest- 
ment and pricing than they have in the past. 
1.2 The Main Basic Products 
of the Industry 
The main petrochemical base products are olefins 
(ethylene, propylene and butadiene), aromatics (benzene and 
xylenes). and methanol. These products are produced through 
two major processes known as: - steam cracking, employed 
mostly for the production of olefins, however it can be used 
for the production of aromatics; catalytic reforming, which 
is the source of aromatics. In addition to the above processes, 
steam reforming is employed for the synthesis of ammonia and 
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also methanol. 
There are numerous paths leading from the basic petro- 
chemical products, mentioned above, to the end products (see 
figure 1.2). However, the main routes are as follows: - 
ethylene and propylene are the basis of the most important 
plastics; aromatics are the basis of synthetic fibres (non- 
cellulosic); and butadiene is the basis of the most important 
of synthetic rubbers; and methanol is the basis of formol 
which is one of the constituents of adhesives. Ethylene is 
by far the most important of all the basic petrochemicals and 
its worldwide production is nearly double that of propylene and 
benzene UNIDO/ICIS, 1978). 
1.3 The Main End-Products 
of the industry 
Plastics pxoductlon constitutes more than half of the 
total petrochemical production (excluding fertilizers). The 
output of these products is growing rapidly due to their 
potential demand. 
Concerning the other main end products, such as synthetic 
rubber, fibres and detergents, their production grew very fast 
during the last twenty years due to their rapid substitution 
of the traditional products such as natural rubber, cellulose 
fibres and soap. It should be mentioned that the substitution 
of these products is not complete. The production of these 
products is tapering off due to their already high degree of 
substitution. The growth of the main end products of the 
industry is illustrated in table 1.1 
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Table 1.1 World production of the main end petrochemicals 
Cmillions of tons) 
'1950 1'9 60 1970 '1974 1975 
Plastics 1.5 7.0 30.2 44.6 38.5 
Synthetic fibres 0.1 0.7 5.1 7.5 7.5 
Synthetic rubbers -- 0.7 2.0, 5.9 7.7 7.4 
Detergents 0.7 3.5 9.0 11.0 10.8 
Total 3,0 13.2 50.2 70.8 64.2 
Source: UNIDO/ICIS, First World-wide Study on the 
Petrochemic al Industry : 1975-2000, 
December 19 78. 
1.4 The Raw Material Requirements 
of the Industry 
Generally, petrochemicals possess a higher carbon to 
hydrogen ratio than crude oil. Therefore, the structure of 
the petrochemical industry restricts the choice of the raw 
materials which can be used economically to produce the basic 
building blocks used in the preparation of the organic synthetic 
products. 
The building blocks are produced mainly from naphtha, 
other oil refining cuts and petroleum gases and despite the 
substantial price increases. of oil since 197.3 the raw-material- 
and fuel structure of the industry have remained unchanged. 
However, in the future it will be necessary to upgrade the 
heavy end of the oil barrel concerning the hydrogen required. 
This will be necessary because of the competition in acquiring 
naphtha between the petrochemical industry on one hand and the 
energy and transport industry on the other. Therefore, the 
12 
necessity of flexible multiple feedstock crackers arises even 
at the price of increased investment costs to optimise the 
utilization of the "total" oil barrel in order to reduce the 
raw material supply problem of the industry in the future 
(UNIDO/ICIS, 1978). 
1.5 The Financial Aspects 
of the Industry 
The petrochemical industry is highly capital-intensive 
and the investments involved are of a very large magnitude. 
In recent years the construction costs for plants have 
increased very significantly as demonstrated in table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 Construction cost indexes 
Year Caverage) 
1960 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
'Index 
100 
132 
137.6 
145.9 
155.6 
174.9 
188.9 
202.2 
227 
274 
305.8 
340.6 
Source: BEICIP CBureau d'Etudes Industrielles et de 
Cooperation de L'Institut Francais du Petrole) 
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it can be observed that . the iriczease in costs between 1972 and 
1974 was in fact higher than the inflation rate prevailing at 
the time. This large increase can be considered as being only 
partly a direct result of the rising cost of energy and its 
impact on the manufacturing cost of building materials. 
However, the major part of the rise in construction costs were 
an indirect outcome of the increase in the cost of energy caused 
_by the demand and supply situation. Petrochemical companies, 
`worried about the increasing cost and the supply of energy, 
put massive orders for plants at a time when major plants were 
already under construction thus exacerbating the situation. 
In the latter half of 1974,. the demand for petrochemical products 
fell which consequently affected the construction industry. 
The rise in construction costs became much more moderate and 
a more balanced situation of the supply and demand for plant 
is expected in the future with the effect of the construction 
cost index increasing in line with the general inflation level. 
It is worth mentioning that a new plant constructed in 1977 cost 
nearly double that of a similar plant in 1970. The present high 
investment requirements of major projects will put pressure on 
companies to go to the money markets for external financing and 
also to participate in joint ventures. This is very much unlike 
the golden days of the industry when its very high growth rate 
enabled it to make large investments, sustained innovation 
efforts, and the ability to finance its own activities. The 
oil companies, because of their vast financial resources, are 
today one of the few exceptions in terms of being able to 
finance internally most of their own petrochemical activities. 
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1.6 Ranges of Investment Cost 
for Petrochemical Plants 
Estimated ranges of investment costs per ton of product 
fox 27 major petrochemicals are given in table 1.3. It can 
be observed from this table that investments do not vary as a 
linear function of capacity. In fact they are related by a 
power function whose exponent is 0.7 (or thereabouts) up to 
capacities of about 200000 metric tons/year, and approaches 1 
for capacities of more than 400000 metric tons/year, indicating 
little, if any economy of scale. This is due to the fact that 
at higher capacity, the number of cracking heaters and heat 
exchangers is just proportional to capacity, since at this 
level the biggest capacity units are being installed. in 
addition large towers must be field welded, rather than shop 
fabricated, adding to costs (Davis, 1978). 
Going through the table, it can also be observed that the 
capital costs, per annual ton of product, of the olefins plant 
's lower than that of aromatics. it is also evident that the 
capital costs of intermediate products such as vinyichloride and 
styrene used in the production of plastics are significantly 
lower than those intermediates used in the production of 
synthetic fibres (e. g. caprolactam, DMT). The capital costs 
of plastics and synthetic rubber plants are also much lower 
than those of synthetic fibres. The general conclusions drawn 
from the above analysis are: - firstly, the bigger the plant the 
lower is the installed cost per annual ton of product and 
therefore the advantages of the economies of scale would lead 
to lower production costs, however there is a disadvantage and 
that is, the larger the plant the bigger is the risk of running 
15 
Table 1.3 Estimation of installed cost for 
petrochemical plants 
(Battery limits licence fees included - 1977 European conditions) 
metalled 
Product 
Capacity 
range cost range press-remarks 
10't/year 
pduct product 
Ethylene 200 - 400 650 - 500 Naphtha steam cracking 
Propylene "100 - 200 (1) (1) butadiene extraction 
Butadiene 32 - 64 benzene extraction 
Benzene 58 - 116 toluene hydrodealkilation 
Ethylene 150 - 300 500 - 380 Ethane steam cracking 
Benzene 40 - 66 
O. xylene 38 - 63 520 - 430 Catalytic reforming 
aromatics extraction 
P. Xylene 100 - 165 (2) (2) 
Methanol 
............. 
200. - 500 
......... . 
180 - 150 
. 
Ethylene oxide 60 - 100 370 - 340 Oxygen basic process 
Vinylchloride 100 - 250 370 - 250 Oxychloration including 
ethylbenzene production 
Styrene 100 - 250 400 - 270 
Ac ylonitrile 100 - 250 750 - 520 
Caprolactam 50 - 150 1800 -1150 
DMT 50 - 80 950 - 830 
TPA 70 - 100 880 - 750 lirnco process 
Adipic acid 100 - 150 600 - 500 
Hexamethylene. diamine 30 - 50 500 - 400 
Iow--density polyethylene 50 - 150 800 - 600 
High-density polyethylene 50 - 100 1000 - 800 
Polyvinyl chloride 50 - 100 400 - 340 Suspension process 
Polypropylene 50 - 100 900 - 750 
Polystyrene 30 - 80 700 - 460 
Alkylbenzene' 20 - 40 200 - 170 
Polybutadiene 30 - 50 600 - 530 
SBR 30 - 80 300 - 250 
Nylon fibres (yarns) 5- 12 2300 -1500 Caprolactani Polymerization 
and spinning 
Acrylic. fibres. _(staples) ___ 
10, --15 1450--! w--1400 - Acrylonitrile-polymeriza-- tion and spinning 
polyester fibres (staples 10 - 15 1450 TPA polymerization and 
and yarns) spinning 
C1) Per ton of ethylene (2) Per ton of aranatics 
Source: UNIDO/ICIS.,. First World-Wide Study on the Petrochemical 
Industry: 1975 - 2000, Decanber 1978. 
I 
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below capacity for longer periods; secondly, the majority of 
the products within the larger capacity ranges fall within the 
lower capital cost ranges; finally, plastics, synthetic rubbers 
and their intermediate and basic rdw-materials are generally 
produced in plants of larger sizes with lower capital costs per 
annual ton of product, whereas synthetic fibres and their 
intermediate and basic raw materials are produced in plants of 
comparatively smaller sizes with higher capital costs per annual 
ton of product. 
1.7 The Production Cost Structure 
of the Industry 
The production costs of olefins and aromatics are affected 
by the cost of raw materials, energy, manpower, the total invest- 
ment, also the plant size and the year in which the plant was 
built. 
One of the dominant factors in raising the production costs 
is the upward trend in the price of oil used as raw material and 
also as energy which is well demonstrated by figure 1.3 describ- 
ing the impact of the increase in price of oil on olefins and 
their intermediate and end products. It can be observed that 
the impact is less further down the stream. Table 1.4 presents 
a more thorough analysis of this impact on petrochemicals, taking 
as an example the production of ethylene. Analysing the produc- 
tion costs, it can be observed that the cost of raw materials 
increased more than 6 times whereas the total production cost 
increased 3.6 times from 1972 to 1977. Another important 
aspect of the above analysis is the total production cost 
advantage, of nine percent, of the plant built in 1972 over an 
17 
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Table 1.4 Increase in olefins manufacturing cost 
(mid--19771 
I ý- 
Naphtha 
, 
Steam : cracking 
Naphtha 
Steam. carack i pg 
Naphtha 
Steam cracking 
Capacity tons/y ethylene 300 000 300 000 300 000 
Econcmic conditions Prevailing Prevailing Prevailing in 
in 1972 in 1977 1977. Unit 
. erected 
in 
1972. Invest- 
ment in 1972 
Fixed capital cost NM $ 104 184.3 104 
Manufacturing cost N$ 
Raw materials c/ 21 150 129 600 129 600 
Utilities 1 080 2 200 2 200 
Catalysts & chemicals 620 1 000 1 000 
Manpower" 700 1 100, 1 100 
Other charges / 6 750 12 000 12 000 
Amortization & return 19 800 35 WO 19 800 
Total manufacturing cost 50 100 180 900 165 700 
Products prices & sales d/ $/ton $/ton $/ton 
10' t/y 
Ethylene 300 90 315 b/ 280 
Propylene 139 55 193 / 172 
Butadiene 38.2 150 520 b/ 465 
Propane LPG 12 32 130 130 
Butane LPG 44.2 32 130 130 
Gasoline 195.8 45 168 188 
I -, 
Maintenance, overhead expenses, insurance, general facilities, 
interest on working capital. 
Patio of olefins prices have been kept constant in the table. 
In fact, ratio between ethylene and propylene prices is slightly 
decreasing from 1972 (1.6) to 1977 (1.4). Ratio of ethylene 
versus butadiene prices is now close to 0.9. Olefins prices 
corresponding to 1977 conditions, considering these present ratios, 
would be as follows: Ethylene 320 $/ton, Propylene 220 $/ton 
Butadiene 370 $/ton 
cf Rawinaterial naphtha = 960,000 ton/year 
d/ Products: Ethylene - 300,000 ton/year Propylene - 139,000 ton/year 
Butadiene - 38,200 "" Propane -- 12,000 "" 
Butane - 44,200 " it Gasoline - 195,000 " it 
Source: UNIDO/ICIS, First World-Wide study on the-Petrochemical 
Industry: 1975 - 2000, December 1978 
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identical plant built in 1977. This is entirely due to the 
historical cost accounting conventions and the companies 
operating on this basis will find it extremely difficult to 
finance the replacement of their old plants at the end of their 
useful life under inflationary conditions (Elbedeiwy, 1979). 
it is also evident that during this period, the fixed 
costs decreased sharply from nearly forty percent to just under 
twenty percent. The variable costs consisting of feedstocks 
and utilities are now very much dominating, having risen from 
44.4 percent in 1972 to 72.9 percent in 1977 and 79.5 percent 
for a plant built in 1972. Because of this dominance, the 
effects of economies of scale and consequently the necessity 
of building as large a plant as possible have declined to a 
certain extent since 1973. This is justified when considering 
that a 15 percent increase in the price of feedstocks for a 
100000 tons/year styrene plant operating at full capacity would 
-bring manufacturing costs 
to the same level as those of a 65000 
tons/year plant. On the other hand an increase of 20% in 
investment costs due perhaps to a location requiring greater 
construction costs because of undesirable local circumstances 
would have the same effect (UNIDO/ICIS, 1978). 
Another reason behind the diminishing importance of build- 
ing larger plants is due to the huge investments involved in 
such plants, requiring continuous production at a rate as close 
to the full capacity as possible otherwise great losses can 
occur. There is a break-even point between 75 to 80% (Davis, 
19781. Below that the plant is running at a loss and especially 
in the case of large plants (500000 ton/year or more) the losses 
20 
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are very substantial indeed. To illustrate this point the 
production costs for a 200000 tons/year styrene plant working 
at 80% capacity are equal to those of a 100000 tons/year plant 
working at full capacity WUNIDO/ICIS, 1978). 
Table 1.5 presents the manufacturing costs of 17 major 
intermediates and end petrochemicals for average plant sizes. 
1.. 8 The Worldwide Assessment of the Industry: - 
Past, Present and Future 
In recent years the general slow-down of the economy in 
industrialized countries coupled with the massive increases in 
production costs have slowed-down the petrochemical market 
growth. However, the decline has been limited due to the 
simultaneous higher price increases of the competitive natural 
products. 
The declining petrochemical market growth has caused over- 
capacity in the industry. Because of this very undesirable 
phenomenon, delays in capacity additions and/or the construction 
of new petrochemical complexes are anticipated until there is 
more harmony between supply and demand. Meanwhile, the industry 
faces extremely serious difficulties concerning market outlets 
and competition. 
1.9 The Factors Affecting the 
Demand for Petrochemicals 
Income and standard of living constitute the most important 
factors responsible for the growth of the demand of petrochemical 
products. The elasticity per caput of most petrochemical 
products has been quite high in most regions, the most dynamic 
22 
of which are the pla. stics'. _ 
Csee_ tAhle. 1.6Z` 
The degree o suhst tut&on of petrochemicals is the second 
most important factor in the growth of demand and provided the 
product is well suited to the demand in its sector of application, 
then the initial growth rate is fast followed by a slow-down as 
a relative point of saturation is reached. There onwards the 
market growth resembles that of the sector of application as a 
whole. 
Further, the degree of substitution does not generally 
exceed 80 percent of the whole market. It should also be 
mentioned that the potential market for plastics is practically 
unlimited especially in packaging, transport and the construction 
industry and the future annual demand is expected to be in the 
order of hundreds of kilos per capita. Synthetic rubber and 
fibres on the other hand have a much smaller potential market 
and their future annual demands are expected to be in the order 
of tens of kilos per capita (UNIDOJICIS, 1978). 
Price is another factor affecting the demand for petrochemicals. 
As expected, the demand varies in inverse proportion to the price 
and this phenomenon is very well demonstrated by the growth in 
demand for plastics during the sixties and early seventies encour- 
aged by the fall in prices Lconstant value) of. these products 
during the same period due to technological improvements, larger 
production units and strong competition between manufacturers. 
These factors together with overcapacity in some cases depressed 
prices to levels very close to. production costs. In order to 
put the effect of the overcapacity on the profitability of the 
industry into perspective it can be noted that for example in 
1977 a 20 percent drop in the output of a large plant required 
23 
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an uncompetitive 'rase ý, n price of 13 percent to conlpensate. 
When considering a large ethylene 'pl, 4nt . 
C50000Q tons/year) , 
the capital charges and return on capital required'are 50 percent 
of the total cost less the value'of chemical byproducts at full 
production, but increase to a dominating 60 percent when operating 
at two thirds of capacity [see figure 1.41. 
Fig. 1.4 Ethylene Production 
Effect of Reduced Occupacity 
65 
60 
U 
U 
55 
44 
ý`° 50 
60 70 80 90 100 
% Plant Occupacity 
Source: Chemistry and Industry, A. W. Taylor, The 
Petrochemical Industry - Some perspective views, 
1 January 1977 
This strengthens the fact that the basic olefins and aromatics 
manufacture, that is necessary to the economy, based on feed- 
stocks which are coproduced in oil refining, producing a number 
of intermediates as coproducts in ratios not necessarily accord- 
ing to the demand structure, is not necessarily stable and 
therefore needs profits relative with the risk involved in such 
investments. 
In the past, prices were significantly greater than production 
costs and were mainly determined by competition with natural 
products. Because of their quality and low production costs, 
25 
petgochemi, cals could-be j axketed iAt px;, ces substantja l1X 
higher than theiz. costs1 thegeb4 9enerattng large profits 
enabling companies to self finance new px: o j ects and research,. 
Prior to 1967 the industry mainly consisted of small produc- 
tion units and therefore those manufacturers capable of using 
large single stream units were happy to let the smaller manu- 
facturers set a "price umbrella" under which they themselves 
acquired huge profits without endangering the interests of 
their competitors. 
However from 1967 onwards the increasing number of larger 
production plants, coming on stream, affected the prices more 
and more to the extent that current prices are relatively down 
. 
Capart from the temporary boom in 1974) to the level required 
by the biggest manufacturers to provide them with. an adequate 
return on investment. 
The boom during 1973-1974 was mainly due to. the over- 
estimation of the coming increase in price of oil by the 
petrochemical processors, who then increased their stocks in 
order to safeguard against a future increase (Champion, 1978). 
The supply and demand situation also hindered the increase in 
prices. Tables 1.7 and 1.8 illustrate respectively the inter- 
national price trends for 17 petrochemicals during 1970 - 76 and 
the huge price rises suffered by Western European contract prices 
for 21 petrochemicals between January 1974 to July 1975 compared 
to 1972. it can be observed that the change in contract prices 
did not resemble the increases in raw materials and investment 
costs which have so deeply influenced the production cost structure 
of petrochemicals, especially those of the basic products. 
During 1972 - 1976 the price of naphtha increased by about 600 
26 
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Table 1.8 Contract prices indexes 
PRODUCT AVERAGE 1972 
JAN. 
1974 
JULY 
1974 
JAN. 
1975 
JULY 
1975 
ETHYLENE 1,00 280-345 310-340 290-350 290-340 
PROPYLENE 100 200 325 310 295 
BUMDIENE 100 260 290 255 210 
BENZIN 100 350-380 435-470 370-400 310-335 
OIýPHOXYLENE 100 405 425 290 250 
P1 XYLENE 100 160 375 350 260 
PHENOL 100 395-465 465-475 310-375 250-295 
1CE'1'0NE 100 290 420 320-370 320 
PHrLIC ANHYDRIDE 100 420 370 210 210 
DIOCTYLPHIAIATE 100 215 290 225 195 
STYRENE 100 300 360 240 200 
ETHYLENE OXIDE 100 110 250 250 225 
LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 100 130-160 185-210 165-185 115-125 
HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 100 170 185 160 150 
POLYSTYRENE 100 135-150 190-250 180-240 140-170 
POLYPMPYLENE 100 140 150 130 115 
P. V. C. 100 135 170 155 145 
NYLON YARN : 100 135 115-120 80-95 
POLYE57M YARNL 100 100 78 60-70 
ACRYLIC FIBRE 100 130 105 90-95 
S. B. R. (Early 19731 100 140 167 178 175 
Source: European Chemical News, 3 October 1975 
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percent, whereas during the sne perýod the price og ethylene 
increased-by 360 percents Thexefore, *. it -can_be. concluded that 
if naphtha-related production costs of ethylene are approximated 
to be around 72 percent of the total costs then the ethylene 
price rises have matched rather well the naphtha price rises but 
have not taken into account the capital cost inflation due mainly 
to overcapacity which kept prices down (UNIDO/ICIS, 1978). 
However, it is expected that in the future the overall situa- 
tion will tend towards equilibrium and that price trends will be 
more related to the variation in the production cost elements. 
Therefore, the production costs will in fact be dependent on two 
major factors: - firstly, the price of crude oil; secondly, the 
overall inflation Cgeneral price index charges: investment related, 
manpower, maintenance, etc. ). Zn 1978 the respective shares of 
the prices, of some petrochemicals, that are expected to vary in 
the future according to the crude oil price and the general infla- 
tion were estimated and are given in table 4.5 (in section 4.9). 
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CH ! PTER 2 
THE OIL COMPANIES' DIVERSIFICATION 
INTO PETROCHEMICALS 
30 
2.1 The Reasons, Strategies and Justification 
of the Oil Companies Forward Integration 
into Petrochemicals 
The multinational oil companies haýve'the'perceived aim of 
diversifying the±i resources to. _become energy companies and to 
find pro ß, table outlets for their large'cash flows. To this 
end, they are diverting a larger portion of their total invest- 
ments into downstream petrochemical operations from basic to 
intermediate to "commodity, type" end petrochemicals. This 
strategy is well demonstrated, for example, by Shell's capital 
expenditure in chemicals manufacturing which has increased from 
nearly 7% of the Company's total capital expenditure in 1974 to 
nearly 22% in 1978 
Company, 19781. 
(annual Report of Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the businesses of the oil companies 
which are defined byproducts-representing various stages of 
conversion of the basic resource. 
Figure 2.1 
Dcn Lnant 
natural 
resource 
sell in 
raw form 
The Businesses of the Oil Companies 
rsion to UConversion to Conversion 
basic interntediate to final form 
products 
sell as basic 
products 
products 
sell as 
intexndiate 
products 
products 
sell to 
processing 
industry 
As a consequence of substantial capital expenditure their 
petrochemical manufacturing capacity and market share is growing, 
compared to that of the other manufacturers. For example in 
1978 the U. S. production capacities of basic products had 
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jncgeased bX neA)qlX 6Q$ of the 1-974 c. ýacjt level (UNIDQ/T. CTS { 
1978L and the. oji companies accounted for. ' 85% of this jncXease 
(for more information see tables 2.1 and 2,21 
The questions arising now . axe; -- Why are 
'they increasing 
their involvement in the petrochemical industry? How are they 
increasing their activities? Finally, is their move into the 
chemicals business a 
. 
good proposition? 
Concerning the first question, it should be mentioned that 
an oil company has as a key strength access to large quantities 
of oil and gas that is used extensively in a wide range of products 
And market applications-. However, the world's reserves of oil 
are depleting very fast and this has caused concern among the oil 
companies in looking for changes in the'areas of its application 
in order to utilize the lighter and the more expensive fraction 
of this resource in the areas with highest returns and to make 
much more use of the heavier and the less expensive fraction in 
the energy and transport sector. To this end they have been 
considering areas with as much value added as possible, especially- 
petarochemicals. This choice seems to be justified when consider- 
ing' the very high-manufacturing value added by the petrochemical 
industry. At the time when the price of crude oil, in the U. S., 
was 9 Dollars/barrel, the value of this barrel increased to 13 
Dollars when refined and sold as gasoline. The same barrel of 
crude oil upgraded to a petrochemical intermediate such as 
glycerine was worth about 50 Dollars. Further processed into 
petrochemical end products, the value of the barrel of crude oil 
went up to between 100 and 200 Dollars (UNIDO/ICIS, 1978). 
Another important aspect'of the first question, concerns the 
chemical affiliates of the oil companies who no longer enjoy the 
privilege of receiving more raw-materials, at discriminatory prices, 
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thgn the chen cal coji n&er, due to the. *? 7ecent t 9htenj n5 og the 
supply situation, J'ha; og to 1973, '. ch*jcal producegs could 
purchase naphtha or gas liquids at low prices due to the surplus 
of supplies. However( this is not so any more due to the faster 
growth. of demand for the light end of the barrel compared to the 
heavy end. 
The U. S. petrochemical industry faces the same problem 
concerning the supply of feedstocks due'to the exhaustion of its 
natural gas reserves during the past decades. As a measure of 
decline it can. be noted that. by 1985 only 50% of the U. S. ethylene 
production is, expected to be based on LPG compared to 75% in 1979 
(Joseph., 19791. Consequently, this raw material is not cheap 
Any more. ' In the future petrochemical plants will have to be 
based entirely on naphtha and gas oil, the prices of which will 
be determined through: competition with the energy and transport 
industry. Consequently, due to the feedstock supply situation 
the oil companies have an advantage over petrochemical companies 
in the control of a variety of raw materials some of which may be 
cheaper than others at any given time due to the significant price 
fluctuations, either for seasonal or structural reasons. They 
also have the advantage, through. further processing, in upgrading 
the sales value of return streams (e. g. mixed gases, 'pyrolysis 
gasoline and heavy residues such as pitch) from steam crackers 
based on liquid feedstocks. However, this advantage can only 
be realized if a close inter-relationship exists between the 
chemical producer and the operator of a large refinery complex. 
Concerning the second question, it can be observed from 
table 2.3 that the oil companies are active in commodity (i. e. 
basic and intermediate) and some even pushing further downstream 
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into the commodity type (i. e. large tonnage thermoplastics) 
petrochemicals. Commodity. chemicals are defined. as chemicals 
sold on the basis of their specifications only and not by their 
performance on a downstream processing machine, or in a product 
incorporating or made from the chemical in question. Therefore, 
the marketing of commodity chemicals is relatively uninvolved 
and depends mainly on the price. 
Table 2.3 Main chemical interests for oil Companies 
Products 
o 
A-1 
monarers for plastics * 
Thermoplastics 
Fabricated plastics/packaging 
GP rubbers * 
Speciality rubbers * 
Ethylene oxide & derivs. 
Propylene oxide & derivs. 
Fiber intermediates * 
Plasticizers/detergents 
Thermosetting resins 
Chemical solvents 
Hydrocarbon solvents 
Fertilizers 
Agrochenicals 
Oil additives 
Speciality chemicals 
Coatings 
Inorganic products 
Source: W. C. Thomson, "Oil and/or Chemical Refineries", 
Hydrocarbon Processing, February 1978. 
However, only a very small number of the oil companies 
have actually participated in the high chemistry areas such as 
dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, fine chemicals and intermediates and 
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their total investments in these areas are very small indeed. 
For example, even though most oil companies produce the 
intermediates used in the production of synthetic fibres, 
very few are actually producing the end products. 
Further the power relationships between oil and petro- 
chemical multinationals conform to a pattern approaching lasting 
co-operation, where the strength of their respective staying 
powers (implies the dominant possession and/or control of an 
object of negotiation) are basically complementary and not 
conflicting, and it is characterized by a mutual respect. 
This situation is reflected in their long-standing involvement 
in basic products, where oil companies through joint ventures 
and/or supply arrangements provide the larger portion of the 
petrochemical industry's needs for basic petrochemicals. 
This situation is practically generalized throughout the world 
with the exception of several U. S. petrochemical companies such 
as DOW that have basic olefins production based on associated 
gases and some EEC petrochemical companies such as ICI which 
produces basic petrochemicals in collaboration with Phillips 
Petroleum at the oil refining end (Thomson, 1978). Further 
examples of this co-operation is given by BP's joint ventures 
with Bayer and with Rhone Poulenc, and Shell with BASF in the 
production of basic petrochemicals during the past two decades. 
On the other hand Hoechst has had supply arrangements with 
Caltex and Marathon. 
There is no distinction between oil and petrochemical 
companies in Italy due to their respective forward and backward 
integration during the past. 
In the U. S. companies such as Dow, Union Carbide and 
Monsanto worried about the security of their basic petrochemical 
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supply sources and also because of 'certain economical 
advantages have built up large basic petrochemical plants. 
As regards their future investment intentions, a policy of 
self sufficiency in basic petrochemicals as opposed to manufac- 
turing an excess amount for sale on the markets is expected. 
By contrast, prior to 1973 companies such as DuPont although 
worried about the cost and the source of their basic raw 
materials preferred to depend wholly on the purchases of 
these materials, mainly through the multinational oil companies. 
However, because of the tightening of the supply situation since 
1973 DuPont has been recently discussing with Atlantic Richfield. 
about the possibility of a joint cracker, so are Monsanto with 
Conoco, and ICI and Solvay with Champlin (Thomson, 1978). 
Concerning the third question of whether the oil companies 
move into the petrochemicals business is a good proposition it 
must be mentioned that the oil companies have been accused of 
being responsible for the overcapacity prevailing during the 
1960's. Today, the main worry of the petrochemical companies 
is the possibility of the oil companies causing the same problem 
in the future which will be disastrous for the whole industry. 
This entails a very thorough study of the impact of any future 
capacity expansions on the future supply and demand relationships. 
However, there are already signs that the petrochemical 
producers have adopted a more conservative approach towards 
expansion policies. Therefore the supply and demand situation 
is expected to be much more balanced in the future, as opposed 
to the late 1960's and the early 1970's. 
Another point regarding the third question concerns the 
cost advantage of the oil companies. Since 1973 there has been 
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a major shift in the production costs of petrochemicals 
(especially those of basic products). Thus the oil companies 
have in this area an advantage over petrochemical companies 
and their cost edge is extended further down as far as the large 
tonnage plastics. However, it should also be mentioned that 
the oil companies will find it extremely difficult to compete 
in terms of cost efficiency with some petrochemical companies 
specializing in certain petrochemicals. 
At this point it is very important to discuss and examine 
the diversification of a number of oil companies into the 
petrochemical business. It is also beneficial to know how 
the traditional chemical companies view the petrochemical 
activities of the multinational oil companies and to find out 
how they cope with the competition from them. 
2.2 The Analysis of the Diversification of a Number 
of Oil Companies into Petrochemicals 
Traditionally the oil companies operate their different 
businesses, including petrochemicals, under strict secrecy 
due to their competitors and the host governments. Therefore, 
it is extremely difficult to find out about their. petrochemical 
activities and the only sources of information available are 
their own published reports which contain the minimum informa- 
tion required by their shareholders, and certain articles appear- 
ing from time to time in chemical journals. In this section 
of Chapter 2 we shall discuss a recent interview made with the 
top executives of a number of oil companies (Lurie, 1979) during 
which they discussed their chemical businesses and we will also 
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comment on the truth of what the companies said by referring 
to information sources where available. 
The oil companies argue that petrochemicals are a 
natural extension of the hydrocarbon business because the 
technology is similar and the oil companies had the feedstocks 
and the cashflow. Concerning the technology factor the 
petrochemical companies have repeatedly accused the oil 
companies of buying their way into the petrochemicals business 
by licensing their technology. However, this does not hold 
entirely when considering that some of the oil companies 
actually helped to create the petrochemical business. For 
example in the case of Exxon the creation dates back to 1920 
when a small plant at the company's Linden, New Jersey, 
refinery produced isopropyl alcohol in commercial quantities. 
Later in 1930's it invented butyl rubber. There are other 
numerous examples such as, Acrylonitrile by Sohio, High-density 
polyethylene by Phillips, terephthalic acid by Amoco and Mobil, 
the development of the manufacturing process for linear 
surfactant alcohols (Alfol) by Conoco, the development of a 
new oxidation process for propylene oxide by ARCO, a new 
process for making moulds and cores without using heat by 
Ashland, the development of the first process to manufacture 
ammonia from natural gas 50 years ago by Shell. Shell also 
built the first plants to manufacture synthetic ammonia from 
natural gas; built the first plants to make synthetic glycerine 
and styrene - butadiene rubber; and were the first to produce 
ethyl alcohol via hydration of'ethylene. 
Of course not every oil company built on its own technology. 
Some companies bought their way in; some developed new products 
and some did both. 
Concerning the feedstock factor the oil companies argue 
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that their current market share in the petrochemicals business 
is not due to their subsidizing of chemical operations by 
pricing feedstocks below market prices and that more importantly, 
all their business decisions have always been made viewing 
market alternatives. However, as discussed earlier'in section 
2.1, the oil companies have access to cheaper feedstocks which 
would consequently affect their competitiveness against the 
traditional chemical companies. 
Finally, with regard to the cashflow factor, high cash 
generation and restricted investment opportunities often leads 
to attempts at diversification (Moslehshirazi, 1979). However 
in the case of the oil companies' diversification into the 
chemical business,. the chemical companies have often accused 
them of being adversaries of the chemical business, overlooking 
the sizable investments made by the oil companies in support of 
the rapidly growing chemical industry. In the future, even 
larger investments will be required by the industry especially 
in the U. S. because of the declining natural gas production 
which will force the decisions to build heavy-liquid crackers 
costing more than 500 million dollars. The capital expenditure 
required for these plants, coupled with a large co-production 
of associated energy products, significantly limits the list 
of companies who can participate on a stand alone basis. 
Concerning the associated energy products, it is worth mention- 
ing that a typical 1.5 billion lbs/year olefins plant processes 
70000 bbls/day of gas oil or other feeds,, and turns out a number 
of-products (high-octane blending stocks for gasoline and fuel 
oil) for which an independent petrochemical company has no 
logistical and marketing networks. An obvious answer, and one 
being seen more and more, is a greater move to form joint 
ventures, including oil company partners (the examples of 
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which are given in section 2.1). Only very few chemical 
companies have the cashflow capacity to undertake such an 
investment, and none without jeopardizing their ability to 
invest in downstream products. 
2.2.1 The investments of the oil companies 
in the chemical industry 
The oil companies have been investing very 
heavily in the petrochemical industry during the 
recent decades. For example, the capital investments 
of Shell's chemical subsidiary in the U. S. for the 
1976-78 period increased to a massive sum of 1.7 
billion dollars which was three to four times the 
petrochemical industry's average, relative to company 
size (Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies' Financial 
and Operational Information, 1969-78). A further 
500 million dollars is being invested on an olefins 
complex that will be completed at Norco, Los Angeles, 
in 1981, which will make Shell the largest U. S. ethylene 
manufacturer (see table 2.2). 
Exxon's investments are no less impressive 
and the company claims to be the fifth-largest chemical 
company in the U. S. and thirteenth-largest in the world. 
It has currently a number of projects under construction 
including a low-density polyethylene plant in Texas and 
an ethylene plant in Scotland. 
Gulf made a significant new round of expansions 
during the 1976-79 period which doubled its ethylene and 
propylene capacities and increased its LDPE and HDPE 
capacities. The expansion also included entry into 
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new areas such as polypropylene and polystyrene. 
Mobil doubled its ethylene capacity in the 
early 1970's and later in 1977 acquired Styrenics 
(Polystyrene and ABS resins) from Dart Industries. 
In 1962 Mobil acquired Krondite, makers of plastic 
clotheslines and plastic bags which became the basis 
for its plastics division and today it claims to be 
the largest manufacturer of disposable plastic products. 
"Texaco has also been investing heavily on 
productive capacity for aromatics, olefins, ethylene 
glycol, urethane and chemical additives for oils and 
greases. The petrochemical division has been receiving 
roughly 10% of the Corporation's capital budget, which 
runs to 1-1.5 billion dollars/year. 
Continental oil's Conoco chemicals, is claimed 
to be one of the most successful petrochemical divisions 
of an oil company (Lurie, 1979). It has centred its 
investments in mainly two areas, surfactants and PVC. 
Conoco entered the surfactants business in 1948 with 
a 25 million lbs/year detergent alkylate plant at 
Baltimore and kept adding to capacity, integrated 
backward with the construction of a plant to extract 
paraffins from kerosine, then integrated forward to 
convert alkylates to sulfonates. Today, Conoco 
together with its Spanish and Japanese affiliates 
account for one third of the world's detergent alkylate 
production. Conoco entered the PVC market by acquiring 
Carbon, a plastic pipe manufacturer, in 1964. This 
was followed with the purchase of Thomson Apex, a 
producer of resins. VCM and ethylene plants were 
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built four years later. The olefins complex provided 
backward integration for PVC and Alfol alcohol. 
Conoco is expanding its ethylene capacity further by 
bringing on stream, in 1980, an ethylene cracker which 
is a joint venture with Monsanto. 
Phillips has recently made substantial invest- 
ments in order to increase its ethylene and high-density 
polyethylene capacity. The company is particularly 
rich in cyclohexane accounting for nearly half the U. S. 
total. 
Among the relative newcomers, Standard Oil's 
Amoco Chemicals is one which has done the most catching 
up, primarily through vast capital investments. Amoco's 
rate of spending between 1967-77 was three times that of 
the industry's average, relative to company size which 
consequently: - quadrupled Amoco's para-xylene capacity 
to reach 37% of the industry's total in the U. S. ; more 
than tripled purified terephthalic acid capacity (45% of 
industry total in the U. S. ) ;. increased ethylene capacity 
by 2 billion lbs/year; and more than tripled propylene 
capacity. The foundation for Amoco's pre-eminence in 
terephthalates was laid in 1956 with acquisition of 
Mid-Century Corporation from Scientific Design. Amoco 
Chemicals was organised a year after the Mid-Century 
acquisition to combine Standard's aromatics marketing 
activities and adapted that company's techniques for 
commercial production of purified terephthalic acid. 
Today it is Amoco's biggest single product and its 
technology is licensed worldwide. In the 1964-75 
period, Amoco also acquired 10 companies, mostly 
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fabricators of plastic household products which were 
to be supplied for their raw materials by the polymer 
resin plants being built during the same period. 
The largest single acquisition, about 100 million 
dollars, was Avisun, maker of polypropylene resin 
and film. Avisun's 50% share in Palchogue-Plymouth 
put Amoco into the fabrics business. Amoco's capital 
budget was around 230 million dollars in 1978 and 1979 
and is expected to grow to about 300 million dollars/ 
year by 1984. The company's investment in 1979 
focused on downstream operations: additional plastic 
bottle (PET) plants (the company has five such units 
and plans five more) and other products, such as carpet 
backing, that use its raw materials. 
Occidental's initial investment in the chemical 
business was the acquisitions of Best Fertilizers and 
Jefferson Lake Sulphur (and its subsidiary Jefferson 
Lake Petrochemicals of Canada Ltd. ) in 1963. However, 
the company's real move into the petrochemicals came 
five years later, in 1968. 
Arco's investments are mainly in organic 
chemicals, thermoplastics resins, aromatics, fertilizers 
and chemical intermediates. Its position is especially 
dominating in proplyene oxide with nearly half the 
industry's capacity in the U. S. The company has plants 
currently under construction for making MTBE, a high 
octane blending component, and PMDI, used in urethane 
plastics. 
Ashland's initial investment in petrochemicals 
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was in the addition of an aromatics unit to a refinery 
in the early fifties. -Ten years later it developed 
the technology to build the first petroleum naphthalene 
plant in the world. By 1967 Ashland had spent some 
$200 million on plants and acquisitions and put them 
all together to form Ashland Chemical. Ashland Chemical 
includes two businesses, each of which may be unique for 
an oil company's subsidiary: distribution of chemicals, 
and foundry products. 
2.2.2 Sales and profitabilities of the petrochemical 
businesses of the oil companies 
The petrochemical sales of the oil companies 
have increased rapidly during the last two decades. 
In 1962 the oil companies' share was less than 1.7 
billion dollars or just 6% of the industry's total 
of 29.3 billion dollars in the U. S. However, by 
1978 the petrochemical sales of the 24 major U. S. oil 
companies reached 24 billion dollars which was 16% of 
the petrochemical industry's total of about 150 billion 
dollars. 
Concerning the profitability of the industry, 
an unpublished report prepared for one chemical company 
gives the operating profit margin (i. e. ROI) of repres- 
entative group of oil companies' chemical divisions in the 
6-7% range for 1976 and 5-6% for 1977; and the operating 
margins for five top chemical companies in the 7-19% 
range for 1976 and 7-16% for 1977. Further, several 
consultants, the names of whom have not been revealed 
(Lurie, 1979), believe that the petrochemical divisions 
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of the oil companies fail the profitability test 
and justify their belief by pointing to the sales 
and earnings of the chemical subsidiaries of 24 major 
U. S. oil companies in 1978 and their respective changes 
since 1977 (see table 2.4). However, the above 
conclusion, based upon only the sales and the earnings 
for a particular year and their changes since the 
previous year, is not necessarily valid. In order 
to examine the profitability of a particular company 
it is necessary to study a number of performance 
measures including the rate of return on investment, 
long-term rather than short-term profitability, etc. 
The long-term approach is essential in such an examina- 
tion because companies do go through periods of rapid 
expansion in assets and also at. times do sell off 
undesirable assets which would consequently affect 
measures such as the ones mentioned above. 
We shall now discuss and evaluate the businesses 
of the subsidiaries of a number of major oil companies 
in more detail in order to see how they compare against 
the studies mentioned above. 
Royal Dutch/Shell group (the 40-60 Anglo-Dutch) 
has the largest chemical business of any oil company. 
The company's 1978 sales reached 4.9 billion dollars 
(Royal_Dutch/Shell Group of companies' Financial and 
Operational Information, 1969-78). Shell U. K. Ltd. 
is the second largest petrochemical manufacturer after 
ICI. The company claims that it had a modest profit 
on petrochemicals in the U. K. in the first six months 
of 1979, in contrast to a 30 million dollars loss in 
1978. 
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Table 2.4 Sales and Earnings of the Petrochemical 
Subsidiaries of the oil Companies 
Sales 
Total Change 
in from 
(Millions of dollars) 1978 1977 
Earnings* 
Total Change 
in from 
1978 1977 
Exxon Corp. $4,653.01 +11.1% $268.0 
Shell Oil 2,710.01 +16.4 100.0 
Standard Oil (Ind. ) 1,831.6 +12.6 45.52 
Gulf Oil 1,752.01 +38.8 81.0 
Occidental Petroleum 1,719.4 + 6.0 38.52 
Phillips Petroleum 1,536.01 + 8.9 60.02 
Atlantic Richfield 1,512.0 +22.4 91.0 
Mobil Corp. 1,361.01 +13.1 153.0 
Texaco Inc. 935.91 + 4.7 54.72 
Ashland Oil 882.9 +10.4 15.72 
Standard Oil (Calif. ) 
- 
831.0 +12.0 25.02 
Tenneco Inc. 808.0 -3 54.0 
Conoco 680.81 +35.0 61.32 
Union Oil of Calif. 678.1 +20.9 105.2 
Cities Service 415.81 + 3.5 16.04 
Kerr-McGee 375.4 +16.0 . 
37.0 
Standard Oil (Ohio) 327.7 + 4.1 19.7 
Northern Natural Gas 235.3 + 4.8 12.92 
El Paso Co. 206.4 + 5.3 15.7 
Houston Natural Gas 175.6 + 8.1 29.64 
American Petrofina 167.9 - 3.8 22.0 
Pennzoil Co. 151.5 + 5.0 34.7 
Getty Oil 125.5 - 3.9 18.0 
Clark Oil 23.3 + 2.0 6.1 
+20.7% 
-17.0 
+14.8 
+ 8.0 
-52.5 
-20.0 
+18.2 
+16.8 
- 7.4 
+97.4 
-13.8 
3 
+12.4 
+67.2 
-50.2 
NA 
-36.7 
- 2.2 
-57.5 
+22.5 
+47.1 
+ 5.7 
-31.0 
- 7.2 
Pre-tax operating income, unless otherwise noted. 
1Including transfers to the company's other divisions. 
2Net 
after-tax income. 
3Company 
made significant acquisitions in 1977-1978; 
comparable 1977 data not reported. 
4 Including equity in earnings of chemical affiliates. 
Source: "Oil and Chemicals Era of peaceful co-existence"q Chemical Week, 17 October 1.979. 
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Exxon's sales of chemicals have increased from 
295 million dollars in 1960 to nearly 4.7 billion dollars 
in 1978 (see table 2.4). The company claims that its 
chemical division's return on capital employed was 12.01% 
in 1978 and that during the 1974-78 period its returns 
have been comparable with the return on capital employed 
of other major U. S. chemical companies (the ranges of which 
were given earlier). 
Mobil's chemical division has also grown very 
rapidly during the past two decades. Its sales have 
increased from 7 million dollars in 1960 to nearly 1.4 
billion dollars in 1978 and the parent company has 
expressed satisfaction with the return on its chemical 
sales. 0 
Conoco is one of the most profitable petrochemical 
divisions of an oil company. Its 1978 net earnings of 
61 million, on sales of 680 million dollars, exceeded 
its 1960 sales of 55 million dollars. The company claims 
a 35-40% return on assets and credits it to low cost 
incremental expansions, high value added, the highest 
sales per employee in the industry and strong emphasis 
on R and D. 
Gulf achieved chemical sales of $1.752 billion 
dollars in 1978. The company claims that its chemical 
profits are marginally better than oil and considerably 
more volatile (no figures available). 
Phillips's sales of petrochemicals have increased 
from 195 million in 1960 to an estimated 2 billion dollars 
in 1978. Phillips. 's chemical division attributes 
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breakthroughs in its laboratories as being largely 
responsible for its strength in some key chemicals, 
notably carbon black, synthetic rubber and polyethylene 
plastics. The parent company claims that the return 
on capital between the parent company and its chemical 
subsidiary (no figures available) have been varying from 
year to year due to the narrowing of the gap between the 
cost and the price of petrochemicals. For the longer 
term the company expects a little less return on chemicals 
than on petroleum. 
The petrochemical sales of Standard Oil's Amoco 
have grown from under 400 million in 1969 to 1.8 billion 
dollars in 1978. Amoco's return on chemical assets of 
$1.6 billion dollars was 3% in 1978. This low rate of 
return was claimed to be partly due to the rapid expansion 
in assets, which averaged 22% during the 1974-78 period. 
However, the company believes that their chemical opera- 
tions will exhibit good growth and profitability in the 
long term. 
Occidental's chemical subsidiary (Hooker. Chemical) 
had sales revenue of 1.719 billion dollars in 1978 consist- 
ing of: - $796 million worth of chemicals and plastics; 
$593 million worth of fertilizers, other agrochemicals and 
sulphur; $254 million worth of metal finishing; and 
$75 million from Occidental's petroleum subsidiary in 
Canada. Among the advantages of being a part of an oil 
company are the availability of parent company's research 
facilities and its financial capability, and Occidental's 
chemical subsidiary is thereby benefiting from: - a 
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process recently developed for the manufacture of 
hemihydrate phosphoric acid which will cut production 
costs by 15-18 dollars/ton; and also the funding of 
an $86.6 million waste to energy plant at Niagara Falls 
that is expected to save the company over-10 million 
dollars/year in power costs (i. e. an ROI of nearly 
12%). 
Atlantic Richfield's chemical sales have 
increased from $50 million in 1960 to $1.5 billion in 
1978 and the company's chemical subsidiary (ARCO) 
claims that if the Corporation allocates them the 
required capital, they can reach sales of more than 
$4 billion dollars by 1984-85. However, the parent 
company has expressed dissatisfaction with ARCO's 
return on investment (no data available). 
Ashland's Industrial Chemicals and Solvents 
claims to be the largest reseller of chemicals in the 
U. S. and only about 30% of the products it sells are 
made by Ashland. Ashland's chemical sales reached 
$883 million and according to the parent company, 
Ashland Chemical's return on investment compares very 
well with the rest of the company. 
Having discussed the sales and the profitability 
of the petrochemical subsidiaries of a number of major 
oil companies, substantiating with data where available, 
their performance does not seem to be as low as those 
given in the two studies referred to earlier in this 
section. Of course, there are obviously a number of 
companies such as ARCO and Amoco whose ROI is not 
satisfactory at the moment due to reasons given earlier, 
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but their poor profitability cannot be generalized 
to apply to other companies such as Exxon, Continental 
and Gulf,. which are showing adequate return on their 
chemical investments during a period when the petro- 
chemical industry faces large overcapacities of production. 
2.2.3 Problems and Financial Losses Involved in 
the Diversification of the Oil Companies into 
the Chemical Business 
In this section we shall discuss some of the 
problems and the financial losses which the oil companies 
faced in their move into the chemical business in order 
to be able to make a more thorough analysis of their 
strategies, in the next section. 
Exxon went into fertilizers in Latin America, 
the Philippines and South Africa without foreseeing 
the extent of worldwide marketing from large scale 
plants. Substantial importation of fertilizers took 
place in areas of the world which Exxon had expected 
would rely on local production. Consequently, the 
company divested parts of its fertilizer business 
including the sales of two fertilizer plants in 
Aruba to Grace at a considerable loss. Neither 
companies have revealed up to now the exact transaction 
involved in the deal. 
Mobil, like Exxon, moved into the fertilizer 
business by acquiring Virginia Carolina Chemicals and 
likewise retreated from the retail fertilizer and 
ammonia production but retained Carolina's phosphate 
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reserves in Florida. 
Phillips also found out that it had no particular 
strength in the very competitive nylon and polyester 
fibres market (which very few oil companies have 
participated in due to the marketing difficulties) 
and therefore retreated but retained its strong position 
in olefins fibres. It also retreated from vinyl calen- 
dering in the U. S. and PVC and polystyrene in Belgium 
for the same reason. The company has sold a total of 
$275 million worth of chemical assets in the past two 
decades. 
Ashland owned plastic pipes, plastic housewares, 
plastic film and synthetic rubber businesses. However, 
they were not big enough to compete, therefore the company 
had either to expand in these areas or retreat and due to 
the strong competition prevailing at the time they decided 
to retreat. 
in 1978 Ashland sold two other chemical businesses 
which were not profitable including: - three coatings 
resins plants to Kellogg for about $20 million but retained 
its speciality and polyester resins business; and its 
Chemical products Division (fatty acids) to a subsidiary 
of West Germany's Schering for $60 million. As a result 
of all these divestitures the company expects better returns 
on its chemical assets in the future. 
in addition to chemicals, Ashland oil has also sold 
more than half of the $1.4 billion worth of properties it 
considered not essential to its corporate strategy. Part of 
that money has been used to buy large quantities of its 
own shares. 
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2.2.4 Strategies of the Oil Companies on their 
Chemical Businesses 
Having discussed the reasonings behind the 
diversification of the oil companies into chemicals 
and the evolution of their businesses during the recent 
decades with special emphasis on the nature of their 
investments, the growth of their sales, their profit- 
abilities and some of their misinvestments, we are now 
in a position to state, evaluate and comment on the 
differences of their overall strategies on their petro- 
chemical businesses. 
While the oil companies have much in common 
(e. g. feedstocks and money) their strategies differ in 
certain respects. Shell's emphasis is on the expansion 
of its basic olefins and aromatics production capacities 
(see table 2.2). The company has participated in the 
high chemistry areas (see table 2.3), however its total 
investments in these fields are very small compared to 
its total chemical assets. 
As a result of some of the misinvestment in the 
1960's, during the late 1960's and early 1970's Exxon 
limited further new capacities (see table 2.2) and 
concentrated on structuring the company. Like Shell, 
Exxon is concentrating on the expansion of its olefins 
and aromatics production capacities and its overall 
strategies for the 1980's is based on logical additions 
to its product line and technical emphasis on trimming 
feedstock and energy requirements. 
Gulf's strategies are basically similar to those 
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of Shell and Exxon and the company is currently interested 
in moving further into intermediates. The products which 
the company is interested in, include phenol, alpha- 
olefins, polyolefins and synthetic lubes. The company 
is also interested in plastic fabricating and is looking 
, for a high technology area synergistic with its plastics 
resin position. Gulf already manufactures plastic oil 
cans and owns an engineering company which manufactures 
pipes, tanks and vessels. The company made a contro- 
versial acquisition in 1977 involving the take-over of 
Kewanee Oil, however the deal also included two speciality 
chemical divisions which are not the sort of businesses 
the oil companies are efficient in and hence aiming for. 
Gulf, on the other hand, claims to be satisfied with these 
divisions and believes that some of their businesses have 
good potential as a new platform for growth, and that they 
will add many dimensions to Gulf's different businesses 
and therefore the company will support them strongly. 
Mobil is also actively involved in olefins, 
aromatics and plastic resins and its overall strategy 
is based on self-sufficiency in these areas. The company 
is also looking towards the commercialization of a new 
resin developed in its laboratories (poly - para - methyl - 
styrene) as a replacement for polystyrene; further expan- 
sions of plastic shopping bags in supermarkets (Mobil is 
closest to the consumer with its plastic bags); 
polyethylene film for pallet overwraps; and oriented 
polypropylene as a replacement for cellophane. 
Texaco, on the other hand, has adopted a more 
conservative strategy towards the chemical business. 
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The company is not interested in downstream products 
such as plastic pipes, wrapping paper and plastic bags 
and prefers to grow in areas where it has marketing 
strength including aromatics, olefins, ethylene glycol, 
urethane and chemical additives for oils and greases. 
Another area in which the company looks for growth is 
the production of synthetic gas from coal, based on 
Texaco's proprietary process (Chemical Week, 8 August 
1979). However, due to the huge capital required 
(i. e. $300 million), its first plant which was initiated 
recently is a joint venture with Southern California 
Edison. 
Conoco is concentrating on the expansion of its 
surfactant and PVC businesses together with self-sufficiency 
in their raw materials. 
Phillips's strategies are similar, to Texaco's. 
That is, to expand in areas where they have marketing 
strength and retreat from those where they have no partic- 
ular strength. Areas in which the company is successful 
include ethylene, h. d. p. e. and Cyclohexane. Phillips 
has expressed doubt on the success of the proprietary 
technology developed by some of the oil companies for 
downstream projects due to the difficulties of getting 
into a new business at a time of high energy costs. 
Standard Oil's strategy during the last two 
decades has been to move further down, into the process- 
ing of petrochemicals which has involved the acquisition 
of many companies, mostly fabricators of plastic house- 
hold products whilst at the same time building up rapidly 
its olefins, aromatics and resins production capacities 
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to meet the raw material requirements of its fabricating 
plants. The company's spendings in 1979 focused on 
downstream operations mainly involving the acquisition 
of additional plastic bottle plants and also carpet 
backing plants. Its future strategy is also based on 
the growth of downstream operations: the expansion 
of its moulded products line; entry into the manufac- 
turing of containers for personal care products; and 
pushing plastic bottles into the beer bottle market. 
Occidental, unlike other oil companies, has no 
feedstock tie in with its chemical operations. The 
company has stated in the past that it went into chemicals 
because the chairman wanted to diversify and found 
chemicals attractive. Its strategy has since been to 
grow in mainly two areas, resins and fertilizers. 
Atlantic Richfield's chemical subsidiary (ARCO) 
hopes to grow very rapidly in order to attain, in a few 
years time, sales level comparable to those achieved 
by major oil companies such as Shell and Exxon. 
Arco is depending on the parent company's financial 
backing and R and D facilities in order to achieve 
this objective. The company puts special emphasis 
on R and D and has recently developed new processes for 
making methyl tertiary butyl ether, polymeric isocyanates, 
adipic acid and caprolactam, and work is currently in 
progress on a new ethylene oxide process. 
Ashland's strategy has been to solidify its 
chemical business by selling those assets which were 
not very profitable. The subsidiary includes two rather 
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unique businesses: distribution of chemicals, selling 
products most of which are actually produced by other 
manufacturers; and foundry products. 
At this point we shall state our overall 
conclusions based on the analysis of the strategies 
of the oil companies on their chemical businesses. 
The most important conclusion drawn from the analysis 
presented in this section and from table 2.1 concerns 
the concentration of the majority of the oil companies 
on the large tonnage, commodity and 'commodity type' 
chemicals (e. g. olefins, aromatics, intermediates and 
plastic resins). Of course it is true that some 
companies like Shell, Gulf and Mobil have participated 
in the high chemistry areas and the downsream, plastic 
fabricating business but their total investments in 
these fields are very small compared to their total 
chemical assets. Standard Oil is probably the one 
with most substantial downstream chemical assets among 
the oil companies, however as we mentioned earlier the 
parent company is not satisfied with the profitability 
of its chemical operations. It is also worth mention- 
ing that Ashland which had some downstream chemical 
assets similar to those of Standard, sold them due to 
their low returns. 
The question arising now is why the majority of 
the oil companies invest in the large tonnage (i. e. 
commodity and 'commodity type') and not the more 
sophisticated (i. e. performance) chemicals. This is 
due to the very nature of these products. In the case 
of commodity and commodity type chemicals, which are 
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sold on the basis of their specifications only, marketing 
is relatively uninvolved depending mainly on the price, 
and since as we discussed earlier the oil companies have 
an advantage over chemical companies in having access to 
cheaper raw materials, therefore they can easily compete 
with them on the basis of price. However, in the case of 
performance chemicals, bought on the basis of both their 
specifications and the results when using them (the clients 
of which are generally dispersed), marketing involves a 
wide variety of major activities and also the price. 
The activities include: frequent technical services at 
customer level; support by a technical service laboratory; 
advertising, both technical and institutional; and financ- 
ing the working capital for clients in the form of raw 
materials credit. Consequently, since the oil companies 
do not necessarily have the logistical and marketing net- 
works required for this type of activity, it would be very 
difficult for them to participate in this area. Further, 
the oil companies would also find it extremely difficult 
to be price competitive in this area because of the cost 
efficiency of the chemical companies in high chemistry 
fields. 
2.3 The Views of the Chemical Companies 
on the Diversification of the Oil 
Companies into the Chemical Business 
and their Strategies for Coping with 
the Competition from the Oil Companies 
In this part we shall discuss the views of some of the 
more traditional chemical companies on the diversification of 
the oil companies into the chemical business together with their 
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strategies for coping with the competition (Lurie, 1979). 
Most of the chemical companies are very critical of the 
chemical operations of the oil companies especially during the 
1960's and early 1970's. They blame the oil companies' 
irresponsible use of cash as the cause of their past contribu- 
tions to overcapacity and accompanying price cutting. Some, 
like Dow, believe that apart from Exxon, Shell and Phillips 
the other oil companies actually entered the chemical business 
as price cutters. However, this belief does not seem realistic 
because as it is known across this industry, price cutting entry 
is self limiting due to the constant change, improvement and also 
introduction of new petrochemical products. They also claim 
that due to the oil companies' price cutting, things have been 
made uneconomic for them in certain areas (e. g. oxo alcohols, 
olefins). The chemical companies are also very critical of 
some of the oil companies which have, in the past, rushed into 
the downstream operations and were later forced to abandon them 
due to bad experiences. 
The chemical companies see the advantages of the oil 
companies in their cashflow, raw materials and dominating 
position in chemical building blocks (products for which low 
cost is the dominating factor). However, they are unimpressed 
with their profits in value added chemicals and research and 
believe that most oil companies do not have an understanding 
of the upgrading techniques involved in the industry. They 
also consider the quality and performance characteristics of 
the oil companies' chemical plants inferior to their own on 
the basis that most chemical companies research and design 
their own plants while most oil companies go to engineering 
companies and buy processes. The companies further claim that 
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those oil companies which have bought their way into the 
chemical business are not doing well and that they only 
managed to enter because of penetrating easy markets such 
as polystyrene, low-density polyethylene, ethylene glycol 
and styrene monomer. Finally, most chemical companies have 
the opinion that chemicals are a sideline for most oil 
companies and do not receive the dedication that oil does. 
However, in the decades since the oil companies began 
their diversification into petrochemicals, most chemical' 
companies have learnt that the oil companies need the chemical 
output to maximise return on plant, and also a healthy 
industry to further process that output. Consequently the 
relationship between the oil and chemical companies has to be 
satisfactory in order for the system to operate smoothly and 
rather than competing, the two should give each other support 
in reaching the end market. Therefore today, most chemical 
companies respect the oil companies as tough competitors, 
reliable suppliers, sizable customers and even partners. 
The chemical companies respect, in particular, the first 
line oil companies as good and fair competitors due to their 
demand of high returns on chemical assets, which keeps prices 
up. However, in certain areas the chemical companies have 
found the competition very difficult due to low prices (e. g. 
terephthalates, DMT, TPA). Concerning the supply of their 
raw materials, the chemical companies prefer to purchase from 
oil companies (usually on a long term basis) rather than other 
chemical companies because they have found them more dependable 
(particularly for the way they honoured contracts during turbu- 
lent times, e. g. 1973-74), and also there is no conflict of 
interest. 
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2.3.1 The Strategies of the Chemical Companies 
for Coping with the Competition from the 
Oil Companies 
At this point it is worth finding out about the 
strategies of the chemical companies for coping with the 
competition from the oil companies. Generally the 
chemical companies believe that the overall impact of 
the oil companies entry into the chemical business has 
been to push chemical companies further downstream (for 
example 18/ cent worth of ethylene makes 60 cent worth 
of speciality polyethylene). The chemical companies 
answer to the competition from the oil companies includes 
Rand D, higher technology, strength in marketing, value 
added and leadership in product areas, and they believe 
that the oil companies do not necessarily have these 
strengths. Some companies concerned about the costs and 
potential shortages of their petrochemical feedstocks have 
begun to integrate backwards in'order to reduce the risk. 
Among these companies are: Dow which is building a 
180000 bbls/day refinery in Texas; Du Pont which has 
formed two joint ventures with National Distillers and 
Conoco for the manufacture of carbon monoxide and synthesis 
gas, and gas exploration, respectively; ICI which has 
formed joint ventures with Champlin Petroleum and Soltex 
Polymer for an olefin cracker, and with Chevron for oil 
and gas exploration; finally Monsanto which has formed a 
joint venture with Conoco to expand its olefins and aromatics 
capacity. However, companies like Union Carbide have no 
plans for any backward integration (oil and gas), claiming 
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that they do not understand the oil business. 
2.3.2 The Views of the Chemical Companies on the 
Strategies of the Oil Companies 
Finally, since the strategies of the oil companies 
on their petrochemical businesses are of great importance 
to this present research, it is worth discussing what 
the views of the chemical companies are, on this matter. 
Union Carbide believes that the oil companies are unlikely 
to build more ethylene plants because of low returns and 
the need to build new refineries for the required feed- 
stocks. However, Carbide and also Dow believe that the 
economics and the nature of the chemical business will 
force the oil companies to integrate forward in order to 
gain better returns on their investments. Du Pont on 
the other hand believes that the oil companies tend to 
move downstream on a logical and selective basis. 
Finally, Grace does not expect the oil companies to 
move forward any further, on the assumption that the oil 
companies are not going to use their cashflow for invest- 
ments that do not make any sense; and does not see them 
as a threat in chemical fields beyond those areas in which 
they already are. At this point we would like to comment 
that the views expressed by companies such as Union Carbide 
and Dow are quite different from our own conclusions about 
the strategies of the oil companies (presented earlier), 
however the views held by Grace and Du Pont are more in 
line with ours and for the same reasons. Further, First 
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Boston's study on the diversification of the oil companies 
into the chemical business, which will be discussed in 
chapter three, also makes similar conclusions to those 
of Grace, Du Pont and our own. 
66 
CHAPTER' 3 
RELATED STUDIES AND PROBLEM DEFINITION 
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3.1 Other Related Studies 
There have been very few studies carried out in this 
area which have been published, however in the next section 
we shall discuss three major studies which are of special 
value to this present work. 
3.1.1 The UNIDO Study 
The first world-wide study on the petrochemical 
industry was prepared by the International Centre For 
Industrial Studies (ICIS) of the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) in 1978. The study 
related to two problems which the Lima mandate poses. 
Briefly, the Lima declaration and plan of action on 
industrial development and co-operation was adopted at 
the second general conference of UNIDO in March 1975, 
and was approved by the general assembly at its seventh 
special session. The mandate emphasizes the importance 
of the role of industry as a dynamic tool. of growth for 
achieving rapid socio-economic developments in the devel- 
oping countries and calls for a rise in the share of the 
developing countries to a minimum of 25% of the total 
world industrial production by the end of the 20th 
century. It particularly encourages the developing 
countries to give priority to the development of basic 
industries such as petrochemicals in order to strengthen 
their industrial structure and hence capture a more signi- 
ficant portion of the world trade. However, two problems 
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arise from the Lima declaration: firstly, to 
investigate the involvement of each sector of the 
industry in reaching the 25% target; secondly, to 
evaluate the size of the resources required to 
achieve such a target. 
The UNIDO/ICIS study relates to the investi- 
gation of. both the above problems in the petrochemical 
sector, Concerning the first problem, the study makes 
a detailed global assessment of the petrochemical 
industry together with a comprehensive analysis of its 
structure and development from the past up to its likely 
state by the turn of the century. Regarding the 
probable share of the developing countries in the 
total global petrochemical production by the end of 
the 20th century, the study explores three scenarios: 
firstly, the tendencial scenario (the future is the 
continuation of the past conflicting situation although 
it can be unacceptable by the developing countries 
interested in a structural change in the petrochemical 
industry); the most probable scenario resulting from 
an objective analysis of the constraints and implement- 
ation possibilities; and finally the normative scenario 
inspired for instance by the Lima target and the degree 
of co-operation needed to achieve it. 
Regarding the second problem, the study has 
developed a model of the world petrochemical industry 
capable of simulating future behaviour. The model is 
then employed to assess the size of the resources required 
by each of the above three scenarios. The study also 
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informs the industrialised and the developing countries 
in detail of the implications and the degree of co-operation 
needed in carrying out any of the three scenarios. 
Concerning the modelling technique, the report 
states that due to the lack of internationally comparable 
data it was not possible to employ any time extrapolation 
technique to forecast to the end of the 20th century as 
is common in the industry. Hence, sophisticated fore- 
casting methods capable of quantifying long term trends 
were developed incorporating qualitative considerations. 
Concerning the modelling methodology we are not really 
able to state any constructive comment because the report 
does not give a documentation of the relationships 
embodied in the model. However, the study as a whole 
is very well founded covering all aspects of the industry 
together with its most pressing problems with particular 
emphasis on overcapacity. Although the study is not of 
direct relevance to our research, since our problem. 
concerns the strategic management decision making at 
the company level, a great deal of insight has never- 
theless been gained of the nature of the industry. 
The report has also gathered a tremendous amount of-data 
on the world petrochemical industry some of which has 
been used and acknowledged in our study. Finally an 
important point concerning our research is that the 
report has explored the consequences of errors in the 
forecasting of demand on the planning of future capacities 
and concluded that significant overcapacity would result 
according to the period of misplanning and the size of 
the error in the growth of demand. 
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The overall prediction of the report concerning 
the achievement of the Lima target is that, according to 
the present market realities and the projects on hand 
the two sides (i. e. the developed and the. developing 
countries) will be in a more conflicting situation in 
the short term, however expects closer co-operation in 
the medium and the longer term. 
3.1.2 The McKinsey Study 
A major study was undertaken by McKinsey and 
company for the National Economic Development Office 
in 1977, in order to investigate the prospects for the 
Western European plastics materials industry in the 
1980's and identify a range of strategies by which the 
U. K. might increase its share of the EEC market. They 
estimate the future demand for plastics in Western Europe 
and also quantify the range of uncertainty about their 
forecasts. They then estimate what capacity was already 
committed to meet that uncertain future demand in order 
to work out the range of additional capacity requirements. 
They further explore the factors that affect decisions 
to construct capacity in order to determine how manufac- 
turers would probably expand their capacity in the U. K. 
under present circumstances and then assess the scope for 
actions by any one or a combination of the parties to 
the NEDC, that could have an`influence on the present 
capital investment pattern and the likely nature of that 
influence. 
The study suggests that during the 1980's the 
plastics industry in the U. K. could achieve a trade balance 
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with the EEC depending on new initiatives, otherwise 
the most it can do is to hold its present share of the 
market, however there are also factors at work that 
could cause a further deterioration. It also emphasizes 
the necessity of the decisions which had to be made in 
1978 if the full range of U. K. strategy options for 
achieving a trade balance were to be kept open. 
The study states that due to the forecast growth 
in demand, considerable additional capacity will be 
required throughout the EEC towards the end of the 1980's, 
but expects the current high level of excess capacity to 
continue well into the 1980's. In contrast to this 
conclusion, they believe that the plants committed for 
the U. K. are unlikely to enable the industry to maintain 
or increase its current market share, beyond the beginning 
of the 1980's, and therefore conclude that the U. K. is 
likely to require additional capacity some years prior 
to the rest of the community. McKinsey acknowledges 
the manufacturers fears of the magnitude of the uncertainty 
about the future demand for plastics and states that 
although future capacity requirements are very sensitive 
to this uncertainty, the U. K. will still be in need of 
additional capacity at least one or-two years before the 
rest of the community. 
Based on this conclusion, the study sets out a 
number of strategic options open to the U. K. plastics 
materials industry. . Firstly, the U. K. could decide to 
halt any further capacity expansions until the community's 
overcapacity is absorbed, however McKinsey believes that 
this strategy would result in the growth of imports. 
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The second strategy involves the expansion of capacity 
in the U. K. to meet the local demand and also for 
exports, bearing in mind that the rest of the community 
will find it extremely difficult to do likewise due to 
their significant overcapacity. This strategy is believed 
to give the producers in the U. K. the opportunity of 
satisfying the future growth in the European plastics 
consumption which would otherwise be met by new local 
plants. The study stresses the importance of the 
appropriate marketing strategies for the success of this 
option, however it places more emphasis on the timing of 
bringing adequate capacity on stream when the market needs 
it, arguing that otherwise the opportunity to balance the 
trade with the EEC would be lost. Finally, the third 
option which is a compromise between the first and second, 
involves sufficient expansion of production capacity so 
as to protect the current share of local and export markets 
while the rest of the community are in surplus capacity 
and then accelerate the expansion programme in order to 
reach the target (i. e. trade balance) by 1990. McKinsey 
believes that this strategy carries the least risk 
concerning any unforeseen changes in the growth pattern 
of demand or capacity build up in other areas. This 
strategy is believed to place the U. K. in an adequate 
position for speeding up or slowing down the capacity 
expansion programme according to changes in the supply 
and demand situation. 
McKinsey acknowledges the losses which would be 
incurred in increasing production capacity ahead of demand 
which would consequently frighten any investor, however 
he states that the options facing the U. K. are either to 
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pay the cost so as to have a reasonable chance of 
meeting its target (i. e. trade balance), or to postpone 
the expansion of capacity until a later date which 
would consequently mean that there would be less 
certainty of meeting the target. 
" Regarding the first option, McKinsey doubts 
whether the U. K. will be able to offer enough incentives 
to the potential investors unless steps are taken to 
encourage their participation. This doubt stems from 
certain commercial impediments to expansion, believed 
to diminish the United Kingdom's marginal economic and 
technical attractiveness to be chosen as a site for 
plastics manufacturing plants in order to supply plastic 
materials to European markets. 
McKinsey proposes a number of initiatives, 
intended to enhance the United Kingdom's chances of 
expanding sufficient capacity in order to achieve its 
target (i. e. trade balance with the EEC). Among these 
initiatives are on the one hand, shifts in individual 
companies' strategies, marketing priorities and joint 
venture arrangements, believed to be of significant 
importance; and on the other hand the government's 
involvement in influencing the construction of a gas- 
gathering pipeline in the North Sea to supply the 
petrochemical industry with liquid gases at attractive 
prices and also the construction of new petrochemical 
intermediate plants. Further, the study points to the 
unimpressive performance of the construction industry in 
the U. K. concerning their longer construction duration 
times compared to the rest of the EEC and calls for 
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initiatives to alleviate this undesirable phenomenon 
so as to give the companies the opportunity to delay 
decisions on capacity expansions, if so desired, for 
as long as feasible without jeopardizing their chances 
of satisfying any possible future growth in demand. 
Our overall comment on this study is that, it 
is very much of a qualitative nature in the way of 
bringing to attention a number of initiatives which 
could help the U. K. to reach its objective (i. e. trade 
balance) and also suggesting a number of strategy options 
to achieve this target. However, the study does not 
have the scope of evaluating: - the costs of the 
recommended initiatives to encourage investment, and 
the potential benefits and risks associated with such 
investments, in order to decide if any of the three 
strategy options are advantageous to be adopted. 
Further the analytical approach to the study involves 
very simple statistical analysis for demonstrating the 
ranges of capacity build up in the U. K. under different 
strategies taking into account some degree of uncertainty 
about the future demand forecasts and although the study 
stresses the importance of the impacts of the decision 
making interval, errors in forecasting, and plant 
completion times on the capacity planning process, due 
to the simplicity and the inadequacy of the analytical 
technique employed, the study does not thoroughly explore 
the sensitiveness of the process to each of these three 
parameters. 
Our major criticism of this study concerns their 
statement of the oil crisis of 1973 and the world recession 
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being the major causes of the interruption of the 
rapid growth the petrochemical industry experienced 
up to the early 1970's. Of course, these two factors 
did affect the slowdown of the industry, however the 
major cause of the decline in the rate of the growth 
of demand for petrochemicals was, as we discussed in 
Chapter 1, due to the industry reaching the age of 
maturity and this is acknowledged by many of the 
executives of the chemical industry, for example 
N. Champion, the finance and planning director of 
BP Chemicals CChampion, 1978). 
Finally McKinsey's study is of special interest 
to this present work because it covers the range of 
products selected for this study and also contains some 
very valuable information about the petrochemical 
industry. 
3.1.3 The First Boston Study 
A major statistical study with the objective 
of assessing "the myth and realities of the oil companies' 
aggressive move into the chemicals business" was under- 
taken by First Boston Corporation in May 1976. 
The study concentrates on the companies in the 
U. S. A., however since most oil companies are multinational, 
the findings are applicable in a wider context. The 
study looks back to the 1960's when the oil companies 
were first accused of being responsible for the poor 
profitability of the industry and states that their investi- 
gation of the facts show that the accusations were unfounded. 
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It states that it was the chemical industzy's own 
dynamics that caused overcapacity, price wars and 
profit erosion. This conclusion is based on the 
following reasons: - industry unit costs. were falling 
through the development of larger and more efficient 
plants and productivity steadily rose by between 6 
and 10 percent per year; ease of entry into the 
industry had improved to the point where 'off-the- 
shelf' technology was available. The study further 
states that these factors together with excellent unit 
volume growth prospects encouraged aggressive expansions 
not only by oil companies, but also by the food, steel 
and tyre industries plus chemical companies. The 
newer, lower production cost plants soon dictated 
pricing for the entire industry as they rapidly 
accounted for a significant portion of the total capacity. 
The study states that the oil companies were 
responsible for a share of the chemical industry's 
problems in the 1960's, but not exclusively. Their 
involvement in the chemical industry was mainly in two 
areas, petrochemicals and fertilizers. Their partici- 
pation in fertilizers was mainly due to the excess 
availability of refinery hydrogen. However their 
attempts in this field were a failure due mainly to: - 
the overcapacity in the fertilizer industry (companies 
operated these capital intensive plants at high rates, 
irrespective of the demand in order to achieve lower 
production costs for their products); the oil companies 
lack of know-how in marketing fertilizers. However, 
the oil companies participation in the-petrochemicals 
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business was more successful as the majority of their 
customers were the chemical companies, the petrochemical 
business was much more stable than fertilizers and 
finally petrochemicals manufacturing was a natural 
addition to oil refining. 
The study has also analysed the possibility of 
the oil companies moving deeper into chemicals and has 
concluded that they are expanding only in specific product 
areas or in product lines where they possess production 
or marketing advantages, such as the building blocks 
(e. g. ethylene, propylene, benzene, etc. ), some organic 
intermediates and plastics. The data presented in the 
study together with its analysis do not support the theory 
that the oil companies are aggressively integrating 
forwards. 
The study states that the chemical industry 
should not fear the oil companies' increasing share of 
the industry, it should instead consider the possibility 
of the oil companies pricing their petrochemicals on the 
basis of their feedstock costs, where they often enjoy 
a significant advantage. 
The study states that the oil companies may be 
tempted to use this advantage, however their recent massive 
capital investments on their building-block plants may 
moderate their attempts to "play the role of the spoiler". 
The study isolates fifteen petrochemical commodities, 
including ethylene glycol, propylene oxide, styrene, 
some plastics and terephthalates where the oil companies 
may hinder profitability for the chemical companies. 
However, the study states that the oil companies 
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should not be solely blamed if the prices deteriorate 
in the future, since the majority of the chemical 
companies admit that they have overexpanded their 
production capacities. 
The study concludes that the oil companies 
expansions of their petrochemical capacities during 
the 1974-1980 period may in fact be beneficial to the 
chemical manufacturers, when considering that the oil 
companies are generally net sellers of petrochemical 
raw materials to the chemical manufacturers and the 
fact that there may be over-capacity available in these 
products should keep chemical companies' raw material. 
costs down. 
First Boston's study is the most comprehensive 
and also the most relevant concerning this present 
study. Its findings regarding the problems of the 
industry during the 1960's of overcapacity and price 
wars, which have persisted to the present date, are 
very much in line with the arguments put forward in 
chapter 1. Its findings regarding the strategies of 
the oil companies in their forward integration into 
petrochemicals are also in line with the strategies 
stated by the chief executives of the oil companies 
presented in chapter 2. This is especially important 
regarding this present work as it is extremely difficult 
to find out about the petrochemical activities of the 
oil companies and the only information sources available 
are the chemical journals and certain published papers 
and reports. However, the validity of the information 
obtained from such sources should be thoroughly examined 
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but in this case First Boston's study generally 
supports the arguments and information presented 
in Chapter 2. Finally it must be emphasized that 
this study contains much valuable statistical data. 
3.2 Problem Definition 
In the first chapter we presented the background to the 
petrochemical industry together with some of the complexities 
involved in the running of such business, and also discussed 
its most pressing problem, that of world-wide overcapacity. 
At the present time the world petrochemical industry is 
in a serious crisis. The demand is way below on stream 
capacities, which are made up of very expensive plants, and 
under current market conditions production cost increases 
are leading to the erosion of profits. Forecasts made by 
CEFIC (Conseil Europeen des Federation de L'Industrie Chimique) 
towards the end of 1978 indicated that overcapacity in the 
main building blocks of the industry would last until 1982-1983. 
However, another study carried out by Eurofinance, which is a 
financial research organization owned. by nine European and U. S. 
banks, during the same period made a rather gloomier forecast. 
The study states that the predicted investments in neighbouring 
countries of the EEC and the Opec countries could prolong the 
community's overcapacity by another 5-6 years beyond the 1982- 
1983 forecasted by Cefic, which would consequently mean that 
the industry can look'forward to a period of excruciating 
readjustment and lasting throughout most of the 1980's (see 
table 3.1)-. 
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Table 3.1 Realistic Capacity to Produce 
Ethylene and low density 
Polyethylene (m. ton) 
Non-EEC EEC Middle Potential Annual 
Europe Europe East exports increase 
(1982) (1982) (1985) to EEC in EEC 
demand 
" (mid 
1980s) 
ethylene 7.95 16.04 . 2.2 2.65 0.5 
+0.7 
=3.35 
low density 
polyethylene 2.86 5.34 1.1 0.9 0.2 
+0.35 
=1.25 
Note: (1) Non-EEC Europe includes the Nordic countries 
(excluding Denmark), Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Turkey, Austria, and Eastern Europe. 
(2). EEC is the Community of the Nine. 
(3) Middle East is Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. 
(4) Potential exports to EEC are assumed to be 
30 per cent of production capacity. 
Source: Eurofinance, 1978 
However, this problem is not a static one originating 
from the present economic recession but a dynamic one caused 
by decisions made since the late 1960s. Consequently the 
decisions taken now or in the near future will substantially 
determine the future world petrochemical industry from 10 to 
20 years ahead and since the general practice of the top 
decision makers in this industry is to limit forecasts to 
only 5 years ahead, there is a large gap that needs to be 
bridged between the customary forecasting horizon and the 
far reaching impacts of the decisions taken. This phenomenon 
is well explained by Drucker's criterion called "the futurity 
of decisions" : that is, how far in the future will decisions 
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made today limit future action? The petrochemical industry 
is among the industries which have a long lead time of this 
nature. 
In order to shed more light on the dynamic nature of 
the problem it should be mentioned that the most important 
causes of the industry's overcapacity are the aggressive 
capacity expansion programmes adopted by the companies during 
the late 1960s and the early 1970s based on the simplistic 
perception of continually increasing exponential growth of 
demand and also the industry's delay in perceiving the depth 
and duration of the economic recession, especially in OECD 
countries during the 1970s. - During the 1967-1973 period 
many large companies planned on the basis of building larger 
plants than their competitors, outselling their competitors 
at cheaper prices for two or three years to push them out of 
the market, so as to reap profits later for their future 
larger plants. 
However, in early 1970's the industry entered a new era 
in which its growth declined considerably, but the companies 
were unfortunately slow to recognize the extent of the changed 
conditions. In fact according to Eurofinance's study, 
mentioned earlier, the investments in the three years following 
1973 were 22% higher than in the preceding years and have 
continued to rise, as we mentioned in chapter two. 
In the past the effects of misplanning, for example of 
capacity expansion, used to be cured quickly because demand 
was fast in catching up with such` overcapacity. However, in 
the future structural misinvestments will be equivalent to 
self-mutilation. Capital intensive projects, even if they 
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make technological sense, represent a big economic risk. 
Underutilization requires digestion of high overhead costs 
on the face of product price pressure. Such depressed 
market conditions are bringing attention to debottlenecking 
projects instead of new plant construction. 
To sum up the situation, the present overcapacity of the 
industry is mainly, as we mentioned earlier, due to the huge 
orders placed for plants during the 1967-1973 period and the. 
long lags that exist in the construction of petrochemical 
plants. The capital intensive nature of the industry 
together with the decline in the growth of demand have seriously 
damaged the financial performance of the industry. Concerning 
the future for the petrochemical industry, it is expected to 
be dynamic but full of risk and the main task of the companies 
operating in the industry would involve matching their capacities 
to demand and financing their varying capital expenditures. 
3.3 Purpose of the Research 
Our concern in this present-work is in the diversification 
of an oil company into the petrochemical business and the 
exploration of the appropriate corporate strategies. As we 
mentioned in the previous section, the companies operating in 
this industry, including the chemical subsidiaries of the oil 
companies, have been faced with large overcapacities of produc- 
tion since 1974. This phenomenon in turn affects the overall 
corporate strategies of the oil companies towards their chemical 
businesses. Consequently the need for establishing a more 
adequate capacity acquisition policy arises which is one of 
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the main objectives of this study. In achieving this aim, 
a more disciplined approach to investment is required because 
as we now know, the investment policies adopted by companies 
during the late 1960s and the early 1970s have-caused the 
industry a great deal of harm which is expected to continue 
for many years to come. Therefore past history has to be 
examined thoroughly so that similar mistakes are not made in 
the future. 
Further, in order to design an appropriate acquisition 
policy, there is a need for accurate long range planning, 
however there are many obstacles in doing so. The business 
cycles and the resulting capital investment cycles are one 
such obstacle which are common to capital intensive industries 
and according to theory and practice, are amongst the most 
variable components of the G. D. P. (NEDO, 1976). Long varying 
construction completion times also complicate the situation, 
because the need for long planning horizon arises which in 
turn affects the magnitude of the errors in the forecasting 
process. As we mentioned in chapter 1 and also in the 
previous section, badly estimated demand forecasts of the 
past have made certain contributions to the overcapacity 
problem and this suggests that significant errors are likely 
in forecasting the growth of demand for petrochemicals 5 years 
ahead. 
In this study we shall put special emphasis on: - 
(a) Examining the seriousness of the errors in the capacity 
planning process, particularly concerning the forecasting 
of the rate of growth of demand. 
(b) Exploring the interaction between the planning side of 
the business and the top decision making in order to see 
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whether the resultant impact could ever amplify the 
exogenous shocks from the environment. 
(c) Looking for any other factors, besides those mentioned 
earlier, which might have a significant effect on the 
problem. 
(d) Examining the impact on the company when operating under 
inflationary conditions. 
As we have defined the problem, it is evident that our 
interest lies in the possible destabilizing effects of changes 
in the amount of spendings required on new plants interacting 
with changes in the level of spendings the company could 
sustain under the influences of factors which were mentioned = 
earlier and also the aggressive or conservative nature of the 
policies of the top decision makers towards the market. 
Ideally, if the intentions are to match the capacity to demand, 
one would really seek a "balance" between over and under reaction 
towards investments which would hopefully result in a "balance" 
between supply'and demand which is necessary for the long term 
survival of the companies operating in the industry. This 
situation is very well demonstrated by the following diagram 
which in fact represents a feedback loop, and our purpose is 
to explore the implications of this loop on the behaviour of 
the company. 
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This 1s of course just one part of the very complex system 
that we are studying. However, this loop is very important 
due to the interactions which it represents, but the eventual 
solution to the problem would involve the examination of a 
number of endogenous and exogenous factors within the company 
and its environment respectively. 
Before we proceed to explain the method of research, it 
is essential to make it clear that the solution which we hope 
to find should be tested, for sensitivity purposes, against 
the kind of errors which we described earlier and also against 
parameter and relationship errors which might be made when 
modelling the system. Coyle (1977) refers to this type of 
requirement as external and internal robustness. External 
robustness for cases in which the parameters and relationships 
of the outside environment are not known accurately. In our 
case we do know that the demand forecasts could contain a 
large element of error, therefore this criterion is appropriate. 
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Next, internal robustness for cases in which the analyst's 
knowledge of the internal structure of the system under study 
lacks in certain parts which would be consequently reflected 
in the modelling process. To alleviate this problem, one 
should ideally design the policies so that they are not too 
dependent on the parts which include a large element of 
uncertainty, and instead rely on parameters and functions 
which are known more precisely. This is particularly 
important for this present work because as we mentioned in 
chapter two, it has been extremely difficult to obtain all 
the information required due to the confidential nature of 
the operations of the oil companies, therefore the solution 
which we aim to find should be relatively robust to any 
aggregations and approximations made during the modelling 
process. 
3.4 Method of Research 
The enormous complexities of the problem described in 
the previous sections implies that probably the only possible 
approach to the problem is to actually construct a model of the 
system under study in order to be able to analyse the behaviour 
mode resulting from the interactions of the many interdependent 
sub-systems within the organization. In doing so, we need 
to search for a modelling method which would suit our problem. 
Ideally we would like to find one which could satisfy the 
following requirements: - our problem is basically how to 
control and manage the system, therefore the modelling theory 
should have strong links to control theory; the model should 
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operate through time in order to have any meaning in relation 
to the actual company; since the system contains delays and 
elements of non-linearity, the model should also accommodate 
for these very important phenomena; it is important that for 
a problem of this complexity the analyst should choose a 
technique which is understandable by managers so that they 
can participate in the modelling because after all they are 
the ones who know the most about the system; the model should 
not require too much data about the past because firstly many 
organizations do not possess a comprehensive data base system 
and secondly in our case the information is very confidential 
and therefore difficult to obtain; it would also be advantageous 
to choose a technique which enables the analyst to build the 
model as quickly and cheaply as possible, which is usually 
required in a real company situation, and also permits the 
rapid testing of many alternatives which would'be required 
for such a study. 
Among the mathematical modelling techniques available, 
Industrial Dynamics (Forrester, 1962) and(Coyle, 1977) is the 
one which offers the most concerning the above requirements. 
Forrester (1962) describes Industrial Dynamics as "a way 
of studying the behaviour of industrial systems to show how 
policies, decisions, structure, and delays are inter-related 
to influence growth and stability. It integrates the separate 
functional areas of management marketing, investment, research, 
personnel, production, and accounting. Each of these functions 
is reduced to a common basis by recognizing that any economic 
or corporate activity consists of flows of money, orders, 
materials, personnel, and capital equipment. These five 
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flows are integrated by an information network. Industrial 
dynamics recognizes the critical importance of this informa- 
tion network in giving the system its own dynamic characteristics. " 
Coyle in MSD 01977) recommends a number of criteria in 
order to enable the analyst to decide whether a particular 
managerial problem is indeed of the nature suitable for a 
dynamic modelling study. His recommendations are as follows: 
Firstly - Is there any dynamic behaviour? - 
Secondly - Do the dynamics matter, and why? 
Thirdly - Are there any loops? 
Fourthly - Are there any alternative system 
structures or control policies? 
The first chapter of this present research gives sufficient 
detail and justification to Coyle's first two criteria. 
Concerning the third criterion, we have already demonstrated 
a very important loop of the system in the previous section 
and the influence diagram of the whole system which will be 
presented later reveals many more feed-back loops, therefore 
the third criterion is satisfied. With respect to the last 
criterion, the answer must be 'yes' because otherwise the 
system is either very well managed, or completely paralysed 
and neither of these two states apply to the system under this 
present study. Further it is generally possible to make any 
alterations to the organizational structure and policies as 
long as they are feasible. Therefore the fourth criterion 
is also satisfied and we can conclude that the problem is 
indeed within the field of dynamic modelling. 
In this study our purpose is to construct a model of the 
petrochemical subsidiary of an oil company in order to analyse 
its financial performance under the impacts of the supply and 
demand situation, and the capital expenditure programme commit- 
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ments, which then in turn affects the supply and demand 
situation. Therefore we need a corporate financial model 
in order to analyse the top management policies regarding 
planning proposals. Industrial dynamics modelling through 
its successful application to problems concerning corporate 
planning and business policies of firms is thus very appropri- 
ate. Its methodology is especially suitable for the study 
of the management and control of large organizations, such 
as the one under this present study, and in particular how 
they grow and evolve in an uncertain future. Further it is 
particularly powerful in enabling the analyst to explore the 
way in which. policy making within an organization affects 
its behaviour and then to design policies which would produce 
satisfactory behaviour if things go right in the external 
world, whilst at the same time protecting the organization 
against the worst that can happen if things go wrong. Our 
conclusion is thus that the technique is indeed very well 
suited for our problem. 
3.5 System Boundaries 
In a study of this nature the first and most important 
step prior to the construction of the model is to define a 
suitable selection of the boundaries of the system to be 
explored, according to the objectives of the research. 
Forrester (1962) argues that "if all the necessary components 
are adequately described and properly inter-related, the 
model system cannot do other than behave as it should". 
Hence great care has to be taken in order to include all the 
significant factors affecting the behaviour of the system 
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under the study. Any negligence in doing so could result 
in the elimination of behaviour which might be of great 
importance to the aims of the research and hence affecting 
the credibility of the work undertaken. At the same. time 
the researcher has to guard against the boundaries becoming 
unnecessarily extended which could result in the overshadowing 
of the main objectives of the study and also affecting the 
intended duration of the work. 
Concerning this present research, after a great deal of 
consultation with a number of companies interviewed and also 
extensive research in the literature from different sources; 
a system boundary was derived according to the objectives of 
the study which is demonstrated by figure 3.1. 
The next step is to translate the system boundary into 
an influence diagram which would include the most significant 
variables of the system adequately linked. Influence diagram- 
ming is very powerful in demonstrating the causal relationships 
among variables. The list extension technique recommended 
by Coyle (1977) is helpful in enabling the analyst to draw 
a preliminary influence diagram which would embody the most 
important components of the system. We employed this 
technique in constructing a first diagram which was then 
taken to a number of companies. We found the influence 
diagram to be an excellent tool of communication during our 
contacts with the executives of the companies. They gave 
very constructive comments on the links between the variables, 
suggested certain amendments and also some new links and 
variables of great importance. During the interviews we 
perceived that an influence diagram of this nature represents 
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an intuitive model of the system which a manager, or a person 
who knows most about the system, has in mind hence their 
willingness to co-operate. 
Figure 3.2 represents a simplified influence diagram of 
the system under this present study. The diagram does not 
include all the links because to do so would have meant the 
inclusion of hundreds of links crossing one another and thus 
displaying a very complex figure which would be of little use. 
However, it does demonstrate the very bone structure of the 
system embodying the most important components which are 
responsible for the way that the actual system behaves. The 
driving forces of the system together with the assumptions 
made in the modelling process are discussed in chapter 4. 
3.6 Nature of the organization to be Studied 
In this study our concern is with the petrochemical 
activities of the first line oil companies (i. e. the majors 
known as the seven sisters). Their strategies towards the 
chemical business are, as we discussed in chapter two, very 
similar, with minor differences. The research is actually 
based on a hypothetical petrochemical subsidiary of a major 
oil company (due to the reasons given below), however it 
could represent the chemical activities of any of the seven 
companies mentioned above which is advantageous in terms of 
making the conclusions applicable in a wider context and also 
for any possible comparisons. However, the hypothetical 
nature of the company does imply that there is a danger of 
over simplifying the situation which in turn affects the 
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credibility of the work. Consequently in order to prevent 
this we have tried to acquire and analyse information from as 
many sources as available. 
3.7 'Confidential' Contacts with Major Oil 
and Chemical Companies 
During the initial stages of the project, a number of 
major oil companies were contacted in order to find out about 
the possibility of carrying out the work on a real company. 
However, as we mentioned in chapter two, due to the confident- 
ial nature of the operations of the major oil companies, it 
proved impossible to obtain the high level of involvement 
necessary from the management of any of the companies 
approached, but after a great deal of assurances and guarantees 
that no names of persons or companies will be revealed in the 
thesis they did agree to co-operate to a certain extent. 
During the period of our research we have had frequent contact 
with the executives of a number of major oil and also chemical 
companies who have discussed and commented on our work and 
also suggested some very important factors to be included. 
They also provided us with some very important data and informa- 
tion which we were not able to obtain from the other sources. 
These informations are presented in the thesis, however their 
sources will remain undisclosed due to our promise to the 
companies. At this point we would like to state that the 
co-operation of the executives of the companies has been 
absolutely invaluable and crucial concerning the development 
and the completion of our study. Unfortunately we cannot 
name them but we would like to take advantage of this 
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opportunity to give them our deepest gratitude for all the 
time and effort which they contributed towards our research. 
3.8 Geographical Boundary 
For the purposes of this present work, since the bulk 
of the petrochemicals are produced and consumed within the 
industrialized nations we decided to explore the petrochemical 
operations of a major oil company within an industrialised 
region of the world where the conditions would be fairly 
homogeneous. Western Europe is one such region where the 
petrochemical industry is mainly based on naphtha which is 
a product of the refining process of crude oil which is mostly 
imported (although there are some endogenous sources such as 
those of the U. K. and Norway) and the price of which is fairly 
similar over the region. It is also not too unrealistic to 
assume an average overall inflation figure for this region 
(as is assumed by the companies discussed in chapter 4) 
although there are differences from one country to another. 
The growth and the structure of demand for petrochemical 
products, and the construction completion times of the petro- 
chemical plants are also fairly homogeneous over the region. 
At this point we should make it clear that the corporate 
planning model constructed for the purposes of this study 
would be of interest to the parent oil company in order to 
assess the overall performance of its petrochemical operations 
over such a region. There will of course be a number of 
operating companies within the countries covered by such a 
region which will carry out their own detailed planning 
according to certain strategic guidelines set out by the 
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parent company. These guidelines would be the result of 
an overall strategic plan prepared by the parent company 
which is also the aim of our own work. 
3.9 The Chemical Products Selected for the 
Study and the Choice of Feedstock 
The major oil companies, as discussed in chapter 2, have 
been concentrating on the large tonnage commodity and 'commodity' 
type chemicals which include olefins, aromatics, plastic inter- 
mediates, fibre intermediates and plastic resins. Since this 
study concerns the typical chemical operations of one such 
company, therefore we have chosen to concentrate on the largest 
part of their chemical businesses which consists of olefins, 
plastic intermediates and plastics, which respectively fall 
within the basic, intermediate and final products range of the 
petrochemical industry. Figure 3.3 describes the selected 
products in detail together with the internal structure of this 
part of the industry. 
As was mentioned in chapter 1, the European petrochemical 
industry has been mainly based on naphtha which is a product 
of the oil refining process. The United States' petrochemical 
industry is also switching to heavy liquid feedstocks, such as 
naphtha, because of the rapid exhaustion of its natural gas 
reserves. The feedstock situation is also generally the same 
in other areas. Therefore, concerning this present study we 
will concentrate on naphtha, of which the oil companies have 
plenty, as the feedstock for the production of olefins. The 
naphtha steam cracking process yields a number of basic petro- 
chemical products such as Ethylene, Propylene and Butadiene and 
a number of energy products including Gasoline, Fuel oil and LPG. 
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Figure 3.3 The Internal Structure of the Selected Products 
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in the intermediate sector we are considering vinyl chloride 
for which the raw materials are Ethylene and Chlorine, and 
Styrene which is based on Ethylene and Benzene. However, 
since in this study we are not considering the aromatics 
and chlorine production activities of the oil company, there- 
fore Benzene and Chlorine are treated as exogeneous inputs 
and we shall be assuming that"the company has access to 
sufficient quantities of these two raw materials for its 
Styrene and vinyl chloride production. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we shall discuss in detail the equation 
formulations of the model representing, quantitatively, the 
causal relationships existing among the variables described 
in the influence diagram presented in chapter 3. 
There are various computer languages available for 
dynamic modelling, however for the purposes of this present 
study DYSMAP, due to its simplicity and at the same time 
suitability for studying the dynamic behaviour of socio- 
economic systems, was selected CRatnatunga, 1979). The 
Dysmap compiler is very refined, incorporating many features 
including dimensional analyser. Coyle describes in detail 
the formulation of dynamic equations using DYSMAP (Coyle, 1977). 
During the initial stages of the research a simple 
hypothetical model of the system structure of the petro- 
chemical subsidiary of a major oil company was constructed 
which was then taken to a number of major oil and chemical 
companies in order to verify the validity of the relationships 
presented in the model. These contacts, made throughout the 
research up to the present time, have had invaluable impact 
on the evolution of the model to its final form. The people 
interviewed assisted enormously in the adaptation of the model 
in relation to the workings of the actual system. They 
suggested certain changes to a number of relationships, 
recommended some very important factors to be included in 
the model and supplied some very valuable and otherwise 
inaccessible data. Therefore the values of the various 
parameters of the model and the structure of the system have 
. 
been based upon the knowledge and experience of people who run 
the type of system which is under this present study. This 
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is particularly important concerning the validity of the 
model which is discussed in'chapter five. 
The time unit of the simulation period of the model 
is in terms of month. The solution interval, DT, was 
suitably set to / month for reasons of stability. 
The time horizon of the model extends from the year 
1980 to the year 2000, so that we would have the opportunity 
of studying the medium-range dynamic behaviour of the system 
as well as that of its longer-term. 
Due to the size of the model, we shall only describe 
the formulation of those equations which are important due 
to their relative complexity and the importance of the 
assumptions built into them. A full listing of the equations 
of the model is given in Appendix A. 
Since in this study we have modelled the three main 
sectors of the petrochemical industry, i. e. basic, intermed- 
iate and the final product sectors, therefore many of the 
equations written for these sectors are of similar structure 
and if necessary we shall only describe one equation which 
would also define the others. We will also define the 
value of the parameters and the initial conditions of the 
equations. 
Finally the corporate planning model has been built in 
such a way so as to be useful to both the top management and 
the operational staff of the company. It provides detailed 
physical and financial information about each individual 
product required by the operational staff for the running 
of the business as well as the broader type of strategic 
information required by the company's board of directors for 
their yearly decision making on the coming year's programme 
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of new capital expenditure proposals. The model also 
gives the broader physical and financial information about 
the product groups of the company (i. e. basic, intermediate 
and final) so that the top decision makers can readily 
assess the overall performance of their different businesses. 
4.2 The Product Demand Sector 
As was discussed in chapter 2 the majority of the oil 
companies are involved in the production of large-tonnage 
plastics which they sell to plastic fabricating companies 
to be used as raw material for the production of a variety 
of industrial and household products. It was also mentioned 
that a few oil companies have very minor interests in the 
fabrication of plastics but generally. they are net sellers 
of plastic resins to the processing industry. Therefore 
for the hypothetical company under this present study we have 
realistically assumed total non-captive demand for plastics. 
The company's production of plastics depends for its raw 
materials on the production of a number of basic and inter- 
mediate products. Therefore the oil companies retain a 
certain amount of their basic and intermediate production 
for further captive processing by their plastics divisions 
and sell the rest to some of the traditional chemical 
companies and the plastics companies who are dependent on 
the oil companies for the raw materials of their plastics 
production activities. This situation is reflected in the 
modelling process of the demand for the different products 
of the company. Briefly the demand for ethylene consists 
of a captive and a non-captive part. The captive part 
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depends on the demand for vinyl chloride, styrene, low- 
density polyethylene and high-density polyethylene. The 
non captive part is the demand for ethylene by outside 
customers. The demand for propylene depends-on the demand 
for company's polypropylene and the amount of propylene 
demanded by outside customers. The demand for butadiene 
is assumed to be wholly non-captive. The demand for vinyl 
chloride and styrene depend on the demand for company's PVC 
and polystyrene, and the non-captive demand for vinyl chloride 
and styrene respectively (see figure 3.3). 
The pattern of demand (ADGF) for petrochemical products, 
in the model, is a function of an exogenous factor namely 
a scenario for general rate of growth of demand for petro- 
chemicals in the 1980's and the 1990's. We have not con- 
sidered the effect of the company lowering its products prices, 
compared to its competitors, in order to gain a larger market 
share, because during the interviews made with a number of 
major companies they mentioned that this type of marketing 
strategy is, on the long run, very damaging and does not work 
(as discussed in chapter 3) because other companies would 
also lower their prices in order to protect their market share 
and at the end of the day everybody would be worse off. 
They stated that they have learnt from their past similar 
mistakes particularly during the late 1960's and the early 
1970's and have since built up a mutual understanding among 
themselves not to resort to such futile marketing strategies. 
It was also mentioned that the only way a company could 
actually increase its market share would be to acquire plants 
from other companies thereby not disturbing the total capacity 
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of the industry. In this study, therefore, we have 
assumed that the oil companies will not in the future 
try to capture other companies' market shares and we have 
also decided, through consultation with a number of 
companies, not to consider increase in market share 
through acquisition due to the small number of such deals 
happening among companies. -- 
Concerning the general rate of growth of demand for 
petrochemicals in the next decade, it is important to refer 
to Shell's study (Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, 
1980) which forecasts a 4% growth per year in the 1980's. 
This forecast is based on a 2/% growth per year forecast 
for industrial production which would therefore imply that the 
demand for petrochemicals is expected to grow at l/% per year 
higher than the industrial production. However, during the 
interviews made with other oil and chemical companies the 
majority of them mentioned that the 4% growth per year was 
too optimistic and one company was pessimistic enough to 
suggest a growth of 2%. However, the majority thought that 
an average annual growth of 3% would be more realistic and 
therefore we have adopted this figure for our present research 
(even'the 3% growth during the time horizon considered leads 
to significant growth in production capacity, which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5). 
Since the demand for petrochemicals like other industries 
such as electricity, paper, cement, etc., is highly cyclical 
we have introduced this phenomenon into the demand equations 
through the use of a sine wave function. Like many other 
heavy industries, the petrochemical industry experiences a 
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business cycle with an average period of 48 months. it 
was revealed during our interviews with the oil companies 
that they plan according to a business cycle amplitude of 
between +5 and +6 percent. Therefore for our purposes 
we have chosen an average amplitude of + 5/%. 
It was also suggested by the oil companies that for 
planning reasons for the 1990's we can also 'safely' assume 
a 3% general annual growth of demand for petrochemicals. 
Apart from the general growth of demand for petrochemicals, 
it is expected that the structure of demand for plastics in 
Western Europe will change significantly by 1990. This 
has been thoroughly explored and presented in McKinsey's 
study (McKinsey, 1978). The table below describes the 
structure of demand given by McKinsey. 
Table 4.1 The eight core products will continue 
to account for over 80% of consumption 
in Western Europe ..... 
FORECAST CONSUMPTION IN WESTERN EUROPE 
BY PRODUCT, 1976-90 
(%) 
100% 
24 PVC 24 
23 LDPE 22 
10 Polystyrene 9 
8 HDPE 10 
6 Polypropylene 11 
10 ABS/SAN, Polyurethanes 10 
Unsaturated Polyesters 
19 Others 14 
1976 1990 
Source: McKinsey survey of industry sources 
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We also asked the opinion of the oil companies about 
this demand structure and they all agreed with McKinsey's 
forecast. The impact of the structural changes of demand 
for plastics in Western Europe has accordingly been intro- 
duced to the demand sector of the model through a modelling 
device called a multiplier (e. g. LDMUL). For the purposes 
of our study we have assumed a straight line change of demand 
structure through time to 1990 due to the unavailability of 
the individual yearly forecast of demand structure up to the 
end of the decade. Also since the time horizon considered 
for this study extends to the 1990's and the structure of 
demand goes only as far as 1990, we have assumed that the 
structure of demand for plastics in Western Europe will 
remain unchanged throughout the 1990's at the 1990 figures. 
We are now in a position to describe some of the most 
important equations constructed for the demand sector based 
on the information and assumptions which have so far been 
presented in this section. The first equation concerns the 
formulation of the actual petrochemical demand growth factor 
which when multiplied by the base level of demand (in 1980) 
for each product, gives the product demand at any point in 
time: 
(1) A ADGF. K= EXP (RGDM*TIME. K) * (l+AMP*SIN (6.283* 
x (TIME. K+7)/PERD)) 
(1-1) N RGDM = . 03/12 
(1-2) C AMP = . 055 
(1-3) C PERD = 48 
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Where: 
ADGF = Cl). Actual petrochemical demand growth factor 
RGDM = (1/M) General rate of growth of demand for 
petrochemicals 
TIME = (M) Simulated time in model 
AMP = Cl) Amplitude of the business cycle 
PERD = (M) Period of the business cycle 
The first component of the right hand side of equation (1) 
geflects the exponential growth, of 3% per year, of the demand 
for petrochemicals discussed earlier. The second component 
is the sine wave representing the business cycle (it was found 
out from the Chemical Industries Association Ltd. that the peak 
in the production of petrochemicals in Western Europe was 
reached in May 1980, hence the inclusion of TIME. K+7 in equation 
(1) which is an attempt to correct the cycle accordingly). 
Throughout the rest of the thesis wherever division by twelve 
occurs in an equation (as in equation (1-1) above), it reflects 
the conversion of the yearly value of a variable or parameter 
into that of a monthly value due to our unit of simulation time. 
Next we shall explain the demand equation for ethylene which 
would also hold as an explanation for the other demand equations: 
(2) A ED. K = LDPED. K*ETOLD+HDPED. K*ETOHD+VCMD. K* 
x ETOVC+SD. K*ETOS+BED*ADGF. K 
(2-2) C ETOLD = 1.03 
(2-3) C ETOHD = 1.02 
(2-4) C ETOVC = . 485 
(2-5) C ETOS = . 307 
(2-6) N BED = AEECU*EBCAP*EY-((LDPED*ETOLD+HDPED*ETOHD)+ 
x (VCMD*ETOVC+SD*ETOS)) 
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Where: 
ED = (T/M) Total demand for. ethylene 
LDPED = (T/M) Total demand for low-density polyethylene 
ETOLD = (T/T) Amount of ethylene required to produce 
1 ton of low-density polyethylene 
HDPED = (T/M) Total demand for high-density polyethylene 
ETOHD = (T/T) Amount of ethylene required to produce 
1 ton of high-density polyethylene 
VCMD = (T/M) Total demand for vinyl chloride 
ETOVC = (T/T) Amount of ethylene required to produce 
1 ton of vinyl chloride 
SD = (T/M) Total demand for styrene 
ETOS = (T/T) Amount of ethylene required to produce 
1 ton of styrene 
BED = (T/M) Base level of non-captive demand for 
ethylene in 1980 
ADGF = (1) Actual petrochemical demand growth 
factor 
AEECU = (1) Average. Western European effective ethylene 
capacity utilization in 1979 
EBcap = (T/M) Effective basic product capacity including 
energy products capacity 
EY = (1) Ethylene yield per ton of naphtha cracked 
Before explaining equation (2) we would like to stress 
that wherever the word 'demand' is used in the definition of 
the variables of the model given in the listing presented in 
Appendix A and also in the text of this thesis, unless otherwise 
stated, it would mean the demand from industry, other petro- 
chemical manufacturers and also where appropriate the downstream 
product divisions of our hypothetical petrochemical subsidiary 
for a certain product which the hypothetical petrochemical 
subsidiary is actively involved in the production of. 
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Equation (2) describes that the total demand for ethylene- 
depends on the amount of low-density polyethylene, high-density 
polyethylene, vinyl chloride, styrene and ethylene demanded 
from the company. Table 4.2 gives the appropriate data on 
material usages for petrochemicals incorporated in equation (2) 
and also in other demand equations. This table was supplied by 
one of the oil companies interviewed. 
Table 4.2 Data on Material Usages for Petrochemicals 
No. Feedstock 
. ..................... 
Product 
. 
Feedstock Usage 
te/te Product 
1 Ethylene Styrene 0.307 
2 11 vCM 0.485 
3 it LDPE 1.03 
4" HDPE 1.02 
5 Styrene Polystyrene 1.05 
6. VCM PVC 1.01 
7 Propylene Polypropylene 1.096 
Source: 'Confidential' (The Petrochemical Subsidiary 
of a Major Oil Company) 
We will now describe equation (2-6) which works out the 
base level of non-captive demand for ethylene in 1980, i. e. 
the amount of ethylene demanded from the company by industry 
and other petrochemical manufacturers initially in 1980. 
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The base level has been set at the average Western European 
effective ethylene capacity utilization in 1979 multiplied by 
the company's initial effective ethylene capacity in 1980, less 
the total ethylene required for the manufacture of the initial 
amount of low-density polyethylene, high-density polyethylene, 
vinyl chloride and styrene, demanded from the company in 1980. 
This type of formulation implies that the company retains as 
much ethylene as required for its downstream operations and 
sells the remaining part to outside processors. The formul- 
ation in fact represents the petrochemical production strategy 
of the majority of the oil companies which was found out during 
the interviews. The oil companies would like to add as much 
value to the barrel of naphtha as possible, hence their prefer- 
ential downstream production policies which will be discussed 
in'greater depth in a later section. Data on the average 
Western European effective capacity utilization in 1979 for the 
products under this present study was obtained from one of the 
major oil companies and is presented in the table below. 
Table 4.3 Average Western European Effective 
Petrochemical Capacity Utilization 
in 1979 
Plant 
Average Western European 
effective capacity 
utilization in 1979 
Ethylene 90 
Propylene 87 
Butadiene 90 
Styrene 87 
VCM 90 
LDPE 94 
HDPE 72 
PVC 93 
Polypropylene 70 
Polystyrene 77 
Source: 'Confidential' (The Petrochemical Subsidiary of 
a major Oil Company) 
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Having explained equations (2) and (2-6), the reader 
should encounter no difficulty in understanding the other 
demand equations and their appropriate initial values. 
In the demand sector of the model there is an equation 
(TERP) which works out the amount of ethylene required for 
further processing into LDPE, HDPE, Polystyrene (via styrene) 
and Polyvinyl chloride (via VCM), demanded by industry and 
petrochemical fabricators so that in the production planning 
sector of the model provision for preferential allocation of 
raw material to the company's own downstream activities can 
be made. 
Two other equations in the demand sector need to be 
explained. In this sector there is an equation for the total 
demand for basic petrochemical products (TBD) which consists 
of the demand for ethylene, propylene and butadiene. However 
due to the yield constraints of the products of naphtha steam 
cracking process (selected as the only source of olefins for 
this present study) and the forecast change in the structure 
of demand for plastics in Western Europe by 1990 (particularly 
concerning the near doubling of polypropylene's share compared 
to its 1976 share), it became necessary to devise another 
equation (TBDY) as well as TBD in order to work out the total 
demand for basic petrochemical products which would take into 
account the yield constraints of naphtha-based ethylene crackers. 
This is in effect the demand for ethylene, propylene and butadiene 
which the company could hope to satisfy through naphtha steam 
cracking process only. As will be discussed in greater depth 
in the production planning sector, since ethylene and propylene 
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are the major chemical products of the naphtha steam cracking 
process and their yields cannot be varied much, the amounts to 
be produced of these two products have to be in line with their 
yields because otherwise the company could end up with an excess 
amount above the demand for one of these two products for which 
there would be no customer and especially due to the scale of 
such an operation the losses could be quite substantial. 
However it was found out from the companies interviewed 
that they attempt to satisfy the actual demands for ethylene and 
propylene through the cracking of natural gases, some heavy liquid 
petroleum feedstocks such as gas oil, and naphtha which is their 
main source of olefins. The ethylene and propylene yields of 
heavy liquid petroleum crackers can be varied within small 
margins according to the demand of these two products but if 
after variation there is still for example a shortage of ethylene, 
then if the demand for LPG is strong, the company might decide 
to run its crackers according to the demand of ethylene and sell 
the excess propylene thus produced as LPG (however the sale of 
propylene at fuel value is not generally desirable). Further, 
the cracking of propane and ethane produces propylene and 
ethylene respectively which would alleviate any tightness in 
the supply situation of these two products which might not be 
possible to meet through the cracking of heavy liquid feedstocks 
only. The companies also do certain exchanges among themselves 
in order to alleviate any short term shortages or excesses of 
certain products. For instance a company might be short of 
propylene and another company may be in a position to help and 
perhaps vice-versa on another occasion. 
We shall now present the equation formulation for TBDY 
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discussed earlier: 
(3) A TBDY. K = CLIP(ED. K, EPRAT*PD. K, EPRAT, ED. K/PD. K)* 
x EPBTOE 
(3-1) N EPRAT = EY/PY 
(3-2) N EPBTOE = (EY+PY+BY)/EY 
Where: 
TBDY = (T/M) Total demand for basic petrochemical 
products, taking into account the yield 
constraints of naphtha based ethylene 
crackers 
ED = (T/M) Total demand for ethylene 
EPRAT = (1) Ratio of ethylene to propylene production 
or capacity permitted due to their yield 
constraints 
PD = (T/M) Total demand for propylene 
EPBTOE _ (1) Ratio of the total yields of ethylene, 
propylene and butadiene to the yield of 
ethylene 
The CLIP function appearing on the right hand side of equation 
(3) is a standard DYSMAP macro function. In this case it 
evaluates the ratio of the ethylene demand to that of propy- 
lene's and compares it with the ratio (EPRAT) which is feasible 
according to the yield constraints. 
If EPRAT) ED/PD then TBDY = ED*EPBTOE 
If EPRAT < ED/PD then TBDY = EPRAT*PD*EPBTOE 
These relationships in fact represent the adjustment process 
discussed earlier. 
Relationship (3-2) calculates the ratio of the total yields 
of ethylene, propylene and butadiene to the yield of ethylene 
so that when multiplied appropriately, as above, by ED or 
EPRAT*PD would give TBDY. 
Table 4.4 obtained from one of the oil companies gives 
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the yields of ethylene and propylene, incorporated in equations 
3-1 and 3-2, as well as the yields of the other products of the 
naphtha steam cracking process. 
Table 4.4 Approximate data on typical naphtha 
based steam cracker yield structure 
NO. PRODUCT YIELD % wt 
1. Ethylene 31 
2. Propylene 16 
3. Butadiene 5 
4. SC Gasoline 21 
5. Fuel Gas 25 
6. Fuel Oil 1 
7. Loss 1 
Total 100 
Source: 'Confidential' (The Petrochemical 
Subsidiary of a Major Oil Company) 
It can be observed from table 4.4 that the yield of 
butadiene is very small compared to the yields of ethylene 
and propylene and for this reason the companies run the olefin 
plants according to the demands of the major chemical products 
(i. e. ethylene and propylene) and therefore the amount of 
butadiene produced is not necessarily according to the market 
demand. For instance, Western European petrochemical industry 
produces more butadiene than is locally demanded and therefore 
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exports are made to the U. S. where there is a shortage because 
its olefins production (unlike Western Europe which is based mainly 
on naphtha) is at present based mainly on natural gases which does 
not offer the scope of fulfilling its total home demand for butadiene. 
However as was mentioned in chapter 3 the United States' petrochemical 
industry is switching to heavy-liquid crackers due to its dwindling 
natural gas reserves. 
For reasons mentioned above we also decided not to consider 
the demand for butadiene when evaluating TBDY. in equation (3) 
discussed earlier. 
4.3 Forward Planning - Necessary Capacity 
Forecasts Sector 
In our interviews with the petrochemical subsidiaries of a 
number of major oil companies, they stated that the petrochemical 
industry, like many other heavy industries such as electricity, 
cement and steel, has to go through periods of high overcapacity 
due to the cyclic nature of the demand which together with the 
long construction lags of bringing plants on stream and their 
long lifetimes make it impossible for the industry to match its 
capacity to demand at all times. This undesirable phenomenon 
can be highlighted even more if there are any misplannings such 
as those of the late 1960's and early 1970's, discussed in the 
previous chapters, which have since 1974 placed the industry in 
a period of very high overcapacity expected to last well into 
the 1980's. 
As a matter of interest we enquired whether they would 
consider a capacity planning policy which would take their 
production capacities somewhere in between the peaks and the 
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troughs of their business cycles so as to have less overcapacity 
at the expense of missing part of the peaks. They replied that 
this sort of policy might be adequate for small to medium sized 
companies, operating in certain industries, fighting for their 
survival. However, in the petrochemical industry where very 
large companies operate, a producer has always to remain compet- 
itive so as to be able to respond to any potential growth in 
demand because otherwise others, capable of doing so will, and 
thereby increase their market share. In this situation the 
firm which has lost some of its market share would find it 
extremely difficult to capture it again. 
They therefore stated that, accepting that the least risk 
from the point of view of the companies operating in this industry 
is to remain always competitive, then they have to plan their 
capacity in order to take advantage of all the peaks in demand 
due to the business cycle. They further mentioned that this 
kind of capacity build up would of course result in significant 
overcapacity at the troughs of the cycle but is necessary in 
order to enable them to match their capacity to the peaks on 
time. 
We have therefore adopted this capacity planning policy 
for our research which has required the forecasting of a neces- 
sary capacity (which is not always desired) for each product 
over a horizon of 5 years, which is the common time horizon for 
the forecasting activities of the companies interviewed. This 
has involved the formulation of an equation (FNCGF) that fore- 
casts the necessary petrochemical capacity growth factor, which 
is structurally very similar to the equation for the actual 
petrochemical demand growth factor (ADGF), discussed in section 
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4.2, except for the required time shift, the exclusion of the 
sine wave function which represents the business cycle (but 
retaining the amplitude term AMP) and the inclusion of an error 
and bias term, RGDMEB, which may arise when attempting to fore- 
cast the general rate of growth of demand for petrochemicals 
(RGDM). Due to their similarity, it is not necessary to 
present here the equation for FNCGF. 
The equation for FNCGF together with the appropriate 
multipliers representing the forecast changes in the structure 
of demand for plastics (e. g. PPMULP) based on McKinsey's study 
(discussed earlier) and the base level of demand for the differ- 
ent products give the necessary capacity for each product in 
five years time. The equations for the necessary capacities 
are very similar to those representing the demand of the 
different products, described in section 4.2, therefore we 
shall not give their formal presentation. 
4.4 Current Production Capacity Sector 
The equations in the sector are very straight forward. 
For example: 
(4) L BCAP. K = BCAP. J+DT*(BCCR. JK-BCDR. JK) 
(4-1) N BCAP = 7887E3/12 
(5) A EBCAP. K = BCAP. K*MFCUR 
(5-1) C MFCUR = .8 
(6) A EBCAPE. K = EBCAP. K*TYEPB 
(6-1) N TYEPB = EY+PY+BY 
(7) R BCDR. KL = BCAP. K/LTPP 
(7-1) C LTPP = 204 
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Where: 
BCAP = (T/M) Basic product capacity 
BCCR = ((T/M) /M) Rate of completion of basic product 
capacity 
BCDR = ((T/M)/M) Rate of decay of basic product capacity 
EBCAP = (T/M) Effective basic product capacity including 
energy products capacity 
MFCUR = (1) Maximum feasible capacity utilization 
EBCAPE _ (T/M) Effective basic product capacity excluding 
energy products capacity 
TYEPB = Cl) Total yields of ethylene, propylene and 
butadiene per ton of naphtha cracked 
BCDR = ((T/M)/M) Rate of decay of basic product capacity 
LTPP = (M) Lifetime of petrochemical plants 
Equation (4) represents the basic product capacity which 
increases by the amount of any new capacity completed and 
depletes through physical wear. The initial value of basic 
capacity (in 1980) given by equation (4-1) and also those of 
the other products do not necessarily correspond to the produc- 
tion capacities of a particular oil company, however they do 
represent capacities comparable to those of the subsidiaries 
of the major oil companies. 
Equation (5) represents the effective basic product 
capacity in terms of the basic capacity and the maximum feasible 
capacity utilization. It was mentioned in the interviews that 
the effective capacity of a plant is generally lower than the 
capacity which is designed and claimed by the construction 
engineers. The companies stated that it is not usually 
possible to reach a utilization of more than 85 - 90% even 
after 'debottlenecking'. Other factors also reduce utili- 
zation including breakdowns and maintenance. The age of the 
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plant also limits utilization. In the case of a new plant, its 
first year loading is about 60% of the effective capacity, 
2nd year 80%, 3rd year 90-100% and full utilization in the 
4th year, The utilization drops towards the end of the useful 
loge of a plant. Having considered all these factors, the 
companies suggested that on average, a maximum feasible capacity 
utilization of 80% would be realistic, which has been adopted 
for this study. Equation (6) simply evaluates the effective 
basic capacity excluding the energy products capacity. Finally, 
it was mentioned by the oil companies that, for Planning purposes.. 
they depreciate their petrochemical plants physically over a 
life time of 17 years, using the straight line method due to its 
simplicity and close correspondence to the actual decay of plants. 
This method of depreciation is widely used by the majority of 
British companies (ICAEW, 1976). Hence, equation (7) was 
formulated. There are averaging equations in this sector which 
evaluate the average rate of decay of capacities, used in the 
planning of future capacities. The averaging time is 3 months 
which is also used by the companies. 
4.5 Forward Planning - Capacity Requirements Sector 
The oil companies plan for their future petrochemical 
capacity requirements over a horizon of five years. It is 
necessary for them to operate on such a long horizon because 
the construction completion times for the plants producing the 
chemicals are long. For example, the average Western European 
construction times for olefins and plastics plants are 4 and 
3 years respectively which when considering the planning horizon 
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gives the companies 1 and 2 years respectively to make their 
decision on the ordering of the plants. In the interviews 
made with the companies, we asked them why they did not operate 
on a planning horizon of 4 years for plastic products since 
this time scale would still give them a one year decision making 
interval equivalent to that of olefins. It was mentioned to us 
that they operate on a common planning horizon for all products 
because otherwise, due to the interdependency of products for 
their raw material usage, complications would have to be built 
into the planning process which is undesirable. Therefore to 
correspond with reality we have adopted the same system. The 
companies' planners evaluate any desired new capacity for a 
certain product according to its necessary future capacity 
(explained in section 4.3), present capacity, physical wear of 
the present capacity during the decision making interval and the 
construction completion time (i. e. the total time of which equals 
the planning horizon) of the plant producing such a product, and 
the capacity of any such product which the company might have 
on order and which may be completed before the end of the 
planning horizon. This process has correspondingly been 
adopted for our planning sector. As an example, we shall 
present below the equation formulation for the desired new 
ethylene capacity which would also act as the explanation for 
the desired new capacities of other products. 
(8) A DE. K = (NE. K-EY*EBCAP. K)/MFCUR+EY*ABCDR. K* 
x (DMINTB+CDELBP)-EY*BCAPOR. K 
(8-1) C EY = . 31 
(8-2) C MFCUR = .8 
(8-3) C DMINTB = 12 
(8-4) C CDELBP = 43.2694 
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Where: 
DE = (T/M)Desired new ethylene capacity 
NE = (T/M) Necessary ehtylene capacity in 5 years time 
EY = (l) Ethylene yield per ton of naphtha cracked 
EBCAP = (T/M) Effective basic product capacity including 
energy products capacity 
MFCUR = Cl) Maximum feasible capacity utilization 
ABCDR = ((T/M)/M) Average level of decay of basic product 
capacity 
DMINTB = (M) Decision-making interval for basic product capacity 
CDELBP = (M) Construction delay in basic product capacity 
additions 
BCAPOR = (T/M) Basic product capacity on order but not received 
Note that the construction completion time of basic (i. e. olefins) 
capacity presented in equation (8-4) is set at a value less than 
the actual time (i. e. 4 years) mentioned earlier. This is due 
to the behaviour of DYSMAP's DELAY3 macro function used in the 
modelling of the construction process which will be discussed 
in greater depth in the capacity construction pipeline sector. 
Another equation in this sector which needs our attention 
concerns the evaluation of the desired new basic product capacity 
which is based on a. similar methodology to that of equation (3) 
discussed in the product demand sector of this chapter. As 
was discussed in that section, the cracking of naphtha produces 
a number of petrochemical and energy products. The major 
chemical products are ethylene and propylene, and the rest 
of the products are considered as by-products. These two 
products have certain yields and therefore when evaluating 
the desired new basic product capacity, one has to consider 
the desired new ethylene and propylene capacity and adjust them 
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according to their yield constraints in order to decide on 
the size of the new cracker required. This process is 
modelled through the following relationship: 
(9) A DC. K = CLIP(DE. K, EPRAT*DP. K, EPRAT, DE. K/DP. K)/EY 
(9-1) C EY = . 31 
Where: 
DC = (T/M) Desired new basic product capacity 
SPRAT = (1) Ratio of ethylene to propylene production or 
capacity permitted due to their yield constraints 
DP = (T/M) Desired new propylene capacity 
(definition of DE and EY were given above) 
The CLIP function compares EPRAT with the ratio of DE/DP and 
if EPRAT> DE/DP then DC=DE/EY, if EPRAT < DE/DP then DC=EPRAT* 
DP/EY. Hence the desired new basic product capacity is either 
the desired new ethylene capacity (DE) or the feasible new 
ethylene capacity (EPRAT*DP) depending on the comparison and 
in each case divided by the yield of ethylene (EY) in order to 
convert the ethylene capacity to the corresponding basic product 
capacity. 
The planning department, having evaluated any future 
capacity requirements, propose them to the board of directors 
at the end of each year for their approval. Given the board's 
approval, which depends on the company's financial position and 
the nature of their sanctioning policies, the planners would then 
be in a position to decide on the execution of the projects. 
However, these kinds of decisions are usually. made within some 
time interval which we shall call the 'decision-making interval'. 
Hence the construction of the new plants should commence within 
the current interval. As mentioned earlier the decision making 
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intervals in our case are 1 and 2 years depending on the type 
of plant being built. These intervals are differences between 
the planning horizon and the construction delays. 
Based on the above arguments we are now in a position to 
apply a simple proportional control law which gives the target 
rate of ordering plants. As an example we shall present the 
equation for the target rate of ordering basic capacity: 
(8) A TROBCAP. K = DC. K/DMINTB 
(8-1) C DMINTB = 12 
Where: 
TROBCAP = ((T/M)/M) Target rate of ordering basic product capacity 
DC = (T/M) Desired new basic product capacity 
DMINTB = (M) Decision-making interval for basic product capacity 
Finally. we should make it clear that the capital projects 
which are proposed to the board would have previously undergone 
thorough short and long term profitability tests such as DCF 
and also selected according to their suitability in matching 
the company's corporate objectives. However this part of the 
planning process is not within the purpose of this present 
research because our main interest lies in the strategic manage- 
ment decision making. Therefore, we shall assume that the 
capital expenditure proposals put forward are all worth serious 
consideration by the board. 
4.6 Forward Planning - Spending Requirements Sector 
In this sector of the model Company's spending needs are 
evaluated which consist of a number of items. Any gap between 
the working capital required to support the planned production 
(WCAPR) and its actual value (WCAP) should ideally be filled as 
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soon as it arises, hence in our case at each DT. The same 
degree of urgency applies to alleviating any gap between the 
required money to be committed to new capacity addition 
projects (RMCNP) and its actual value (MCNP). This gap 
arises because of the rises in the construction costs of 
plants, . discussed in chapter 1. Since the company is obliged 
to make the required payments to the constructors as scheduled, 
any shortfall has to be quickly dealt with. It was discovered 
from the companies interviewed that when they commit money to 
new projects, they generally include a certain amount to cover 
the future cost rises of the plants. However, they also 
mentioned that their forecasts of the cost rises do not usually 
match the actual rises, due to the difficulty in estimating the 
future inflation level, therefore adjustments become necessary. 
Due to the deficiencies and complications involved in this 
process and also since it is not the purpose of our study to 
analyse such a process, we decided to adopt the methodology 
described earlier which enables the company to adjust MCNP 
according to inflation, and this is sufficient for our purposes. 
Finally the required rate of spending on capital projects 
(RRS) is simply formulated as the target rate of ordering manu- 
facturing capacity for a particular product (e. g. TROBCAP) 
multiplied by the'capital cost per ton of this capacity 
(e. g. CCC), summed for all the different capacities to be 
ordered. RRS is in fact the rate at which the company should 
be spending money now so as to be able to meet the expected 
demand by the end of the planning horizon. However since the 
planning process is continuous, RRS will be reviewed with the 
passage of time. 
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4.7 Implementation of Planning Decisions Sector 
At the end of each year the board of directors of the 
company meet in order to make their decision on the new capital 
expenditure proposals put forward to them by their corporate 
planners. Their decision is generally based on a comparison 
between the required rate of spending on new capital projects 
CRRS) for which approval is needed, and the achievable rate of 
spending which the company could sustain (ARS) through its 
internal cash generation and financial assistance from the 
parent company. RRS is the result of planning discussed in 
section 4.6 and ARS will be defined in section 4.13. Briefly 
if ARS is about the same or exceeds RRS then the company is in 
a firm position and therefore all the proposals would be 
approved. However if ARS is below RRS then the company is 
not in a firm position and hence the proposals have to be 
reduced according to the shortfall. However, it was mentioned 
to us by the companies interviewed that the reduction is not 
actually exactly proportionate to the shortfall. Further 
stating that, defining the ratio of ARS to RRS as the financing 
ratio (FRAT), if for example only 50% of the money can be 
foreseen (i. e. FRAT=50%) then the board might actually approve 
65% of the proposals. They explained that this growth orient- 
ated investment policy stems from their access to parent 
company's vast financial resources and the ability to raise 
capital in the future if necessary. This policy in fact 
implies that the petrochemical subsidiaries of the oil companies 
would actually approve more expenditure than they can afford on 
the assumption that they can obtain the deficit when required. 
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In order to represent the foregoing argument in the 
model, firstly the financing ratio (FRAT) was defined accord- 
ingly. Then through adapting an approach postulated by Coyle 
(1977) a modelling device called the financial multiplier 
(FPMULT) was formulated in order to give the fraction of the 
planned expenditure (RRS) which is actually approved by the 
board, depending on the financing ratio (FRAT). However, it 
should be stressed that such a formulation is a model rather 
than a statement of actual behaviour. 
(9) A FRAT. K = ARS. K/(RRS. K+clip(O, l, RRS. K,. l). ) 
(10) A FPMULT. K = TABHL(TFPMULT, FRAT. K, 0,2,. 5) 
(10-1) N FPMULT =1 
(10-2) T TFPMUT = 0/. 65/1/1/1 
Where: 
FRAT = Cl) Ratio of achievable rate of-spending and 
required rate 
ARS = C$JM) Achievable rate of spending on capacity 
additions 
RRS = ($JM) Required rate of spending on new capital 
projects 
FPMULT = (1) Fraction of planned expenditure actually 
incurred 
TFPMULT =CI. ) Table value for financial policy multiplier 
FPMULT 
Figure 4.1 describes the table function (10-2) graphically. 
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Figure 4.1 Financial Multiplier 
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It can be observed that the above relationship is not 
linear. However, it has to be stressed that the data given 
in the table function (10-2) which is also illustrated in 
figure 4.1 does not actually correspond to any particular 
company because the persons interviewed were not able to 
disclose such information and also mentioned that even if they 
were, it would still be very difficult to quantify the relation- 
ship accurately. 
. 
Therefore the relationship presented is one 
possible pattern, however the important thing is that it 
reflects a growth orientated policy. Note that for values 
of FRAT higher than 1 the value of the financial multiplier 
('PMULT1_remains at 1, which implies that the board of directors 
, would not approve more capital expenditure than required even 
if the company could afford it (this was mentioned to us during 
our interviews with_ the coipanies). 
Besides FRAT we have also defined IFRAT which represents 
the subsidiary's ability to finance its capital projects 
through its internal cash generation. The formulation of 
IFRAT is basically the same as that of FRAT except for the 
exclusion of the financial assistance from the parent company. 
IFRAT is a very useful indicator of the financial performance 
of the subsidiary. 
One other outcome of the board meeting is to decide on 
the need of financial assistance from the parent company. 
The petrochemical subsidiaries of the oil companies do not 
generally borrow from the money market themselves. All the 
borrowings for the different businesses are carried out by the 
parent company and are given to the subsidiary in terms of 
investment from the parent. However, even the major oil 
127 
companies can only borrow within feasible limits, therefore they 
in. turn have to impose limits on the amount of investments which 
they can allow for their subsidiaries. This phenomenon has been 
incorporated in the model through a relationship that works out 
the actual rate of the parent company's monthly investment in 
its petrochemical subsidiary (RIPC) which depends on the 
difference between the subsidiary's actual and feasible spending 
rates (SCDIFF) and also the parent company's maximum monthly 
allowable investment in its petrochemical subsidiary. 
After the board meeting if the amount of capital expenditure 
Approved is below the required level, then the planners have 
to carry out the detailed work of deciding which projects are 
to go through and which are to be shelved for the time being. 
Hence in the model, the availability of funds to pay for the 
target rate of ordering capacity (e. g. TROBCAP) could restrict 
the ordering decision (e. g. BCSR) through the financial policy 
multiplier (FPMULT). 
(11) R BCSR. KL = TROBCAP. K*FPMULT. K 
Where: 
BCSR = C(T/M)/MZ Rate of commencement of basic product 
capacity 
TROBCAP = ((T/M)/M) Target rate of ordering basic product 
capacity* 
FPMULT = Cl) Fraction of planned expenditure actually incurred 
However if FPMULT =1 then there is no restriction. 
Consequently the rate of committing money to new projects 
(RCMTNP) has been formulated as the rate of commencement of 
each kind of capacity (e. g. BCSR1 multiplied by its appropriate 
construction cost (e. g. CCC), and summed for all the different 
capacities. 
Finally due to the importance of having sufficient working 
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capital in order to support the company's production activities, 
the target rate of growth in working capital (TIWC) is wholly 
approved at all times, because otherwise the level of production 
would have to be cut and this is not generally desirable in a 
highly competitive industry. Therefore, working capital 
additions take priority over capital expenditure requirements 
on new plants. 
4.8 Capacity Construction Pipeline Sector 
Zn this sector we have formulated a number of relationships 
that represent the amount of each different product capacity 
which the company has under construction but not yet completed. 
The relationships are simply an accumulation of the difference 
between the rates of commencement and completion of each type 
of capacity. The initial values of these relationships have 
been evaluated by simple mathematical manipulation of certain 
appropriate equations. For example, in order to establish the 
initial value of the amount of styrene capacity on order but 
not yet received (SCAPOR), first of all we assume that the rate 
of commencement of styrene capacity (SCSR) is intially equal to 
its target value (TROSCAP) and also that SCAPOR would initially 
be equal to the initial value of SCSR multiplied by the cons- 
truction delay in styrene capacity additions (CDELS). Now 
all that is left is to substitute in the relationships repres- 
enting TROSCAP and SCAPOR their equivalents defined above so 
as to be able to obtain a relationship which would give the 
initial value of SCSR in terms of other known variables. 
This in turn would give the initial value of SCAPOR, i. e. 
SCAPOR = SCSR*CDELS. 
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In order to represent the construction process in the 
model, we have made use of DYSMAP's DELAY3 macro function 
which is a third order delay having a spread which approxi- 
mately resembles the actual completion of the different stages 
of the project during its construction period (i. e. the start 
up, the main progress and the finishing touches). However, 
it has to be made clear that the construction process modelled 
in such a way does not correspond to the exact real life process 
which is generally quite complicated and not within the purpose 
of this present research which is concerned with the overall 
strategic management decision-making process. At this level 
we are more concerned with the overall physical and financial 
implications of the construction process for the company rather 
than the detailed work involved in the progress of the construc- 
tion activities. 
The following relationship gives as an example the rate 
of completion of styrene capacity: 
(12) R SCCR. KL = DELAY3(SCSR. JK, CDELS) 
(12-1) C CDELS = 31.6729 
Where: 
SCCR = ((T/M)/M) Rate of completion of styrene capacity 
SCSR = ((T/M)/M) Rate of commencement of styrene capacity 
CDELS = (M) Construction delay in styrene capacity additions 
Note that the construction delay in styrene capacity addit- 
ions given by relationship (12-1) is less than the actual value 
(i. e. 36 months). In fact all the construction completion 
times used within the simulated model are less than their 
actual values. This is due to the fact that the delay time 
(e. g. CDELS) incorporated in a DELAY3 macro function is not the 
130 
same as the actual construction completion time. The DELAY3 
macro function is designed in order to give a reasonable spread 
of plant completion times and in doing so the spread becomes 
rather large. Therefore, at the end of the delay time (e. g. 
CDELS) there is still a certain percentage of the capacity 
which is not yet complete. Coyle (1978) in Equations for 
Systems has investigated the behaviour of the DELAYS macro 
very thoroughly and also suggests a number of remedies concern- 
ing the problem of the spread of the delay. 
In our study we have accordingly reduced the delay times 
(e. g. CDELS) in order to make sure that any capacity ordered 
is completed within the actual construction completion time. 
The delay times are given in the appropriate sector of the 
model presented in Appendix A. 
4.9 Pricest Axort zation and Return, 
and Production Costs Sector 
In this sector of the model we generate the prices of 
the different petrochemical products, under this present study, 
in Western Europe. These prices are at balanced supply and 
demand situation, therefore at any point in time according to 
the industry being in a position of overcapacity or under- 
capacity the actual prices will fall or rise above the generated 
prices respectively. The effect of capacity utilization on 
gross profit margin will be discussed in section 4.12. 
In generating the equilibrium prices of the products we 
have made use of a table of relationships presented in UNIDO's 
study on the petrochemical industry (UNIDO/ICIS, 1978). This 
table gives information concerning the shares of the 1978 (the 
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year the study was undertaken) prices of a number of petro- 
chemical products expected to vary with the price of crude 
oil and the shares which are expected to vary with overall 
inflation. This information is presented in table 4.5. 
It can be observed that the impact of the crude oil price 
is less further down the stream (i. e. as we move down the 
table), as was also discussed in chapter 1. Conversely the 
impact of overall inflation increases further down the stream. 
This is because further processing of chemicals requires more 
and more manpower, utilities, plant and machinery, thereby 
increasing the weight of overall inflation. 
We checked on the validity of this information and its 
applicability concerning the 1980 (the initial year of the 
simulation period of the model constructed for this study) 
prices through the interviews made with the oil companies and 
also enquired whether these relationships could be used for the 
projection of the equilibrium prices mentioned earlier. They 
did agree with the information and its applicability to the 
1980 conditions and stated that these relationships would also 
apply to the equilibrium prices. Further, since the UNIDO's 
study does not give the relationships for vinyl chloride, high- 
density polyethylene, PVC and polypropylene, the companies 
kindly supplied us with their estimates which are included in 
table 4.5. 
In order to project the equilibrium prices, one would also 
require their base levels. Therefore we asked the companies 
what the prices of a certain number of petrochemical and energy 
products would have been, if today (i. e. 1980) the supply and 
demand situation for these products were balanced in western 
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Table 4.5 Estimated petrochemical price trends 
(based on current prices) 
Share of present price Share of present price 
expected to vary with expected to vary with 
crude oil price % overall inflation % 
Ethylene 50 50 
Propylene 50 50 
Butadiene 50 50 
Benzene 50 50 
Oxylene - 50 50 
P. Xylene 50 50 
Styrene 40 60 
VCM 35 65 
Acrylonitrile 33 67 
DNIP 30 70 
Ld Polyethylene 29 71 
Hd Polyethylene 29 71 
Polypropylene 29 71 
PVC 28 72 
Polystyrene 28 72 
Source: - UNIDO/ICIS, First World-Wide study on the 
Petrochemical Industry : 1975-2000, 
December 1978. 
133 
Europe. They replied that in a balanced situation the petro- 
chemical industry could probably achieve a return of about 6% 
per year in real value. Further stating that since they work 
on an average Western European inflation rate of about 11% for 
the foreseeable future, therefore the real value of 6% would 
correspond to an inflated value of 17%. The companies are 
also allowed to depreciate the value of their plants over a 
period of 10 years (for more details please see section 4.13). 
The depreciation cashflow is a very important source of funds 
to the companies concerning their future capital investment 
programmes. Based on the above information one of the companies 
supplied us with the possible equilibrium prices of a number of 
petrochemical products presented in table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Possible Prices of a Number of Petrochemical 
and Energy Products if their Supply and 
Demand were Balanced in Western Europe 
in 1980 
PRODUCT PRICE 
$/7'ON 
Ethylene 900 
Propylene 648 
Butadiene 792 
Gasoline 384 
LPG 360 
Fuel oil 192 
Vinyl Chloride Monomer 792 
Styrene 1008 
High-density Polyethylene 1584 
Loo-density Polyethylene 1512 
Polyvinyl Chloride 1272 
Polystyrene 1440 
Polypropylene 1512 
Source: 'Confidential' (The Petrochemical Subsidiary 
of a Major Oil Company) 
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Concerning the future price rises of crude oil, the 
companies stated that they expect the OPEC countries to 
increase their prices by at least the average inflation level 
so as to preserve their buying power. They suggested rises 
between 10-12%, however there was consensus on an average of 
11% which corresponds to their forecast average inflation level 
in Western Europe. 
The following relationships based on the foregoing 
discussion are worth noting: 
(13) A PE. K = BPE*(FE*COPI. K+(ONE-FE)*OII. K) 
(13-1) C BPE = 900 
(13-2) C FE = .5 
(13-3) C ONE =1 
(14) A PPE. K = ETOEP*(FWDV*(WDVC. K+AWCAPRB. K)+DEPPC*WDVC. K)/ 
x (EBCAP. K*EY) 
. 
C14-1) N ETOEP = EYJ (EY+PY ) 
(14-2) N 'WDV = . 17/12 
(14-3) C EY = . 31 
(14-4) A CPTE. K = PE. K+DIFF. K-PPE. K 
(15) A DIFF. K = BY*(PB. K-MKTPB. KZ/(EY+PY) 
(15-1) C BY = . 05 
(16) L COPI. K = COPI. J+DT*(COPI. J*COPR) 
(16-1) N COPI =1 
(16-2) N COPR = . 11/12 
(17) L OII. K = OII. J+DT*(OII. J*OIR) 
(17-1) N 011 =1 
(17-2) N OIR = . 11/12 
Where: 
PE _ ($/T) Price of ethylene when supply and demand 
are balanced 
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BPE = ($/T) Base price of ethylene in 1980 
FE _ (1) Share of ethylene price expected to vary with 
crude oil price 
COPI = (1) Crude oil price index 
ONE = (1) Number 1 
0II = (1) Overall inflation index 
PPE _ ($/T) Part of the price of ethylene which covers 
the required amortization and return on 
investment when supply and demand are balanced 
ETOEP = (1) Ratio of the yield of ehtylene to the total yields 
of ethylene and propylene 
FWDV = (1/M) Fraction of written down value of plants to cover 
the required return on investment when'supply and 
demand are balanced 
WDVC = ($) Written down value of naphtha crackers 
AWCAPRB = ($) Average WCAPRB 
EBCAP = (T/M) Effective basic product capacity including energy 
products capacity 
EY = (1) Ethylene yield per ton of naphtha cracked 
CPTE = ($/T) Cost per ton of ethylene produced 
DIFF = ($/T) Loss or gain of the sale of butadiene to be 
added to or subtracted from the price of ethylene 
and propylene 
COPR = (1/M) Forecast average rate of crude oil price rises 
OIR = (1/M) Forecast average rate of increase of overall 
inflation in Western Europe 
Ethylene and propylene are the major chemical products of 
the naphtha steam cracking process which also yields a number of 
by-products including butadiene, gasoline, LPG and fuel oil. 
The balanced supply and demand prices of ethylene and propylene, 
given in table 4.6, are reached by deducting the balanced supply 
and demand values (i. e. prices) of the by-products of the crack- 
ing process from the total manufacturing costs, hence the rest 
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of the costs would have to be recovered through the selling 
prices of ethylene and propylene. Due to this costing system 
the required amortization and return on investment (at balanced 
supply and demand) is distributed equally within the balanced 
prices of ethylene and propylene. Hence, relationship (14) 
simply evaluates this portion of ethylene's price (PPE). 
Further due to the above costing system and also the 
crackers being run according to the demands of ethylene and 
propylene only (i. e. no control on the amount of by-products 
produced) if the supply and demand situation is not balanced 
for the by-products then the cost of ethylene and propylene 
could increase or decrease accordingly. However since it is 
not within the boundary of this present research to consider 
the variation of the prices of the energy products due to the 
business cycle and seasonal factors, therefore we have only 
considered the fluctuations of the market price of butadiene 
(MKTPB) about its balanced price (PB) which is equally distrib- 
uted on the costs of ethylene and propylene and is defined by 
the relationship (15). 
For working capital requirements, which will be discussed 
0 
in section 4.1, it became necessary to formulate three relation- 
ships in order to generate the average prices of the energy 
products (neglecting the effects of business cycle and seasonal 
variations). It was mentioned to us by the companies that the 
energy products price rises are 100% related to crude oil price 
rises. Based on this information and the base prices of the 
products, given in table 4.6, the above formulations were made 
possible and are given in the appropriate sector of the model 
presented in Appendix A. 
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Relationships (16) and (17) simply give the crude oil and 
overall inflation indexes required for generating the prices 
of the products. 
4.10 Production Planning Sector 
The oil companies interviewed, all stated that their 
production planning policy is based on further processing, as 
much as is demanded and is possible, of petrochemicals which 
they produce and then selling the remainder to other manufac- 
turers. Their reason for this policy is to add as much value 
to the barrel of naphtha as possible. Therefore we have fully 
taken into account this preferential downstream production 
planning strategy in our research. 
The companies actually use very large L. P. models to 
schedule their production activities, however our work does 
not require such detailed planning because we are really 
concerned with the overall strategic behaviour of the sub-systems 
of the organization interacting together. Therefore, for this 
sector of the model we have formulated a number of very simple 
rules by which the overall production strategies of the companies 
will be reflected and we shall rely on the companies' planners 
to work out the detailed 'optimum' production plans (for instance 
by using L. P. ). 
The formulation of the relationship giving the throughput 
in basic product sector (BTPUT) is very similar to relationship 
(3) discussed in sector 4.2. The level is set according to the 
demands of ethylene and propylene, (making sure that no excess 
quantity of any of these two products is produced) and is limited 
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by the effective capacity. Hence the capacity utilization 
in the basic product sector is'defined as the ratio of the 
total throughput in this sector to the total effective basic 
product capacity. The capacity utilizations in the other 
sectors are defined in a similar manner. 
In the intermediate product sector it is worth discussing, 
as an example, the relationship defining the vinyl chloride 
monomer throughput (VCTPUT): 
(18) A VCTPUT. K= Min (CLIP (VCMD . K, CLIP 
(PVCD . K*VCTOPV+ 
(BVCMD * 
x ETOVC/(BVCMD*ETOVC+BSD*ETOS))*(BTPUT. K* 
x EY-TERP. K)/ETOVCI ((PVCD. K*VCTOPV*ETOVC/ 
x TERP. K)*BTPUT. K*EY)/ETOVC, BTPUT. K*EY, 
x TERP. K), BTPUT. K*EY, ED. K-BED*ADGF. K), 
x EVCCAP. K) 
C18--l jC VCTOPV = 1.01 
(18-21 C ETOVC = . 485 
_(18-3 
1. C ETOS =. 307 
.O 
8-41. C EY 31 
--Where: 
VCTPUT =_ jT_/Kj_ Vinyl Chloride monomer throughput 
-VCMD = (TIM). Total demand for vinyl chloride 
PVCD = (T/M). Total demand for polyvinyl chloride 
VCTOPV = (T/T) Amount of vinyl chloride required to produce 1 
ton of polyvinyl chloride 
BVCMD = (T/M) Base level of non-captive demand for vinyl chloride 
in 1980 
ETOVC = (T/T) Amount of ethylene required to produce 1 ton of 
vinyl chloride 
BSD = (T/M) Base level of non-captive demand for styrene in 1980 
ETOS = (T/T) Amount of ethylene required to produce 1 ton of 
styrene 
BTPUT = (T/M) Throughput in basic product sector 
EY = (1) Ethylene yield per ton of naphtha cracked 
TERP = (T/M) Total ethylene required for further processing 
into plastics by the company's plastics division 
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ED = (T/M) Total demand for ethylene 
BED = (T/M) Base level of non-captive demand for ethylene in 
1980 
ADGF = (1) Actual petrochemical demand growth factor 
EVCCAP = (T/M) Effective vinyl chloride capacity 
Equation (18) might appear complicated, however it is not 
and its size is purely due to the interdependencies of the petro- 
chemical products. Basically VCTPUT depends on raw material 
availability, demand for vinyl chloride and the company's effective 
production capacity of this product. The raw materials for the 
production of vinyl chloride are ethylene and chlorine. Produc- 
tion of chlorine is not considered within this present study, 
hence it is considered as an exogenous factor and we shall 
assume that the company can always secure a sufficient quantity 
of this product for its vinyl chloride production. Therefore 
the raw material constraint becomes only that of ethylene's, 
hence the importance of the yield of ethylene from the throughput 
in basic product sector (i. e. BTPUT*EY). The demand for vinyl 
chloride (VCMD), bearing in mind that the company wishes to 
process as much of its petrochemicals further down the stream 
as is possible and demanded and then selling the remainder to 
other processors, consists of the part (that takes priority) 
which is needed by the company's plastics division to be converted 
into PVC and the part which is demanded from the company by other 
downstream processors. 
The production of styrene is dependent on ethylene and 
benzene. Since benzene is also not included in this study, 
it is treated exogenously and the company is assumed to always 
be able to secure a sufficient quantity of this chemical for its 
styrene production. Therefore, styrene's raw material constraint 
140 
becomes only that of ethylene's. 
In the final product sector (i. e. polymers) we shall discuss, 
as an example, the evaluation of the polyvinyl chloride through- 
put (PVTPUT) : 
(19) A PVTPUT. K = MIN(MIN(VCTPUT. K/VCTOPV, PVCD. K), EPVCAP. K) 
(19-1) C VCTOPV = 1.01 
Where: 
PVTPUT = (T/M) Polyvinyl chloride throughput 
EPVCAP = (T/M) Effective polyvinyl chloride capacity 
(See equation (18) for the rest of the definitions) 
Again PVTPUT is limited by the three factors mentioned 
earlier. (i. e. raw material availability, demand for polyvinyl 
chloride and the company's effective production capacity of this 
product). 
As we discussed in chapter 2 the oil companies are net 
sellers of polymers and very few are actually involved in their 
fabrication. We have accordingly adopted this strategy, there- 
fore the whole of the polymer production is sold to the outside 
customers. 
We have incorporated a checking system (CHECKM) in this 
sector of the model to make sure that the throughputs of the 
major basic products (i. e. ethylene and propylene) equal their 
non-captive sales and the amounts retained for further processing 
by the subsidiary. Hence ensuring that there is no leakage or 
creation of materials within the model. 
4.11 Working Capital Sector 
The value of working capital employed in the business 
(«CAP) has been defined as the accumulation of the difference 
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between the addition rate to working capital (ARWC) and the 
rate of reducing working capital if it exceeds requirements 
(RRWC). The initial value of WCAP,, in 1980, has been set 
at its required level. 
Working capital required to support the planned level of 
production (WCAPR) is the cost per ton of each product (except 
for the energy products and butadiene) multiplied by its 
planned level of throughput and also the cover of production 
cost required (COVER) and this is then summed for all the 
different products (the required cover for the sector of 
industry under this present study is 2 months). For energy 
products, their average prices are adopted and for butadiene 
its market price. These, exceptions are due to the costing 
system discussed in section 4.10. If WCAP is below WCAPR 
then the gap has to be filled quickly, as was mentioned in 
section 4.5, because otherwise the planned level of production 
would be affected. Conversely if the ratio of the actual 
working capital to its required (WCRAT) level exceeds 1 and 
reaches'a critical value (WCRCV), reductions become necessary 
over a certain period (TRWC). In our case the limit has been 
set at 1.2, with an adjustment period of 3 months, over which 
the excess working capital is liquidated and added to the cash 
reserves of the company. 
4.12 Sales, Profit and Cashflow Sector 
Concerning the sales of chemicals it is important to 
emphasize that the oil companies' strategy is to process as 
much of their petrochemicals further down the stream as possible 
and then sell the remainder to other processors. We have 
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therefore adopted this policy when formulating the relation- 
ships which give the chemical sales of the company. 
The sales equations are very simple, for example, the 
amount of ethylene which is sold to other petrochemical manufac- 
turers (Esold) is whatever is left, if any, when the total 
ethylene requirements of the planned level of throughputs of 
LDPE, HDPE, VCM and styrene are deducted from the planned level 
of ethylene throughput (i. e. BTPUT*EY). 
Having discussed the sales of the products, we shall now 
discuss the effect of capacity utilization on the profitability 
of the company. However in doing so, due to the size of the 
hypothetical company under this present study (representing the 
petrochemical subsidiary of a major oil company) and its 
competitiveness, we shall be assuming that the company's 
profitability would reflect that of the petrochemical industry's 
average. 
During the interviews made with a number of companies, 
they mentioned that they do not allow sales of chemicals at 
prices below their direct costs even when there is very signi- 
ficant overcapacity in the market. They further stated that 
they can overlook the portion of the price covering the required 
depreciation charges and profits but the direct costs have to 
be covered in order for their businesses to at least remain 
operational. It was explained to us that the decline of prices 
according to the overcapacity situation differs for the various 
products of the industry. This situation is best explained by 
grouping the products according to the behaviour of their 
prices: 
Group A: these are products which are not easily transportable, 
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hence there is insignificant trade of these products inter- 
nationally. Ethylene falls within this group which is 
generally produced in complexes including further processing 
plants that use ethylene as their raw material to for example 
produce vinyl chloride which in turn is converted into PVC. 
On a national scale there is movement of ethylene by pipelines 
but due to this logistic constraint, insignificant international 
trade and also the good relationship between the producers and 
the customers of this product established through long years 
of reliable contracts, the price does not fall rapidly during 
periods of overcapacity. 
Group B: these are products which unlike group A are easily 
transportable (hence free competition), Therefore during 
periods of overcapacity due to the special subsidies protecting 
this type of industry in some countries, the favourable cost of 
raw materials in certain regions and anticipation of full utili- 
zation, large quantities of these products become available on 
the international market and due to the fierce competition the 
prices fall very rapidly. Styrene, butadiene and benzene fall 
within this group. 
Group C: these products, which include polymers, are generally 
produced in complexes, for example PVC which is produced from 
ethylene via VCM. Again the supplier-customer relationship is 
very important and since the customer, through years of trade, 
has been satisfied with the quality of the products he has 
received, will be unwilling to change to another supplier whose 
products he will not be familiar with. Therefore in a situation 
of overcapacity the prices of these products drop slowly but not 
as slowly as those of group A. 
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Group D: these products, which include propylene and vinyl 
chloride, are of such a nature that their prices do not fall 
rapidly during overcapacity periods, however they do decline 
faster than those of group C. 
To quantify the deterioration of the prices of these four 
product groups according to the overcapacity situation is'not 
an easy task. However, one of the companies interviewed 
kindly helped us by suggesting approximate patterns. of the 
deterioration of that portion of the price of products, which 
covers the required depreciation charges and profits, according 
-to the overcapacity situation. We have expressed these 
patterns by a modelling device called the price multiplier 
. whose value 
is dependent on the ratio of demand to capacity 
(not the effective capacity). 
The patterns suggested to us are displayed in figure 4.2{ 
. 
which expresses the relationship between the price multiplier 
and the ratio of demand over capacity. 
Curves A, B, C and D represent the price multipliers of 
the four product groups discussed earlier in relation to the 
ratio of their demands over their capacities. We have approxi- 
mated each curve by three straight lines in order to simplify 
their inclusions within the model, however they do still reflect 
the general pattern of the deterioration of prices displayed 
by curves A, B, C and D. We should also state that these 
curves do by no means represent the real value of deteriorations 
and that they only display their possible shapes, therefore 
our own approximations using straight lines are adequate enough 
for the purposes of this present research. 
The relationships given in figure 4.2 demonstrates that if 
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Figure 4.2 PRICE MULTIPLIER 
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 110%% 
OVERCAPACITY UNDEMPACITY 
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the ratio of demand over capacity (not the effective capacity, 
effective capacity = .8x capacity) for a certain product is 
80% (i. e. balanced supply and demand situation) then the price 
multiplier is 1, however if the ratio falls to 50% then the 
price multiplier drops to zero. The 50% figure is by no 
means accurate and just serves as an estimate. The price 
multipliers are used to determine the gross margin on sales 
of the different chemicals. We shall present, as an example, 
the formulation of the price multiplier for ethylene (PME) and 
its consequent use in evaluating the gross margin on ethylene 
sales (GME). 
(20) A PME. K= TABHL (TPME , (TBDY . K*EY/TYEPB) 
/ (BCAP 
. K*EY) , 
x 5,1.1,. 1) 
(20-1) T TPME = 0/. 77/. 97/1/1.03/1.23/2 
(20-2) C EY = . 31 
(21) A GME. K= PPE. K*PME .K 
Where: 
PME = Cl) Price multiplier for ethylene 
TPME = (1) Table values of PME 
TBDY = CT/M) Total demand for basic petrochemical products, 
taking into account the yield constraints of naphtha 
based ethylene crackers 
TYEPB = (1) Total yields of ethylene, propylene and butadiene 
per ton of naphtha cracked 
BCAP = (T/M) Basic product capacity 
EY = (1) Ethylene yield per ton of naphtha cracked 
GME = ($/T) Gross margin on ethylene sales 
PPE _ ($/T) Part of the price of ethylene which covers the 
required amortization and return on investment 
when supply and demand are balanced 
Relationship (20) gives the appropriate price multiplier 
for ethylene (PME) in accordance with the ratio of the demand 
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for ethylene (taking into account the yield constraints) to 
its capacity. This multiplier is in turn used in equation 
(21) in order, to establish what the gross margin is on ethylene 
sales. In section 4.9 we discussed the formulation of a 
number of relationships that evaluate the part of the price 
of each product which covers the required amortization and 
return on investment when supply and demand are balanced 
(e. g. PPE). However in reality the supply and demand are 
rarely balanced, therefore the margin which the company can- 
obtain on top of the direct costs through the selling price 
per ton'of the product is not equal to its balanced value 
(e. g. PPE). The price multiplier (e. g. PME) reflects this 
imbalance between supply and demand, and hence appropriately 
adjusts the balanced portion of the amortization and return 
(e. g. PPE) in order to give the actual gross margin on sales 
of chemicals (e. g. GME). 
Figure 4.2 also demonstrates the possible values of the 
price multipliers in a situation of undercapacity, which lie 
to the right of the 80% Demand/Capacity ratio (i. e. balanced 
supply and demand). The lines drawn in the undercapacity part 
of the graph are related to the lines in the overcapacity 
sector, because we have assumed that the price multipliers 
would increase slowly (in a situation of undercapacity) in 
the case of product groups A, C and D due to the importance 
of the supplier-customer relationships (i. e. the supplier 
would not raise its prices too high for its contract customers) 
and logistic constraints (in the case of some of these products 
the producer is connected to its customers through pipelines, 
therefore it would be difficult for the supplier to change 
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its customers and vice-versa). Conversely, in the-case of 
product group B which are easily transportable (and hence free 
competition) the price multipliers are assumed to increase 
very rapidly if there is a shortage on the market of such 
products. 
Finally we should mention that the table values of the 
price multiplier for butadiene (TPMB) are somewhat different 
from the other table values. This is because during our 
interviews with the oil companies, they mentioned that they 
expect the market price of butadiene to vary about + 20% of 
its balanced value, given in table 4.6 section 4.9, in the 
future according to the supply and demand situation. There- 
fore based on this information and also the pattern of behaviour 
presented for product group B in figure 6.2, we have formed the 
table values of the price multiplier for butadiene which vary 
between 0.8 and 1.2'äccording to the supply and demand, and 
when this is applied to the balanced price of butadiene (PB) 
we obtain its market price (MKTPB). 
Having discussed how we arrive at gross margins on the 
sales of chemicals, we are now in a position to evaluate the 
rate of receipt of profit from production and also the company's 
cash resources (PR). This is simply the level of throughput 
of each product (e. g. BTPUT*EY) multiplied by the appropriate 
gross margin per ton of sales (in this case GME) summed for 
äl1 the different product sales, plus the interest which the 
company earns on its cash reserves (CASH) and also the money 
which is committed to new capacity addition projects but not 
yet paid for (MCNP) and hence kept in the bank. The oil 
companies interviewed mentioned that, assuming an average 
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Western European inflation rate of 11E for the forseeable 
future, then an average interest rate of 2% higher than this 
level Cto cover the risks) would probably result. Therefore 
we have adopted this value for our study. A three month 
exponential smooth of PR gives the average profit level (APL). 
In order to evaluate how much of the profits are actually 
retained by the company for future investments (RP), it is 
necessary to know what proportion is paid in taxes and dividends. 
During an interview with one of the companies, it was mentioned 
to us that if the company is investing heavily then the portion 
is very small because the company offset plant allowances of 
100% against tax. However if the company is not investing, 
then the portion could be up to 52%. Since including this 
criteria within the model would have meant a certain amount of 
complications not necessary for the purposes of this study, we 
have instead assumed (having consulted the companies) that on 
average 30% of the profits will be paid in taxes and dividends. 
Therefore, the retained profit is equal to 70% of the rate of 
receipt of profit, having deducted from it the depreciation 
charges (DCFL). A three month exponential smooth of RP gives 
the average retained profit (ARP). 
4.13 Cash Generation Sector 
In this sector of the model a number of very simple 
relationships enable us to assess the company's spending 
capacity: 
(22) A DCFL. K = MAX(O, CLIP(DEPPC*WDV. K, PR. KL, PR. KL-DEPPC* 
.x 
WDV. K, O)) 
(22-1) N DEPPC = 1/120 
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(23) L CDCFL. K 
(23-1) N CDCFL 
(24) A ACGR. K 
(25) A ARS. K 
(25-1) C PHOR 
(26) A MAXIPC. K 
(26-1) N MAXIPC80 
= CDCFL. J+DT*(DEPPC*WDV. J-DCFL. J) 
=o 
= ARP. K+ADCFL. K 
= (MAXIPC. K+FREXP. K)-(ARWC. K+ECP. K) 
= 60 
= MAXIPC80*OII. K 
= 5E8/12 
(27) A MINCASH. K = PC*WCAPR. K 
(27-1) C PC = .3 
Where: 
DCFL = ($/M) Depreciation cash flow 
DEPPC = (1/M) Fraction of value of plant allowable for 
depreciation 
WDV = ($) Written down value of capital plants 
PR = ($/M) Rate of receipt of profit from production 
and cash resources 
CDCFL = ($) Cumulative depreciation cashflow unfulfilled 
ACGR = ($/M) Actual cash generation rate 
ARP = ($/M) Average retained profit 
ADCFL = ($/M) Average depreciation cashflow 
APL = ($/M) Average profit level 
ARS = ($/M) Achievable rate of spending on capacity 
additions 
MAXIPC = ($/M) Parent company's maximum monthly investment 
in its petrochemical subsidiary 
CASH = ($) Cash reserves of company 
MINCASH = ($) The level below which the company's cash reserves 
should not fall 
ARWC = ($/M) Addition rate to working capital 
ECP = ($/M) Escalation in cost of plants under construction 
due to inflation 
MAXIPC80 = ($/M) Base level of parent company's maximum monthly 
investment in its petrochemical subsidiary in 
1980 
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011 = (1) Overall inflation index 
PC = (1) The proportion of the value of the working capital 
to be kept in cash by the company 
Even though the companies depreciate the plants physically 
over a lifetime of 17 years, due to inflation of the capital 
cost of plants they are allowed to depreciate the value of the 
plants over 10 years (accelerated depreciation) and hence this. 
is deducted from their profits before they are taxed. However 
if the profits are lower than the allowable depreciation 
charges, then all that the company has for its depreciation 
cashf low is the actual prof it . The depreciation cashflow 
(DCFL) is thus simply defined by equation (22). A three 
month exponential smooth of DCFL gives the average depreciation 
cashflow (ADCFL). In order to balance the books we have 
formulated relationship (23) which accumulates any unfulfilled 
depreciation charges, discussed above. Average depreciation 
cashflow together with the average retained profit give the 
actual cash generation (ACGR) of the company. As was discussed 
in section 4.7 the petrochemical subsidiary of an oil company 
has also access to the cash generation of its parent company, 
however according to a certain limit. Since the petrochemical 
industry has reached its maturity and is expected to grow in 
the future according to the whole economy, we have assumed that 
the yearly investments of the oil companies in their subsidiaries 
have also reached their peak. Hence we have set the criterion 
For a thorough analysis of this criterion please see Robert K. 
Jaedicke and Robert T. Sprouse, "Accounting Flows: Income and 
Cash", Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965, pp80-86 
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that the parent company's maximum monthly investment in its 
petrochemical subsidiary would be according to its maximum 
level in 1980 multiplied by an overall inflation index in 
order to preserve the value of the investment at its 1980 
value (see relationship (26) ). We assumed an initial value 
of half a billion dollars per year which does not relate to 
any particular company but is probably in the region of what 
they can afford to give to their chemical subsidiaries. In 
our interviews with the companies they mentioned that it is 
important for them not to allow their cash reserves to fall 
below a certain level which is in turn related to their working 
capital requirements. This requirement has been formulated 
by relation (27) which sets the minimum cash level at 30% of 
the value of the required working capital. 
We are now in a position to assess the company's achiev- 
able rate of spending on capacity additions (ARS) in terms of 
the maximum monthly financial assistance which the parent 
company is able to give to its subsidiary, the rate of expen- 
diture which could be sustained through the subsidiary's 
internal funds, and finally the addition rate to working 
capital and escalation in cost of plants under construction 
(due to inflation) which have to be paid for no matter what, 
and hence take priority over spendings on new projects (see 
relationship (25) ). 
4.14 Capital Cost of Plants Sector 
As was discussed in section 1.6, the installed cost (per 
ton) of petrochemical plants decreases as larger capacities 
are ordered. The drop is not linear and varies according to 
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I a power function whose exponent is 0.7 up to capacities of 
about 200000 tons/year and approaches 1 for capacities of 
more than 400000 tons/year, indicating little if any economy 
of scale. It was found out during our interviews with the 
companies that they are only interested in the larger capacities 
due to lower investment costs per ton of product and the spread- 
ing of overheads and semivariable costs,. hence resulting in a 
lower manufacturing cost per ton of product, which is absolutely 
essential in such a competitive industry. In section 4.18 
the typical plant sizes which the companies are interested in 
(see table 4.7) are presented. Hence in this study the 
capacities ordered are of these particular sizes. The capital 
costs, given in this sector of the model, are for 1980 conditions. 
However as we discussed in chapter 1 the capital costs of the 
petrochemical plants are expected to increase in the future 
according to the overall inflation. Therefore the capital 
costs in 1980 multiplied by the appropriate overall inflation 
index (0II) give the capital costs of the plants at any time 
in the future. 
4.15 Valuation of The Company Sector 
The total liabilities of the petrochemical subsidiary (TL) 
is simply the sum of the parent company's total investment (to 
date) in its petrochemical subsidiary and the subsidiaries 
cumulative retained profits. The parent company's total invest- 
ment (IPC) is the accumulation of its past investments. The 
initial value (i. e. in 1980) of IPC has been chosen in such a 
way as to balance the books. Cumulative retained profits (CRP) 
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is the accumulation of the profits retained in the past. 
Again the initial value (i. e. in 1980) of CRP has been 
selected so as to balance the books. 
Money committed to new capacity addition projects (MCNP) 
is a composite of the rate of committing money to new projects 
(RCMTNP), escalation in cost of plants under construction due 
to inflation (ECP) and the rate of adding to value of petro- 
chemical plants (RAVP). 
The required money to be committed to new capacity addition 
projects is simply the amount of capacity which the company has 
on order (but not yet received) for each product multiplied by 
its appropriate capital cost and summed for all the different 
capacities. 
Written down value of the plants are simply a composite 
of the rate of adding to value of plants and the rate of 
financial depreciation of plants. 
Rate of adding to value of plants has been formulated as 
the rate of completion of capacity multiplied by the appropriate 
capital cost (per ton) prevailing at the time of completion 
(and not the cost at time of ordering). 
4.16 Balance Sheet Sector 
The equations formulated for this sector of the model 
are very simple and standard representing the accounts of the 
. company, therefore we shall only discuss them briefly (see the 
listing in Appendix A for their exact forms). 
The feasible rate of expenditure which could be sustained 
through the company's internal funds (FREXP) is the sum of the 
actual cash generation (ACGR) and the excess cash (if any) 
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which could be spread and spent over the planning horizon. 
The rate at which the company spends cash (RSC) is 
the total of the rate of committing money to new projects 
(RCMTNP), the addition rate to working capital (ARWC) and the 
escalation in cost of plants under construction due to 
inflation (ECP). 
The cash reserves of the company (CASH) is a composite 
of the inflow and the outflow of money. The inflow consists 
of the profits retained CRP), depreciation cashflow (DCF1) , 
rate of reducing working capital if it exceeds requirements 
(RRWC) and the actual rate of the parent company's monthly 
investment in the subsidiary (RIPC). The outflow is simply 
the rate at which the company spends cash (RSC). The 
initial value of cash (in 1980) has been set at the difference 
between the total liabilities of the company (TL) and total 
of the written down value of plants (WDV), working capital 
employed (WCAP) and the money committed to new capacity 
addition projects (MCNP). 
The difference between the rate at which the subsidiary 
spends cash (RSC), and that which it has available (FREXP) 
determines whether there is any need for financial assistance 
from the parent company. 
The total assets of the company (TA) consists of the 
written-down value of its capital plants (WDV), working 
capital employed (WCAP), money committed to new capacity 
addition projects (MCNP) and cash reserves of the company 
(CASH). 
We have incorporated a checking system (CHECKF) in this 
sector of the model to make sure that the account books 
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balance, that is the total assets of the company plus the 
cumulative depreciation cashflow unfulfilled (CDCFL) equals 
the total liabilities of the company. 
4.17 Performance Index0Sector 
One of the most common performance * indexes' in' the 
commercial environment is the return on investment which is 
simply the ratio of the average profit level of the company 
to its total assets. Hence in this sector we have formulated 
a relationship that gives the subsidiary's return-on invest- 
ment (ROI) which is the ratio of its average profit level 
after depreciation charges (i. e. 
_APL-ADCFL) 
to its total 
assets (TA). 
4.18 Amendments Necessary to the Basic Model 
- to Assess the Capacity Build up Process, 
Under the Effects of the Economic Size 
Constraints, if Joint Ventures were not 
to be Formed 
As was discussed in chapter 1, the running of reasonably 
large plants is essential in this internationally competitive 
industry in order to produce the products as cheaply as 
possible. Concerning the basic model constructed for this 
study, whose sixteen sectors were discussed in this chapter, 
it is assumed that if the desired new capacity of a product is 
less than the economic size of such a capacity then the 
company would form a joint venture with other companies in 
the same situation so as to take advantage of the economies 
of scale (the reason and justification for this assumption is 
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discussed in detail in chapter 5). Table 4.7, obtained 
from confidential oil company sources, presents the typical 
plant sizes which they are interested in, together with their 
appropriate capital costs. However it must be made clear 
that these economic sizes are from the point of view of the 
oil companies, therefore for other concerns they might be 
different. 
In order to assess the capacity build up process (under 
the effects of the economic size constraints) if joint 
ventures were not to be formed, three sectors of the basic 
model were amended accordingly. The sectors are 4.5,4.7 
and 4.8 which are given in appendix B. The changes made 
to sectors 4.5 and 4.7 basically concern the target rate of 
ordering capacity (e. g. TROBCAP) and the rate of commencement 
of capacity (e. g. BCSR), upon which the economic size cons- 
traints are imposed. Further, these two rates are kept 
constant (during every twelve months period) at levels 
determined as a result of the company's yearly board meeting, 
for reasons of consistency in the ordering process. These 
changes were facilitated through the use of DYSMAP's SAMPLE 
and INT functions. 
Finally'in section 4.8 the initial values of the amount 
of each different type of capacity under construction have 
been set at levels which are in multiples of the appropriate 
economic sizes. The simulated result of the amended version 
is discussed in chapter 5. 
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Table 4.7 Approximate Data on Battery 
Limits Plant Costs 
(1980 Index Construction Values) 
NO. PLANT 
TYPICAL PLANT 
SIZE 
'000 to/a, 
APPROXIMATE BLP COST 
per to Product 
$/te capacity 
1 Steam Cracker 450 640 
(Naphtha) 
2 Styrene Dbncsner 300 230 
3 VCM 300 330 
4 IDPE 100 500 
5 HDPE 100 500 
6 PVC 120 380 
7 Polypropylene 100 830 
8 Polystyrene 100 400 
i. e. Excluding offsites, utilities plant etc. 
Source: 'Confidential' (The Petrochemical Subsidiary 
of a Major Oil Company) 
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CHAPTER 5 
VALIDITY OF THE BASIC MODEL 
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Having built the model the next step, prior to making 
any further analysis, is to establish whether or not the 
model is valid. However this is not an easy task, especially 
since there is no general agreement among management scientists 
on a set of criteria which could be used to test the validity 
of a model. The managers of the industry, on the other hand, 
have a more pragmatic type of approach towards the issues 
concerning the credibility of such a model. The manager's 
concern is to observe whether the model is well structured, 
embodies all the important factors (from his point of view 
because after all it is he who is supposed to know most about 
the system) and finally, useful in fulfilling its purposes. 
In the field of System Dynamics, Forrester (1961) and 
Coyle (1977) have acknowledged the complexities surrounding 
the issue of credibility of models and have therefore, based 
on the pragmatic managerial approach, common sense and scien- 
tific methods, put forward a set of guidelines to assess the 
validity of a model. Coyle refers to model validation as 
meaning the "process by which we establish sufficient confi- 
dence in a model to be prepared to use it for some particular 
purpose". 
The guide lines put forward are as follows: 
(i) Does the model relate to questions and behaviour 
that are of importance to the success of the 
organization? 
(ii) Is the system boundary right? 
(iii) Does the model contain an effective choice of 
variables, properly related according to those 
of real life? 
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(iv) Are the parameter values correct? 
(v) Does the model contain any gross technical errors? 
(vi) Does the model generate behaviour characteristics 
similar to those of the real system? 
These guide lines put forward by the authors mentioned 
above seem adequate to serve as tests for establishing the 
validity of the model constructed for the purposes of this 
present research. Therefore, in the following paragraphs 
we shall discuss how our model compares in relation to the 
above requirements, and hence its validity. 
(i) During our interviews with the oil companies, they 
repeatedly stated that their main problems during 
the 1970's have been the increasing material prices 
coupled with overcapacity (since 1974) and the 
resulting deterioration of the prices of petro- 
chemicals which in turn affects their profitability, 
and thus their corporate strategies towards the 
chemical business. They also mentioned that they 
expect the overcapacity situation to continue well 
into the 1980's. In this present research we are 
addressing these very same problems, which we 
discussed in great depth in chapters one and three, 
that are of great importance to the future perform- 
ance of the companies. We also discussed, in 
chapter 3, a number of very important questions 
related to the purpose of the research. In the 
next chapter we shall employ the model to provide 
answers to these questions. Thus we can safely 
state that the first requirement has been fulfilled. 
(ii) In chapter 3 we carefully selected the boundaries of 
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the system in relation to the objectives of this 
present work. In doing so we only included those 
factors which are believed to be of significant 
importance in determining the dynamic behaviour of 
the system and enabling us to answer the questions 
drawn from the purpose of the research. For 
example, in chapter four it was explained that 
since our concern is with corporate planning issues 
we did not think that it was necessary to employ an 
L. P. model to handle the production planning sector 
of the research which would have involved great 
detail and effort, not required for our purposes. 
However it should be made clear that we are by no 
means implying that there are inadequacies in L. P. 
as a modelling technique. Indeed it is widely used 
in this industry for scheduling the detailed produc- 
tion activities but for our purposes we do not need 
a very detailed and sophisticated manufacturing plan- 
ning sector, particularly since the dynamics involved 
would be too short for the time scale chosen for this 
study. 
(iii) In chapter 4-we discussed in detail the formulation 
of most of the relationships incorporated in the 
model presented in appendix A. Some of these 
relationships are standard physical and accounting 
relationships. A large number of them are based on 
our findings during the interviews made with a number 
of companies, during which we also checked on the 
reality of the other relationships. For example, 
the central decision-making process for the approval 
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of the yearly capital expenditure proposals, the 
preferential downstream production planning policy 
and the different patterns of the deterioration of 
the prices of the petrochemical products according to 
the overcapacity situation were discovered during 
the interviews and included in the model. In the 
cases where relationships were difficult to quantify 
(such as the deterioration of the prices mentioned 
abovel and only rough estimates were supplied to us, 
we tested the model (see chapter 6) with a reasonable 
range of values for these relationships in order to 
detect any significant change in the dynamic behaviour 
of the system. Based on the judgment and skill of 
the executives of the companies interviewed, whose 
co-operation has'been invaluable concerning the 
formulation of the relationships, and our safeguards 
against areas of less certainty, we believe that the 
mechanisms of the model could closely resemble those 
of the real system. 
Civi Most of the parameter values of the model were 
obtained from confidential company sources and also 
from published sources after thorough research. 
System Dynamics models are not generally very sensitive 
to the values of most of their parameters and they may 
be selected anywhere within a plausible range. The 
few sensitive parameters will be identified through 
the appropriate model testings (see chapter 6). 
(v} We have carried out a series of tests in order to 
make sure that the model does not contain any errors: 
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(a) The model has been tested by DYSMAP's 
Dimensional Analyser in order to make sure 
that the resultant dimension of the right 
hand side of each relationship is the same 
as that of its left hand side. 
(b) The outputs of the simulation runs of the 
model have been thoroughly checked in order 
to make sure that the values of the variables 
are within. realistic ranges. 
(c) In order to comply with the Balance Sheet 
rule that the total assets of the company 
should equal its total liabilities we have 
accordingly devised a checking system 
(CHECKF) in the model which computes the 
difference between the two, so as to make 
sure that the model does not leak or create 
any money. The value of CHECKF was found 
to be negligible throughout the simulation 
which in effect confirms that the accounting 
" equations of the model are correct. There 
is also another check, CHECKM, in order to 
make sure that the model does not leak or 
create any petrochemical material, which in 
-turn confirms the correctness of 
the produc- 
tion equations of the model. 
(d) In order to make-sure that the model does not 
produce any false dynamics particularly with 
respect to improper initial conditions, it was 
subjected to a standard STEP input. This 
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involved the running of the model under constant 
demand for products for the first 96 months and 
then a sudden 20% STEP increase in the demand of 
products. The model forecasts the increase in 
demands 60 months in advance. Therefore the 
model would be free of any false dynamics if its 
state variables demonstrate steady behaviour 
(except those which are not expected to do so) 
during the first 36 months. Figure 5.1 (a, b 
and c) demonstrates this test and confirms the 
non-existence of false dynamics. 
(vi) Finally concerning the question of whether or not the 
model generates behaviour characteristics similar to 
those of the real system, this can be generally approached 
through qualitative and/or quantitative comparisons 
between the simulated and the real performances of the 
organization. However since in our research we are not 
modelling any specific company it is not possible to 
perform any detailed statistical fit test. Even in 
the case when the analyst is modelling a particular 
organization and has access to the company's confidential 
data, it is still extremely difficult to do so because 
the information systems are not generally sufficiently 
comprehensive, do not go back in time far enough and 
do not indicate all the policies and the changes made 
to them through time, and many other practical obstacles. 
Further since our aim is to explore the appropriate 
corporate strategies to be pursued by the company during 
the 1980's and the 1990's, we would gain very little by 
spending a great deal of effort in getting the model 
to reproduce the past performance of the company. 
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However, having said this, 'it is important to know 
as much about the past history of the organization 
as possible in order to be able to design its 
appropriate future strategies. Therefore it can 
be concluded that in our case quantitative comparisons 
of behaviour are neither possible nor appropriate and 
hence we will spend our effort in establishing whether 
or not the simulated behaviour corresponds qualitat- 
ively with that expected from the real system. 
Forrester and Coyle argue that if the model contains 
all the necessary components adequately described and 
properly interconnected, and has captured the causes 
of the actual system's difficulties, then the model 
cannot do other than produce the same basic charac- 
teristics and trouble symptoms as the actual system. 
Forrester further argues that "once the general 
qualitative nature of a particular phenomenon is 
present in a model and approximately correct, it can 
usually be adjusted to any desired value by changing 
system parameters without moving these parameters 
outside the range compatible with our knowledge of 
their values in the actual system". However both 
authors acknowledge that a perfect fit of the model 
to the actual system does not really help in designing 
a better system. The above arguments put forward by 
the two authors encourages us even more in adopting 
the qualitative approach for comparing the simulated 
and expected future behaviour of the system under this 
present study. 
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Examining figures 5.2 (a, b and c) it can be observed 
that the model indeed demonstrates behaviour mode which is 
qualitatively similar to that expected from the real system. 
(The horizontal axis of the figures corresponds to that of 
time which is in terms of months. Months zero and 240 
correspond respectively to. January 1980 and January 2000). 
The basic, intermediate and final product capacity build 
ups enable the petrochemical subsidiary to take advantage of 
all the peaks in demand which, as was discussed in chapter 4, 
is the objective of the companies. As can be observed the 
company initially (i. e. in 1980) has significant excess 
capacity in all three product sectors, corresponding to the 
average overcapacity in Western European petrochemical industry 
given in section 4.2, which take nearly 10 years to be absorbed 
into. the system hence resulting in a balance between the actual 
and the necessary capacity. This time span is known as the 
settling time of the system. It is useful for managers to be 
aware of its magnitude in order to appreciate the long term 
effects of their decisions and changed circumstances. 
The effective capacity utilization, after initial low 
levels, settles at a sustained oscillatory mode fluctuating 
between 90-100%, according to the position of the 4-year 
business cycle. The excess capacity during the troughs of 
the cycle is very undesirable, since it leads to the erosion 
of the prices and hence the profitability of the industry. 
However it cannot be helped, due to the impracticalities of 
significant stockpiling for long periods. If stocking was 
feasible then the producers could have maintained a lower 
level of capacity than in our case and would still have been 
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able to meet the peaks in demand through stockpiling during 
the troughs of the cycle which would have in turn resulted 
in high utilization of plants at all times. We believe that 
the capacity acquisition process designed for this study is 
probably the most adequate as it leads to minimum overcapacity 
during the troughs of the cycle, given the constraints concern- 
ing the objective of the company, the long construction 
duration of the plants and the impracticalities of massive stock 
holding. However as will be demonstrated in chapter 6, the 
process is sensitive to errors in demand forecasts. 
Concerning the financial performance of the company, it 
can be observed that the ability of the petrochemical subsidi- 
ary to finance its capital projects (i. e. Internal Financing 
Ratio (IFRAT) ) declines through time even with ample initial 
cash reserves. Consequently in the latter half of the 1990's 
the subsidiary becomes heavily dependent on financial assist- 
ance from the parent company which is both alarming and 
undesirable concerning the long term viability of such a 
business. In order to assess the financial situation of the 
company more thoroughly we have extracted values from the 
tabular output and for the sake of brevity we use the initial 
and final values of the selected variables as in table 5.1. 
The decline in IFRAT, from 4.62 in 1980 to 0.25 by 
the year 2000, is basically due to two factors. Firstly, 
the growth in demand during the time horizon considered which 
leads to significant growth in the effective basic, intermediate 
and final product capacities (67.3%, 64.7% and 78.1% respec- 
tively) involving massive investments, and the financing of 
working capital increases required to sustain growth in 
production. Secondly the rises in overall inflation and 
i 
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Table 5.1 Summary of the Performance 
of the Basic Model 
Time 
0 240 
($x9) ($x9) 
Balance Sheet Items 
Investment by Parent Canpany IPC 4 9.576 
Cumulative Retained Profits CRP 2 35.156 
Total Liabilities TL 6 44.732 
Cash CASH 1.386 3.513 
Working Capital WCAP . 919 13.873 Written-down Value of Plants WDV 2.995 15.557 
Money Committed to New 
Projects MCNP .7 11.789 
Total Assets TA 6 44.732 
Other Variables 
Cumulative Pretax Gross 
Profits CPGP 0 66.18 
Cumulative Actual Cash 
Generation CACG 0 43.656 
Cumulative Required Spending CRS 0 26.758 
on Capital Projects 
Cumulative Escalation in Cost 
of Plants CECP 0 8.566 
Internal 
Financing 
Ratio IFRAT(1) 4.62 0.25 
Changes 
Growth in TL less increase 
in IPC 33.156 
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the price of oil. The overall inflation is directly respon- 
sible for the escalation in cost of plants which in our case 
places an enormous burden on the company as can be observed 
from the growth in the values of WDV, MCNP and CECP given in 
table 5.1. The crude oil price rises also necessitate huge 
increases (from $0.919 billion in 1980 to $13.873 billion by 
the year 2000) in the value of the working capital employed 
«CAP). 
It can be observed from table 5.1 that the company indeed 
generates large amounts of cash, as demonstrated by the growth 
of total liabilities less increase in investment by the parent 
company. However, due to the increasing demand (and hence 
the increasing capacity requirements) and inflation, the 
subsidiary would have to obtain financial assistance from the 
parent company from the second half of the 1990's onwards which 
by the year 2000 reaches a total of $5.576 billion. In the 
next chapter we shall attempt to analyse the financial problems 
more thoroughly through careful investigation and simulation 
experiments. 
The behaviour mode discussed above was that of the Basic 
Model, in which it has been assumed that if the desired new 
capacity of a product is less than the economic size of such 
a capacity then the company would form a joint venture with 
other companies in the same situation, so as to take advantage 
of the economies of scale. 
In order to observe, in particular, the pattern of capacity 
build up (under economic size constraints) in a scenario in 
which joint ventures would not be formed, the model was modified 
accordingly (details of which were discussed in section 4.18). 
Figure 5.3 demonstrates the simulated behaviour in such a case. 
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As can be observed, after the initial years during which the 
overcapacity is absorbed, the capacity planning process is 
no longer capable of enabling the company to take advantage 
of the peaks in demand. In fact, in the case of the inter- 
mediate products (i. e. Styrene and VCM), the production 
capacity falls even below the troughs of the business cycle, 
due to the large economic sizes of the plants producing these 
products. This pattern of capacity build up proved to be 
undesirable when discussed during our interviews with the 
companies, since it did not achieve their aim. However 
this deficiency is purely due to the imposition of the 
economic size constraints when ordering new capacity, since 
in the Base Case (discussed earlier) the company could meet 
all the peaks in demand. There are two ways of alleviating 
the shortfall in capacity. Firstly, to order a plant of 
minimum economic size when only a part of its capacity is 
required, however this strategy would threaten other manu- 
facturers' market shares. It was mentioned to us in our 
contacts with the companies that during recent years they 
have built up a mutual understanding among themselves not to 
resort to such a strategy which would lead to overexpansion 
by all manufacturers in order to preserve their market shares 
and result in overcapacity and the deterioration of prices. 
The second option which is feasible and open to a company 
is to go into joint venture with other companies in the same 
situation. As was discussed in chapter 2, in recent years 
a large number of joint ventures have been formed between the 
oil and chemical companies and also among oil companies 
themselves. Among the reasons given for these joint ventures 
are the chemical companies' desire to secure feedstock supply 
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through oil company partners, and the huge capital costs 
of the petrochemical plants. ' It is our belief that the 
low level of growth in demand compared to the past, coupled 
with the large economic sizes of the petrochemical plants 
together with the mutual understanding among the companies 
in keeping to their own market shares will force them to go 
into joint ventures in the future. Of course the other 
reasons mentioned earlier would make the joint ventures even 
more attractive; however the factors mentioned above will 
be the dominating ones. In the case of a chemical company 
wishing to increase its basic product capacity (i. e. Olefins) 
there will most probably be the need for an oil company 
partner, rather than a chemical company due to the. co-production 
of a large quantity of energy products for which only an oil 
company has the required marketing logistics. 
The need for joint ventures due to the market share 
consensus among the companies is well reflected by the Shell- 
Esso cracker project at Moss Morran approved by the U. K. 
government in 1979 (European Chemical News, 1979). As was 
discussed in chapter 3, McKinsey had predicted that the U. K. 
will require new petrochemical capacity a few years before the 
rest of the EEC, hence the approval of Moss Morran. However 
the important factor concerning the above joint venture is 
that, the major oil companies have very large cash generations, 
for example in 1980 Shell and BP declared profits in terms of 
billions of dollars. Therefore they do have the ability of 
financing a whole petrochemical plant on their own, and there 
is really no other factor to stop them doing so other than 
the mutual market agreement among themselves. 
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In our interviews with the companies, we discussed the 
above findings and they did mention that they could be true, 
however they were generally unwilling to comment any further 
on the matter. We believe that their unwillingness was 
because the market share consensus and the consequent joint 
ventures would in effect imply a 'Cartel' among the companies. 
In the next chapter all our experiments will be on the 
base case, in which it has been assumed that the petrochemical 
subsidiary will go into joint ventures with other companies 
if its capacity requirement for any of the products under 
this present research is less than the economic size. 
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6.1 Analysis of the Company's 
Financial Problems 
In chapter 5 we concluded that the decline in the 
financial ability of the subsidiary was due to'the growth 
in demand (and hence the growing investment requirements) 
and inflation. Ideally. a company as such, in a mature 
industry should, under the right economic climate be capable 
of generating enough cash so as to finance internally its 
capital projects. However this is not so in our case. 
In order to substantiate our conclusion about the impact of 
growth and inflation on the financial performance of the 
system, we shall in this section employ the model to explore 
the effect of each of these two factors. 
As an initial experiment it would be interesting to see 
how the system would perform if there was to be no growth in 
demand and no inflationary measures. However, we have 
already conducted an experiment in chapter 5 which can also 
equally serve for this purpose (see figure 5.1 (a, b and c) ). 
In that experiment, in order to make sure that the model did 
not produce any false dynamics, it was run under constant 
demand for the first 96 months and then a sudden 20% STEP 
increase in the demand of products was injected and from there 
onwards the demand was maintained at this level. This run 
also did not include any inflationary measures (i. e. OIR = 0, 
COPR = 0, IR = . 02/12, DEPPC = 1/LTPP (i. e. financial depreci- 
ation of the value of plant according to its physical lifetime 
(i. e. LTPP) and not the accelerated depreciation), FWDV = 
. 06/12). It can be observed from figures 5.1 (a, b and c) 
that under constant demand RAVP, WCAP and IPC remain constant, 
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as we would expect. The cash reserves CCASH) grow very 
rapidly due to the retained earnings and consequently so 
does the financial ability of the company (IFRAT). Note 
that the value of IFRAT goes negative for a short while at 
time 96 due to the heavy required increase in the value of 
WCAP triggered by the STEP increase in demand. The ROI 
falls continuously, due to the continuous increase in liquid 
assets (i. e. CASH) which earn a low return in the bank, 
compared to that earned on physical assets (i. e. on WDV and 
WCAP). Our conclusion from this experiment is that, with 
no growth and no inflation, the company would indeed become 
more and more wealthy and would have no problem other than 
finding a more profitable way of utilizing its vast liquid 
assets kept in the bank. 
In the next scenario we considered the possibility of 
constant demand but with an imposed business cycle, and an 
inflation level the same as that of the base case. As can 
be observed from figure 6.1 RAVP and WCAP grow steadily due 
to inflation. The cash reserves grow-very rapidly mainly 
due to the healthy profit level. The value of IFRAT declines 
somewhat,. due to the increasing investment requirements, 
stemming from the high inflation level (i. e. 11% annually). 
However even at the end of the simulation period its value 
is at a very comfortable level indeed. Due to the healthy 
financial performance the value of IPC remains at its initial 
value all through the simulation period. 
Our next scenario concerns the case in which there is 
growth in demand according to the base case, but no inflat- 
ionary measures. Figure 6.2 demonstrates the financial 
performance of this experiment. It can be observed that 
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RAVP, WCAP and CASH grow steadily and slowly according to 
the demand pattern. The subsidiary manages to finance all 
its capital projects from internal cash generation, hence 
there is no investment by the parent company (IPC). The 
internal financing ratio (IFRAT) starts to settle at a 
sustained oscillatory mode, towards the end of the simulation 
time, with a minimum value which is over 1. Return on invest- 
ment also follows a sustained oscillatory mode. Our overall 
conclusion from this scenario is that the company would have 
no problem in providing the required investment for the 3% 
annual growth in demand as in the base case, provided that 
there is no inflation in the economy and the price of raw 
materials. 
In the next scenario we considered the possibility of 
the inflation level being half that of the base case (i. e. 
OIR =. 055/12, COPR = . 055/12, FWDV = . 115/12, IR = . 075/12, 
DEPPC = 1/120). Figure 6.3 demonstrates the financial per- 
formance of the company under this level of inflation. As 
can be observed, RAVP and WCAP grow significantly due to the 
inflation and growth. Consequently due to the increasing 
investment requirements the value of IFRAT declines and 
towards the very end of the simulation period the subsidiary 
becomes dependent on financial assistance from the parent 
company (i. e. when IFRAT falls below 1). Comparing this 
scenario to the two previous ones, it is evident that the 
reason for the poor financial performance of the company is 
the coupled effect of inflation and growth which gradually 
exhaust its internal financial resources. 
In the next scenario we increased the level of inflation 
to one and a half times that of the base case (i. e. OIR =. 165/12, 
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COPR = . 165/12, IR = . 185/12, FWDV = . 
225/12). Figure 6.4 
demonstrates this experiment. It can be observed that the 
result is devastating for the company. RAVP and WCAP grow 
enormously. Due to the massively increasing investment 
requirements the subsidiary becomes heavily dependent on 
financial assistance from the parent company all through the 
1990's. The internal financing ratio, IFRAT, reaches 
extremely low levels towards the end of the simulation run 
which is very alarming. 
Our overall conclusion from the experiments described 
in this section is that the financial performance of the 
company and hence its long term viability is very much affected 
by the rate of growth of demand and the inflation level. 
indeed the system was found to be extremely sensitive to these 
two parameters. In the case of constant demand and no 
inflation the financial performance of the company was extremely 
good. With constant demand and an inflation level the same 
as the base case, the company's performance was satisfactory. 
In the case of growing demand but no inflation the company 
still managed to cope reasonably well. With growing demand 
and an inflation rate half that of the base case, the perform- 
ance was rather poor and towards the end of the simulation 
period the subsidiary became financially dependent on the 
parent company. However this performance was comparatively 
much better than the base case. With a higher inflation level 
than the base case the financial performance was extremely poor 
and alarming. Hence we would like to state confidently that 
if in the future demand grows at a rate of 3%, then an inflation 
level of even 5.5% would lead to a decline in the ability of 
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the company to finance its capital projects. The system 
simply cannot cope under the coupled effect of growth in 
demand and high inflation. According to the experiments 
carried out, there is most probably a limit within the 0-5.5% 
inflation level, beyond which the system would commence to 
exhibit poor financial performance. It is possible through 
simulation to find the limit but due to the time consuming 
nature of the exercise, it was decided not to spend a great 
deal of effort in doing so. Anyway, the important thing is 
that we have demonstrated the effect of inflation and the 
range within which its plausible value would lie. We further 
believe that the value probably lies in the lower half of the 
range. 
Generally in a System Dynamics study, if the system 
produces poor performance it is usually possible through loop 
analysis of the structure of the system to identify the trouble 
areas with poor control mechanisms and then'improve the control- 
lability and performance through the design of suitable and 
practical policies. However in our case the system would 
have behaved satisfactorily if it was not for the high inflation 
level. Hence the remedy is either a reduction in the level 
of inflation, which is not controllable by the company and 
depends on the whole economy or, as has been investigated by 
Elbedeiwy (1979) to adopt accounting policies which would 
calculate the depreciation charges on the replacement cost 
of'plants when operating under inflationary conditions, and 
not according to the historical cost accounting which has been 
employed in this study and is the general practice in the 
industry. It is not within the scope of this present study 
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to employ Elbedeiwy's sophisticated accounting method to 
assess the changes in performance. Therefore it remains 
as a possible area of research for the future. In the next 
section we shall discuss the robustness of the model and 
identify some sensitive parameters of the system, the values 
of which when altered within a plausible range could lead to 
a certain level of improvement in the financial performance 
of the system, but not to the extent of complete improvement. 
6.2 Robustness of the Model 
Concerning Coyle's (1977) criterion of external robustness, 
we have already tested the model with a STEP increase in demand, 
in chapter 5. This demonstrated that the system is capable 
of responding adequately to such a shock and then settling at 
the required level after a certain time span. Further, in 
the base case with exponential growth in demand and an imposed 
business cycle the system again responded suitably by achieving 
its objective of matching the capacity to that necessary for 
growth. In the previous section we also tested the model 
against different rates of inflation (which is an exogenous 
input) and it was discovered that the system is indeed very 
sensitive to inflationary measures. 
In this section we shall spend some time on checking the 
external robustness of the model against other factors of 
importance, such as the errors in the forecasts, and also 
check for internal robustness against errors in the estimation 
of parameters, table functions etc. This is most easily done 
through performing a sensitivity analysis which would enable 
us to identify the critical factors, which involves the variation 
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of the values of the parameters (one at a time) within a 
plausible range so as to observe any changes in the overall 
performance of the system. 
In chapters three and four we stated that some of the 
parameters and functional relationships employed in the model, 
although within a plausible range, could not be estimated 
accurately due to the difficulties of quantification and also 
the confidentiality of information. The sensitivity testing 
has been most helpful in exposing those factors which are of 
a sensitive nature. Due to the size of the model, in order 
to prevent spending a great deal of effort and time on such a 
r 
process, we have limited ourselves to the testing of those 
parameters which are believed to be of significant importance 
concerning the purpose of the study. 
6.2.1 'Sensitivity Testing 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are represented 
in Table 6.1 which also includes the result of the Base Case 
for reasons of comparison. A certain number of important 
performance indicators were selected in order to highlight 
any significant changes in the overall performance of the system 
when the value of a parameter was altered. These are given 
in the table and their definitions are as follows: 
1) Cash Reserves of Company (CASH) 
2ý Parent Company's Total Investment in its Petrochemical 
Subsidiary 
. 
(IPC ) 
3) Ratio of Achievable Rate of Spending and Required 
Rate (FRAT) 
4) Internal Financing Ratio (IFRAT) 
5) Return on Investment (R0I) 
6) Effective Basic Product Capacity Excluding Energy 
Products Capacity (EBCAPE) 
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6.2.1.1 
In the first run of the sensitivity analysis the duration 
of the decision making intervals for basic (i. e. DMINTB), inter- 
mediate and final product capacities (i. e. DMINTIF) were decreased 
and then increased by half respectively in order to assess the 
consequent impacts on the system. 
In the case of the decisions on the capital expenditure 
proposals being made within an interval half that of the base 
case, there was at the end of the simulation period an excess 
EBCAPE of 8072 tons/month compared to the base case (see table 
6.1). The shorter DMINTB and DMINTIF increased the financial 
requirements. Consequently the value of IPC increased signifi- 
cantly (i. e. the subsidiary became more financially dependent 
on the parent company), and as expected the values of CASH, FRAT, 
IFRAT and ROI decreased. 
A longer decision making interval, expectedly, led to a 
shortfall in EBCAPE of 7757 tons/month compared to the base case, 
and hence a lower IPC. The financial position of the company 
improved due to lower capital expenditure. 
Our conclusion from Run 1 is that the overcapacity and under- 
capacity resulting from altering the decision making interval is 
not really significant (about 1.7% of the capacity in the base 
case). However the financial performance, particularly the 
change in the level of IPC, is significant. 
6.2.1.2 
In Run 2 the construction delay for basic plants, and for 
intermediate and final plants was increased to 48 and 36 months 
respectively in order to assess the overall change in the perform- 
ance of the company. Longer construction delays do happen and 
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it is worthwhile to study their impacts. 
As expected there is a shortfall of 6111 tons/month in 
EBCAPE compared to the base case, however this is not at all 
significant. The financial performance is very much the same 
as the base case. Hence we can safely conclude that the system 
is highly robust concerning the construction duration time of 
the plants. 
6.2.1.3 
As was explained in chapters 1,3 and 4 the petrochemical 
industry has in the past blamed tht errors in the forecasting 
processes of demand for the problems which the industry has 
faced since 1974. Hence in Run 3 we tested this phenomenon by 
supposing that from 1990-1995 the industry forecasts the growth 
of demand between 1995-2000 to be 2% in one scenario and 4% per 
year in the next (in the base case it is 3%) and we also assumed 
that the actual growth in demand between 1995-2000 turns out to 
be 3% per year. These experiments enable us, to find out about 
the impacts on the system of pessimistic and optimistic fore- 
casting respectively. 
Figures 6.5 (a and b) demonstrate the performance of the 
system (see also table 6.1) under pessimistic forecasts. As 
can be observed there is significant shortfall in capacity 
during time 145-240, particularly at about time 195. At the 
end of the simulation period there is 24017 tons/month less 
EBCAPE than the base case. Concerning the financial performance, 
the value of IFRAT at time 120 goes sky high (out of our own 
scales) due to the very low spending requirements stemming from 
the low growth of demand forecasted for the year 1995 and which 
continues up to the year 2000. At time 180 IFRAT drops signifi- 
cantly due to 'the increasing spending requirements arising from 
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the growth of demand commencing to be forecasted at its original 
higher value (i. e. 3%). Due to the decrease in investment 
requirements during 1990-1995 the cash level goes up enormously 
and IPC, expectedly, decreases. ROI improves due to the higher 
utilization of capacity and the resulting high values of price 
multipliers. 
Figures 6.6 (a and b) demonstrate the performance of the 
system with optimistic forecasting (see also table 6.1). 
Significant overcapacity occurs during time 145_240, reaching a 
peak at about time 218. The value of IFRAT falls significantly 
at time 120, due to the heavy financial requirements triggered 
by the higher growth of demand forecasted for time 180, which 
continues up to time 240. At time 180, the value of IFRAT shoots 
up significantly due to the very low spending requirements stemming 
from the lower growth of demand (i. e. 3%) being forecasted for 
time 240 onwards. The final level of Cash is higher than the 
base case due to the lower level of investments needed during the 
period 180-240. IPC increases due to the heavy investments made 
by the subsidiary during time 120-180. ROI declines due to the 
lower utilization of the plants which depresses profits. 
Our overall conclusion concerning Run 4 is that errors in the 
forecasting process and the period of misplanning do indeed have a 
great impact on the system (as also concluded by the UNIDO (1978) 
study). They can cause, as was demonstrated, significant over- 
capacity or undercapacity with very important financial implica- 
tions for the company. If we accept the fact that there is bound 
to be some degree of uncertainty about the forecasts of future 
demands for petrochemicals, then in order to protect the company 
from the impacts of such undesirable phenomenon, it becomes 
necessary to attempt to re-design the capacity acquisition 
199 
I 
I ' 0 
1 
1 . . 
0 l II \ 1 
1 
M . \ d I 
va U3 iL co 
\ " UJU 
\ i OUO 
" O -. O 
>- ad W Co f. CL 
\ ' - JU U 
" ( cr. OQ cc Q 
l U W. QLU 
\ .: d }WU =y- wi-a. tu i-- 
` " J UUWUUU 
oQr¢ 
o p d I- 
cr. U. 
O O W UO[: WU 
i N 4 wCLCL º- 
UUM W JU 
1 r. sý W! - CCý H 
U70F-QCD 
1 cr OZO 
t'" `" °ý . O W 
ä 
w a . O =t 
i oUOCow 1 . H L. '-+ la. W li.. cc 
-. C3 cr r3 C3 
Z U3 ZZ- Iý24. Z 
1 CE cc r 
O W= W= W 1 
w>w>w> 
o". oº-"o"-. O º- º- I-- 
-J 0 -J CJ -J LJ 
`, F-- U- F-" U. º- LL. 
o LL. ° W °WO 
. '1 1 - I rw 
` (J: ... ý.... r... 
zZs=r ' 
, [3 = - %---- .. - 1\ , tt v. I 
1 
1 
11 
1 
I 
O a_ n_ Q_. 
> cc cc OUOUOU O F-W1-" WF-W 
J1 
-------- 0 ------ ___ 
--- 
00 ------- 0 -------- C) --- 
- 
0 ----------- _ __-_ _ 000 __ o _ m _______________ to ° m m In C3 0 O v N N . -, 
>-. 
Z 
cc 
a- 
(3 
U 
O 
ZJ 
cc Q 
U 
W º-i 
O= 
W 
LL-Z 
C )u 
O 
OO 
1- k- 
CO W 
cc a_ U 
W CL 
0-1 O 
LL- CD 
IL 
U 
I- W 
HQ 
H 
I--w 
O CC 
WO 
4Ü 
wo 
O 
CS U 
Li- cc 
,ý cý 
200 
ý` 
ý\ýý 
ý` ý\ 
` 
\. 
ý,. 'ý ý .' 
.ý .ý ", 
." 
: 
º 
00000 
00000 
Co v) t Co cv 
1 1'5 
I ,. 
V. 
-- .. __ 
.\ 
/\T 
L1. 
ýý 
1 
, 
ý'ý+ý 
. /I' \ 
11 
I, ý 
0 
0 
O 
It 
C; 
0 
L', I 
0 
CD 
O 
co 
0 
J 
W 
D 
oO 
ti 
OW 
H 
oD 
cc 
J 
oz 
C; 
.v ý- 
SIC U) 
z 
cr- 
C3 
cc .. J V) 
C. m 
J !A 
cl: 
r 
2 w 
zz 
U ". 0 
Q H- º- Z 
Ww 
a. _ 
1- w U) 
ow 
w =o>-"-. o 
Jwz 
¢r QJF--1- 
>oacc dz 
J ýf-C U 
oa. oo s 
E- ZU E- 
o 
wwcn'w 
JO. U> 
º+ct r ZZ 
M U3 CC 
C]ºý Waz 
cLß. >IL - mt 
dw2UO 
4. UW C) 
O (aUJz 
c! ) wac 
Hý ck: 1-- 
QYWwW 
=aU] W 1-0 
Oaccz 
7C U CL . -4 
2_r 
VVVVVV 
L. J I- 
tea= Q 
> CC CO 0-, ' --4 cr-uCC(. t- o 
OLD 
C 
U) b U? NO Lo NO N cv 04 -4 14 r+ 
O Q) co [- (D U0 It 0") N --+ O 
-------; ý------- ------- rd ------- -------0-------0------- - "--------i cli 0 O 
ON p °O C? 
op00p0 
.JI. o ;. 
-------------------- 
>-- 
Z 
c 
U- 
U 
O 
ZJ 
OQ 
zU 
W ý-+ 
W 
LL Z 
CO U 
O 
cr_ 
F-F- 
UDW 
CE CL 
V 
W CL 
cr- 
O 
LL. O 
IL 
U 
F--W 
UD C: ) 
HQ 
'-W 
U-k- 
Q cc 
%o O . o- 
Qý 
Q 
ÖU 
ýcC 
. ý. A 
201 
process in order to desensitise it against such errors. 
However an undertaking of this nature would itself entail a major 
study. Therefore it remains as a future area of research. 
6.2.1.4 
In an article in the Chemical Age Journal (Joseph, 1979) 
it was predicted that in the future due to the high cost of 
replacing a plant, it would become more economic to extend its 
physical lifetime up to 25 years, rather than to replace it 
when fully depreciated after a lifespan of ten years. Hence 
we put this scenario to the test, through Run 4, to observe 
its financial implications for the company (see table 6.1). 
Due to the longer lifetime (LTPP) the spending requirements 
declined, resulting in a very significant increase in the level 
of CASH and also a marked decline in IPC. The value of ROI 
is very much the same as the base case. Hence our conclusion 
is that the increase in LTPP indeed makes the company richer, 
however the qualitative behaviour of the system remains the 
same. 
6.2.1.5 
In section 4.12 we mentioned that the companies pay very 
little in taxes and dividends (TAXDIV) when investing heavily 
(through offsetting plant allowances of 100% against tax), 
otherwise they pay up to 52%. For the purposes of our study 
an average value of 30% was adopted. In Run 5 we tested the 
sensitivity of the model, by paying a TAXDIV of 20% and 40% 
respectively. 
In the case when the company pays only 20% in taxes and 
dividends, the financial performance improves significantly. 
The level of CASH is nearly double that of the base case through 
larger retained earnings. IPC is less than half. The minimum 
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value of IFRAT is more than doubled. ' ROI is lower than the 
Base Case due to the high level of liquid assets. 
When the company pays a higher portion of its profits in 
taxes and dividends the financial performance deteriorates 
significantly and the value of IPC increases by 50%. IFRAT 
reaches an alarming minimum level of . 075. 
Our conclusion on Run 5 is that the variation of TAXDIV 
has indeed very significant implications for the company. The 
less the company pays in taxes and dividends, the better it is 
for its long term survival. Most probably, due to the heavy 
future investment requirements, the company would be able to 
give away very little in taxation and hence a figure of 20% for 
TAXDIV might well be plausible. 
6.2.1.6 
In Run 6 we varied the fraction of the written down value 
of plants and working capital to cover the required return on 
investment when supply and demand are balanced (FWDV) at about 
its. original value of . 17/12 per month. The values selected 
were . 15/12 and . 19/12 per month (see table 6.1). 
In the case of FWDV = . 15/12 the financial performance of 
the system is quite poor. IPC increases due to the low level 
of. internal profit generation. Hence the minimum value of 
IFRAT reaches a value significantly lower than that of the base 
case. ROI also declines considerably. 
In the scenario when the industry somehow manages to 
increase its return expectations (i. e. FWDV = . 19/12) the 
financial performance, as one would expect, improves markedly. 
Due to the high internal profit generation, the level of CASH 
increases significantly and IPC drops to nearly two thirds of 
that of the base case Cwh&ch is desirable by the subsidiary). 
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The minimum value of IFR1T also improves considerably in 
comparison and there is also -a much improved ROI. 
Our conclusion on Run 7 is that, if the industry manages 
to demand a higher return on its assets, then its long term 
viability would be improved but not to the extent of alleviating 
all together its financial problems. This may seem surprising 
to those industrialists who believe that adequate ROI would lead 
to financial stability, underestimating the effects of operating 
under high inflationary conditions which require suitable account- 
ing policies (Elbedeiwy, 1979) that would take account of- the 
rising replacement costs of plants. 
6.2.1.7 
Next we considered altering the base level of the parent 
company's maximum monthly investment in its petrochemical sub- 
sidiary in 1980 (MAXIPC80) to $33.33 million and $50 million 
respectively. The financial performance in both cases is very 
much the same as the base case, as we would expect, except the 
decline and improvement in FRAT respectively. Hence we can 
safely conclude that the system is robust concerning variations 
in MAXIPC80. 
In Run 9 the proportion of the value of the working capital 
to be kept in cash by the company (PC) was varied about its 
original value of 0.3. The values selected were .2 and . 4. 
The performance of the system did not change significantly 
except for a decrease and an increase in the level of cash. 
Hence the model is robust to the variations in PC. 
6.2.1.8 
In the next Run we tested the model against increasing the 
fraction of the value of plants allowable for depreciation 
(DEPPC). In the base case the value of the plant was depreciated 
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over a lifespan of 10 years (i. e. DEPPC = 1/120 per month) 
whereas in this run it was depreciated over 5 years (i. e. 
DEPPC = 1/60 per month). The results of this run did not 
show any significant changes in the qualitative behaviour of 
the system in comparison with the base case, although the level 
of cash improved and there was a decline in IPC. There was 
also a slight improvement in the minimum value of IFRAT. 
Hence our conclusion is that the financial ability of the 
company cannot be improved significantly by increasing the 
depreciation rate when operating under high inflationary 
conditions (as has been investigated by Elbedeiwy (1979) ). 
6.2.1.8 
As was discussed in section 4.12, the relationship between 
the deterioration of prices and the magnitude of overcapacity 
is very difficult to quantify and we stated-that the relation- 
ships represented in figure 4.2 only highlighted the shape of 
the deterioration and were by no means accurate in numerical 
terms., Hence in Run 11 we lowered the curves (i. e. faster 
deterioration of prices during periods of overcapacity and 
hence caster price rises during periods of undercapacity). 
In table 6.1 only table values of price multiplier for ethylene 
(TPME) are noted due to the scarcity of space, however we will 
now present the table values of the other price multipliers:. 
TPMP 
= 0/. 47/. 77/1/1.23/1.53/2 
TPMVCM J 
TPMB = . 8/. 834/. 9/1/1.1/1.166/1.2 
TPMS = 0/. 17/. 5/1/1.5/1.83/2 
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TPMLDPE 
TPMHDPE 
TPMPVC = O/. 57/. 8/l/1.2/1.43/2 
TPMPS 
TPMPP 
Although the curves were lowered by a small margin, the 
financial position of the company declined to a certain degree. 
Due to the lower internal profit generation, the subsidiary 
became more financially dependent on the parent company than 
the base case, by borrowing more than two billion dollars more. 
The cash level also declined significantly. The minimum value 
of IFRAT was . 17 compared to the . 25 of the base. 
Our conclusion on Run 10 is that the system has shown a 
certain degree of sensitivity towards the values of the price 
multipliers and due to our limited knowledge about these relation- 
ships, it is necessary, as a future area for research, to investi- 
gate and quantify as plausibly as possible the relationships 
represented by figure 6.2. 
Our overall conclusion can thus be stated that, although 
the quantitative results of the performance indicators were 
relatively sensitive to a number of parameters, the most important 
matter, from the robustness point of view, is that the qualitative 
mode of the financial performance of the company remains unchanged, 
no matter what. That is, the declining financial capability 
of the company to finance its capital expenditure requirements. 
This phenomenon highlights the relative robustness of the 
system. 
6.3 Model Experiments 
In this section we shall run the model as a conventional 
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'what would happen if' type of simulation. In the previous 
section it was discovered, as suspected, that the financial 
performance of the model was relatively sensitive to TAXDIV, 
LTPP, MAXIPC80 and FWDV, and in particular to the value of 
the first parameter. Hence we thought that it would be 
interesting to find out about the combined effect of these 
parameters, set at their desirable values (highlighted by the 
sensitivity analysis), on the financial performance of the 
company. 
Among the four parameters mentioned above, the changing of 
FWDV (the return which the petrochemical industry and hence the 
company can expect on its assets at equilibrium supply and 
demand) is not really feasible by the company, since it requires 
a collective approach by all the producers and also depends on 
the overall state of the economy. However the values of the 
other three parameters could be altered, from the point of view 
of the company, within a plausible range. Hence in our first 
scenario we considered the combined effects of these three para- 
meters (with TAXDIV = . 2, LTPP = 300, and MAXIPC80 = $6x108/12 
per month) on the system, and then in the next scenario we added 
to this combination the desirable value of FWDV (i. e. . 19/12 per 
month). However, before carrying out the simulation runs 
concerning these two scenarios, we would like to state that we 
do not expect significant qualitative changes in the financial 
performance of the system because its deteriorating behaviour 
mode, as was discussed in section 6.1, is very much determined 
by the level of inflation. 
The first scenario is more achievable, from the company's 
point of view, and its results are demonstrated by figure 6.7. 
Due to the favourable values of the three parameters, particularly 
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the low level of payment in taxation and dividends which leads 
to higher retained earnings and the longer lifetime of plants 
which decreases the investment requirements, the company's cash 
reserves grow enormously to about three times as much as the 
base case. The minimum value of IFRAT is just above 1 which 
is four times that of the base level and hence IPC remains at 
its-original-value all throughout--the-simulation-period-(i. e. the 
subsidiary survives on its own cash generation up to the time 240 
but after this period, which is not within our time span, it will 
become financially dependent on the parent company). 
The second scenario is probably less achievable in the near 
future due to the overall state of the economy, nevertheless we 
shall demonstrate its impact on the system. As can be observed 
from figure 6.8, under this scenario the cash reserves grow even 
more significantly than in the first scenario for basically the 
same reasons together with the added effect of higher FWDV. 
The minimum value of IFRAT is about 1.69 which is more than 6 times 
larger than that of the base case. However the value of ROI is 
not much higher than the base level, due to the significant level 
of liquid assets and their low return. 
Our overall conclusion on the results of the scenarios 
investigated within this section is that quantitatively these 
two scenarios lead to significantly better financial performance 
than the base case. However the qualitative behaviour which we 
believe is more important in the long term, and which is dictated 
by the overall inflation, is basically unchanged. 
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CHAPTER' `7 
'CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
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7.1 Conclusion 
As was discussed in chapter 1, prior to 1967 the petro- 
chemical industry mainly consisted of small production units 
and therefore those manufacturers capable of using large single 
stream units were happy to let the smaller manufacturers set a 
"price umbrella" under which they themselves acquired huge 
profits, without endangering the interests of their competitors. 
During this 'golden era' the industry was experiencing very 
rapid growth, which was facilitated by the low cost of its 
feedstocks, the cost of which was going down, even in real 
value. Hence the prices of petrochemical products were very 
competitive against those of the natural products resulting in 
their ever increasing substitution. 
However, from 1967 the number of larger production plants 
(which could produce the products at substantially lower costs, 
due to the economies of scale) increased rapidly due to the 
aggressive approach of the producers to the market, and also 
the ease of entry into the industry, which encouraged the pene- 
tration of companies in other industries. During this era many 
companies planned on the simple basis of building a larger plant 
than their competitors, outselling the competitors at lower 
prices for a few years in the hope of capturing their market 
shares and then reaping the profits later for the next larger 
plants. Fortunately for the companies, such misplannings did 
not cause significant overcapacity during this period because 
demand was quick to catch up. 
However, at some point in the early`197O's the petrochemical 
industry entered a nett era of maturity in which the faster subs- 
titution phase for most products started to tail off; the 
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benefits of plant economies of scale reached their peak and 
the feedstock costs started to move up. The sudden quadrupling 
of oil prices in 1973 affected the slow-down of the industry 
further. Due to the misplannings of the late sixties and early 
seventies, the industry has, since 1974, been faced with large 
overcapacity and the resulting low prices for its products. 
This undesirable phenomenon together with. the high inflation 
level in material prices which the industry has had to operate 
under during the 1970's (and which hardly existed in the earlier 
periods) have very much threatened the long term survival of the 
chemical companies. - 
Having explored the evolution of the industry, the study 
then concentrates firstly on examining the implications of an 
oil company's diversification into the petrochemical business, 
in the way of exploring the past and present history of the oil 
companies' participation in order to find out about their reasons 
for doing so and also their strategies. We also isolated those 
product areas in which the oil companies' diversifications failed 
(and the reasons for their failures) and further, those in which 
they were successful and have since been concentrating on. 
In the second stage we concentrated on exploring the 
corporate strategies to be followed by the petrochemical subsidi- 
ary of a major oil company, operating under the effects of the 
undesirable factors discussed earlier. In order to fulfil this 
purpose we constructed a Corporate Planning Model which could 
be used for decision-making in such a company. In doing so we 
have tried to include all the important factors and policies 
inherent in this kind of system, most of which were discovered 
through the much appreciated co-operation of the executives of 
a number of major. oil and chemical companies. Since it is the 
interactions between these factors and policies which determine 
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the dynamic behaviour of the company through time, and our 
aim is to analyse the outcome of the interactions in order 
to shed more light on the appropriate corporate strategies 
for the organization, we believe that System Dynamics offers 
a strong methodology for this type of analysis. 
Hence we employed SD to construct a Basic Model which could 
be simulated in order to produce the expected dynamic behaviour 
of the company during the 1980's and the 1990's, the results of 
which were discussed in chapter 5. As was discussed in that 
chapter, the simulated behaviour corresponds closely to that 
expected from the real system. The effect of the 4-year 
business cycle on the capacity utilization and hence on the 
profitability of the company is very well demonstrated, as is 
the decline in the financial ability of the company to finance 
its capital projects from internal sources (which is very unlike 
the 'golden days' when the industry was able to finance its 
rapid growth through its own large internal cash generation) and 
hence its increasing dependence on financial assistance from the 
parent company in the 1990's. 
In chapter 6 we analysed the decline in the financial 
ability of the company (IFRAT) and proved that it was due to 
the coupled effect of growth and inflationary measures. The 
system is exogenously driven by an expected general rate of 
growth of demand (i. e. 3% per year) and an inflation level of 
11% per year. Even a 3% increase per year, which is very low 
compared to that experienced in the past, leads to significant 
increase in the company's productive capacity by the end of the 
1990's, requiring heavy investments together with the financing 
of the increasing working capital requirements. The high 
inflation level of material prices exacerbates the situation by 
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increasing the financial burden on the company, hence resulting 
in the decline in its financial status. We demonstrated that 
the system could cope with either the growth in demand or the 
inflation, but not with both at the rates assumed for this study 
(i. e. 3% and 11% per year respectively). Through sensitivity 
testing we observed that the system eventually ran into financial 
problems, hence dependence on finance from the parent company, 
even with a 5.5% inflation level. Therefore, we concluded that 
there must be an inflation level between the 0-5.5% range, 
probably in the lower end of the range, beyond which the finan- 
cial ability of the company would decline to the extent of 
eventual dependence on financial rescue by the parent company. 
It is therefore quite clear that the system simply cannot cope 
with inflation levels of large magnitudes. If the average 
inflation level in Western Europe persists, as expected, at a 
. level close to that forecasted for the purposes of this study, 
then besides a number of options open to the company, which can 
improve its financial performance to some degree (which will be 
discussed later) but not to the extent of complete financial 
stability, the company should somehow effectively take account 
of the inflation in the replacement costs of physical assets. 
In chapter 6 we mentioned that Elbedeiwy's (1979) accounting 
method of revaluing the physical assets at their current replace- 
ment costs and their depreciation according to this value might 
well be appropriate and lead to adequate financial stability for 
the company. However, this has to be explored thoroughly, as 
a future area of research. 
In chapter 5 we explored the impact of economic plant size 
constraints on the Basic Model, having taken out the assumption 
that the subsidiary would go into joint ventures with other 
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companies if its desired new capacity for a product falls below 
the economic size of such a capacity. We observed that the 
growth in capacity did not enable. the company to take advantage 
of all the peaks in demand which is the main objective of the 
companies. Even though the hypothetical company under this 
present study is of the size of major companies operating in 
this industry, (hence possessing substantial market share)-due 
to the rate of growth of demand and the large economic sizes of 
the plants, its capacity falls short of the peaks in demand. 
We also discussed in that chapter the consensus among the 
companies not to attempt to capture each others market share 
which would mean that a company cannot order a plant when- only 
a part of its capacity is required. Hence, the only way that 
the company could reach its objective is to go into joint 
ventures with other companies in the same situation. We have 
given many examples of joint ventures, in chapters 2 and 5, and 
believe that in the future the main reason for their formations 
will be the market share consensus among the companies. 
Although other factors such as the huge capital costs of the 
plants would make such undertakings even more attractive. 
In chapter 6 we tested the external and the internal robust- 
ness of the model. It was discovered that the system is sensitive 
to the errors in the demand forecasting process which could result 
in substantial overcapacity or undercapacity. Hence, as a future 
areaýof research, it would be extremely worthwhile to attempt to 
re-design the capacity acquisition process in order to desensitise 
it against such errors. 
The effect of increasing the depreciation rate of the value 
of the plants was also investigated and we observed that under 
inflationary conditions such a policy would not, as might have 
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been expected, lead to significant improvement in the financial 
stability of the company. 
The system was found to be quite sensitive to the varying 
portion of profits paid in taxes and dividends. The lengthening 
of the physical lifetime of plants also led to some degree of 
improvement in the financial performance of the company. The 
varying of the limit of financial assistance from the parent 
company, expectedly, plays a decisive role during the periods 
when the subsidiary is under heavy financial burden. 
It was also discovered that if the industry as a whole 
could raise its return expectation on assets, then the company's 
financial performance would improve to a certain extent. 
The relationship between the deterioration of prices and 
the magnitude of the overcapacity proved to be sensitive to some 
degree. However further thorough research in this area is 
required. 
Our overall conclusion on the robustness of the model is 
that, although the system is relatively sensitive, concerning 
quantitative performance, to a number of factors, it is quite 
robust qualitatively since there is no significant change in 
the overall behaviour mode regardless of variations in the 
parameters. 
Based on our detailed conclusions, we would now like to 
propose the appropriate corporate strategies to be followed by 
the petrochemical subsidiary during the next two decades. 
Accepting the fact that the company would have to sustain a 
certain degree of growth, and also operate under high inflation 
levels for the foreseeable future, then the company should 
explore the possibility of adopting, where possible, a depreci- 
ation policy which would take account of current replacement 
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costs (as recommended by Elbedeiwy (1979) ) in preference to 
the historical cost accounting. 
There are also a number-of options open to the subsidiary 
by which its financial performance could be improved, which in 
turn affects its long term viability and survival: 
a) to pay out as little in taxes and dividends as possible, 
which when considering that the subsidiary is allowed 
plant allowances of 100% against tax and also being wholly 
owned by the parent company, should not be too difficult. 
b) to extend the physical lifetime of the plants to their 
practical limits. 
Finally the parent company should be prepared to come to the 
financial rescue of its subsidiary during the periods when its 
internal cash generation is not large enough to cover its expen- 
ditures. 
7.2 The Scope for Future Research 
This present work, has opened the path to other interesting 
areas of research for the future. 
Naphtha has been the main source of petrochemicals in Western 
Europe and is expected to remain the dominant feedstock for the 
foreseeable future. We therefore chose this raw material'as 
the source of the company's petrochemical products. However, 
due to the heavy increase in the demand of the lighter end of the 
barrel, it is expected that the companies would build plants 
which could use other varieties of feedstocks such as LPG and 
gas oil in order to alleviate the feedstock supply problem. 
The model has been built in such a way as to facilitate the use 
of other raw materials. Hence it would be interesting to extend 
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the model accordingly to consider the case of a company which 
uses a variety of feedstocks for its petrochemical operations. 
In the model we have not attempted to forecast the company's 
cash generation in the future. Hence, the decisions on capital 
expenditure programmes are based wholly on the level of cash 
generation prevailing at about the time when the decisions are 
taken. It would be interesting to explore the impact of the 
forecast on the decision-making process. 
In chapter 4 we mentioned that the relationship between the 
price and the demand/supply situation is very difficult to 
quantify, and that the relationships presented were of the right 
behavioural pattern, but by no means accurate in numerical values. 
Later, in chapter 6, we tested the model against errors in the 
quantification of these relationships, and the system was found 
to be sensitive to some degree. Therefore, it is our belief 
that it would be quite worthwhile to attempt to quantify the 
relationships as accurately as possible. 
The model has been built with the flexibility of including 
other product ranges so that if the company intends to diversify 
into other areas, it can explore its implications prior to making 
firm commitments. 
Finally, concerning the operation of the company under 
inflationary measures, as was discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the 
escalation in cost of plants is very substantial indeed which 
places an enormous burden on the company. Elbedeiwy (1979) has 
thoroughly investigated this matter and developed an accounting 
policy which depreciates the value of the plants according to 
their current replacement costs in preference to the historical 
cost accounting (employed in our study which is also the general 
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practice in the industry). He has applied the technique to 
a hypothetical textile firm and observed significant improvement 
in its financial stability. Hence, as a future area of research 
it would be extremely interesting to apply such a technique to 
the system under this present study in order to observe the 
changes in-its overall performance. 
Finally the capacity acquisition process was found to be 
sensitive to errors in the demand forecasts. Therefore, it 
would be extremely worthwhile to attempt to re-design the process 
in order to desensitise it against such errors. 
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF COMPUTER PROGRAMME OF THE BASIC MODEL 
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DOC 
DIM 
*A CORPORATE MODEL FOR A PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE FILE NAME ANSARI 
NOTE A COPY OF THIS MODEL IS STORED IN THE ARCHIVE OF 
NOTE SYSTEM DYNAMICS RESEARCH GROUP i 
NOTE UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD , MANAGEMENT CENTRE 
NOTE EHM LANE r ßD9 4JL i TEL 4L299 STD 0274 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ************************************************************r******* 
NOTE PRODUCT DEMAND SECTOR 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A ADGF, K=EXP(RGDM*TII"IE, K)*(1+AMP*SIN(6,283*(TIME, K+7)/PIRD)) 
N RGDM9,03/12 
C AMP=, 055 
C PERD=4$ 
A TERP. K=LDPED. K*ETOLD+HDPED. K*ETOHD+PSD. K*STOPS*ETOS+PVCD, K*VCTOPV 
X *ETOVC 
A ED, K=LDPED. K*ETOLD+HDPED. K*ETOHD+VCMD, K*ETUVC+SD, K*ETOS+BED*ADGF. K 
N LIED=AEECU*EBCAP*EY-((LDPED*ETOLD+HDPED*ETUHD)+(VCMD*ETOVC+SD*ETOS)) 
C AEECU=. 9 
A PD, K=PPD. K*PTOPP+BPRD*ADGF. K 
N RPRD=AEPCU*EBCAP*PY-PPD*PTOPP 
C AEPCU=, 87 
A ßD, K=BBD*ADGF, K 
N ßßD=AEBCU*EI3CAP*BY 
C AEBCU=, 9 
A T13D, K=ED. K+PD, K+BD, K 
A T13DY, K=CLIP(ED, K, EPRAT*PD. K, EPRAT, ED. K/PD. K)*EP13TOE 
N EPBTUE=(EY+PY+BY)/EY 
A VCtI[), K=PVCD, K*VCTOPV+BVCMD*ADGF, K 
N BVCNID=AEVCU*EVCCAP-PVCD*VCTOPV 
C AEVCU=, 9 
A SD, K=PSD, K*STOPS+BSD*ADGF. K 
N RSD=AESCU*ESCAP-PSD*STUPS 
C AESCU=. S7 
A TID. K=VCMD. K+SD. K 
A LDPE: D, "K=BLDPED*LDMUL. K*ADGF. K 
N BLDPED=AELDCU*ELDCAP 
C AELDCU=, 94 
A LDMUL, K=TABHL(TLDMUL, TIt-1E. K, U, 132,132) 
T TLDMUL=1/. 9655 
A HDPED, K=6HDPED*IiDMUL. K*ADGF. K 
N BHDPED=AEHDCU*EHDCAP 
C AEHDCU=. 72 
A HDt"tUL, K=TABIIL(TIIDMUL, TIME. K, U, 
_132! 
152) 
T THDMUL=1 /1 . 1365 
A PVCD, K=RPVCD*PVMUL. K*ADGF, K 
N fPVCD=AEPVCU*EPVCAP 
C AEPVCU=, 93 
A PVI. 11)L. K=TABHL(TPVMUL, TIIIE. K, O, 132,132) 
T TPVMUL=1/1 
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A PSD. K=BPSD*PSMUL. K*ADGF. K 
U BPSD=AEPSCU*EPSCAP 
C AEPSCU=, 77 
A PSMUL, K=TABHL(TPSMUL, TIME. K, 0,132,132) 
T TPSMUL=1/. 9197 
A PPD. K=BPPD*PPMUL. K*ADGF. K 
N BPPD=AEPPCU*EPPCAP 
C AEPPCU=, 7 
A PtPI1UL, K=TABHL(TPPMUL, TIME. K, O, 132,132) 
T TPPMUL=1/1.5556 
A TFD. K=LDPED, K+HDPED. K+PVCD. K+PSD, K+PPD. K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE **********************************, v******************************** 
NOTE FORWARD PLANNING -NECESSARY CAPACITY FORECASTS SECTOR 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A FNCGF, K=EXP(RGDM*RGDMEB*(PHOR+TIME, K))*(1+AMMP) 
C RGDMEB=1 
A NE, K=NLD, K*ETOLD+NHD. K*ETOHD+NVC. K*ETOVC+NS. K*ETOS+BED* 
X FNCGF, K 
A NP, K=NPP. K*PTOPP+BPRD*FNCGF. K 
A NVC. K=NPV, K*VCTOPV+BVCt1D*FNCGF. K 
A NS, K=NPS. K*STOPS+BSD*FNCGF. K 
A NLD, K=BLDPED*LDMULP. K*FNCGF. K 
A LD1IULP, K=TABHL(TLDMUL, TIME, K+PHOR, O, 132,132) 
A HHD. K=BHDPED*HDMULP. K*FNCGF. K 
A HDMULP, K=TABHL(THDtIULIT IME . K+PHOR, Oil 32,152) 
A NPV, K=BPVCD*PVMULP, K*FNCGF. K 
A PVMULP, K=TABHL(TPV14UL, TIWE. K+PHOR, 0,132,132) 
A NPS. K=BPSD*PSMULP, K*FNCGF. K 
A PSMULP, K=TABtIL(TPSMUL, TIME. K+PHOR, O, 132,152) 
A NPP. K=BPPD*PPMULP, K*FNCGF. K 
A PPI, IULP, K=TABHL(TPPMUL, TIME. K+PHOR, O, 132,13Z) 
C PHOR=60 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE CURRENT PRODUCTION CAPACITY SECTOR 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L BCAP, K=BCAP, J+DT*(BCCR. JK-BCDR. JK) 
N BCAP=7$87E3/12 
A EBCAP, K=BCAP. K*t"1FCUR 
A EBCAPE, K=EBCAP, K*TYEPB 
N TYEPB=EY+PY+BY 
R BCDR, KL=BCAP, K/LTPP 
C LTPP=204 
L ABCDR, K=ABCDR. J+(DT/TAPCDR)*(BCDR. JK-ABCDR. J) 
N ABCDR=BCDR 
C TAPCDR=3 
L VCCAP, K=VCCAP. J+DT*(VCCCR. JK-VCCDR. JK) 
N VCCAP=375E3/12 
A FVCCAP. K=VCCAP. K*MFCUR 
R VCCDR, KL=VCCAP, K/LTPP 
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L AVCCDR, K=AVCCDR. J+(DT/TAPCDR)*(VCCDR, JK-AVCCDR, J) 
N AVCCDR=VCCDR 
L SCAP, K=SCAP, J+DT*(SCCR. JK-SCDR, JK) 
N SCAP=830E3/1? 
A ESCAP, K=SCAP. K*MFCUR 
R SCDR, KL=SCAP, K/LTPP 
L ASCDR, K=ASCDR. J+(DT/TAPCDR)*(SCDR. JK-ASCDR. J) 
N ASCDR=SCDR 
A ICAP, K=VCCAP, K+SCAP. K 
A EICAP, K=ICAP. K*MFCUR 
R ICDR, KL-'ICAP. K/LTPP 
L LDCAP. K=LDCAP, J+DT*(LDCCR. JK-LDCDR. JK) 
N LDCAP=1U05E3/12 
A ELDCAP, K=LDCAP. K*MFCUR 
R LDCDR, KL=LDCAP, K/LTPP 
L ALDCDR. K=ALDCDR. J+(DT/TAPCDR)*(L, DCDR, JK-ALDCDR. J) 
N ALDCDR=LDCDR 
L HDCAP, K=HDCAP, J+DT*(HDCCR. JK-IiDCDR, JK) 
N HDCAP=215E3/12 
A EHDCAP, K=HDCAP. K*MFCUR 
R HDCDR, KL=HDCAP, K/LTPP 
L AHDCDR. K=AHDCDR. J+(DT/TAPCDR)*(HDCDR, JK-AHDCDR. J) 
N AHDCDR=HDCDR 
L PVCAP, K=PVCAP, J+DT*(PVCCR. JK-PVCDR, JK) 
N PVCAP=325E3/12 
A EPVCAP. K=PVCAP, K*MFCUR 
R PVCDR, KL=PVCAP, K/LTPP 
L APVCDR, K=APVCDR. J+(DT/TAPCDR)*(PVCDR, JK-APVCDR, J) 
N APVCDR=PVCDR 
L PSCAP, K=PSCAP, J+DT*(PSCCR. JK-PSCDR, JK) 
N PSCAP=13UE3/12 
A EPSCAP, K=PSCAP, K*MFCUR 
R PSCDR, KL=PSCAP. K/LTPP 
L APSCDR, K=APSCDR. J+(DT/TAPCDR)*(PSCDR, JK-APSCDR. J) 
N APSCDR=PSCDR 
L PPCAP. K=PPCAP. J+DT*(PPCCR. JK-PPCDR, JK) 
N PPCAP=397E3/12 
A EPPCAP. K=PPCAP, K*MFCUR 
R PPCDR, KL=PPCAP. K/LTPP 
L APPCDR, K=APPCDR. J+(DT/TAPCDR)*(PPCDR, JK-APPCDR, J) 
N APPCDR=PPCDR 
A FCAP, K=LDCAP, K+IIDCAP. K+PVCAP. K+P'SCAP, K+PPCAP. K 
A EFCAP, K=FCAP, K*MFCUR 
R FCDR, KL=FCAP, K/LTPP 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ***********, r******************************************************** 
NOTE FORWARD PLANNING -CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS SECTOR 
NOTE *******, t**, ********************************************************* 
NOTE 
NOTE 
N EPTOE=(EY+PY)/EY 
C EY=, 31 
C PY=, "16 
C BY=. 05 
C GY=. 21 
C LPGY=, 25 
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C FY=. U1 
C LOSS=, 01 
C ETUS=, 307 
C ETUVC=, 485 
C ETOLD=1.03 
C ETOHD=1, U2 
C VCTOPV=1.01 
C STUPS=1,05 
C PTOPP=1.096 
A DE, K (NE. K-EY*EBCAP. K)/MFCUR+EY*AICDR. K*(D(-iINTß+CDELßP)-EY*BCAPOR. K 
A DP, K=(NP. K-PY*EBCAP. K)/I. IFCUR+PY*ABCDR. K*(DMINTB+CDELßP)-PY*BCAPUR, K 
C MFCUR=, ö 
C DMINTB=12 
A DC, K=CLIP(DE. K, EPRAT*DP. K. EPRAT, DE, K/DP. K)/EY 
N EPRAT=EY/PY 
A DVC. K=(NVC. K-EVCCAP. K)/tIFCUR+AVCCDR, K*(DMINTIF+CDELVC)-VCCAPUR. K 
C DMINTIF=24 
A DS, K=(NS. K-ESCAP. K)/MFCUR+ASCDR, K*(DMINTIF+CDELS)-SCAPOR, K 
A DLD. K=(NLD. K-ELDCAP. K)/MFCUR+ALDCDR, K*(DIiINTIF+CDELLD)-LDCAPOR. K 
A DHD, K=(NHD, K-rEHDCAP. K)/IiFCUR+AHDCDR, K*(DMINTIF+CDELHD)-HDCAPUR, K 
A DPV, K=(NPV, K-EPVCAP. K)/I4FCUR+APVCDR, K*(Df4INTIF+CDELPV)-PVCAPOR, K 
A DPS, K=(NPS, K. EPSCAP. K)/MFCUR+APSCDR, K*(DMINTIF+CDELPS)-PSCAPOR. K 
A DPP. K=(NPP. K-EPPCAP. K)/FIFCUR+APPCDR, K*(DMINTIF+CDELPP)-PPCAPUR, K 
A TROICAP, K=DC, K/DMINTB 
A TROVCCAP, K=DVC, K/DMINTIF 
A TROSCAP, K=DS. K/DMINTIF 
A TROICAP. K=TROVCCAP. K+TRUSCAP. K 
A TROLDCAP. K=DLD. K/DMINTIF 
A TROHDCAP. K=DHD, K/DMINTIF 
A TROPVCAP, K=DPV, K/DMINTIF 
A TROPSCAP. K=DPS, K/DMINTIF 
A TROPPCAP, K=DPP, K/DMINTIF 
A TROFCAP. K=TROLDCAP, K+TROHDCAP, K+TROPVCAP, K+TROPSCAP, K+TROPPCAP. K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE FORWARD PLANNING -SPENDING REQUIREMENTS SECTOR 
NOTE ***********************************************ý******************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A TIWC, K=MAX(U, (WCAPR. K-WCAP. K)/TAWC) 
N TAWC=DT 
A ECP. K=(RMCNP. K-14CNP. K)/TIt1R 
N TIMR=DT 
I. CECP, K=CECP, J+DT*ECP. J 
N CECP=U 
A RRSI. K=TROBCAP. K*EY*CCC*OII. K 
A RRSI, K=(TROVCCAP. K*CCVCIIIC+TROSCAP, K*CCSC)*OII, K 
A RRSF. K=(TROLDCAP. K*CCLDPEC+TROHDCAP, K*CCHDPEC+1'ROPVCAP. K* 
X CCPVCC+TROPSCAP. K*CCPSC+TROPPCAP. K*CCPPC)*OII. K 
A RRS, K=RRSB. K+RRSI. K+RRSF, K 
L CRS. K=CRS. J+DT*RRS, J 
N CRS=0 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANNING DECISIONS SECTOR 
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NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A FRAT, K=ARS, K/(RRS. K+CLIP(O, 1, RRS. K,, 1)) 
A FPMULT, K=TABHL(TFPMULT, FRAT. K, U, 2,, b) 
N FPMULT=1 
T TFPMULT=O/, 6S/1/1/1 
A IFRAT, K=(FREXP. K-ARWC, K-ECP. K)/RRS, K 
A ARWC. K=TIWC, K 
R RIPC, KL=tIAX(MIN(SCDIFF, K, MAXIPC, K), O) 
R ICSR, KL=TROBCAP. K*FPMULT, K 
R VCCSR, KL=TROVCCAP. K*FPMULT. K 
R SCSR, KL=TROSCAP. K*FPMULT. K 
R ICSR, KL=VCCSR. KL+SCSR, KL 
R LDCSR, KL=TROLDCAP, K*FPMULT. K 
R HDCSR, KL=TRUHUCAP, K*FPMULT. K 
R PVCSR, KL=TROPVCAP. K*FPMULT, K 
R PSCSR, KL=TROPSCAP. K*FPMULT. K 
R PPCSR, KL=TROPPCAP, K*FPMULT. K 
R FCSR, KL=LDCSR, KL+HDCSR, KL+PVCSR, KL+PSCSR, KL+PPCSR, KL 
A'RCMTNP, K=(BCSR, KL*EY*CCC 
X +(SCSR. KL*CCSC+VCCSR, KL*CCVCMC) 
X +(LDCSR. KL*CCLUPEC+HDCSR, KL*CCHDPEC+PVCSR, KL*CCPVCC 
X +PSCSR, KL*CCPSC+PPCSR, KL*CCPPC))*OII. K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE CAPACITY CONSTRUCTION PIPELINE SECTOR 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L BCAPOR, K=BCAPOR. J+DT*(BCSR. JK-BCCR. JK) 
N FCAPUR=(((NE-EY*EBCAP)/t1FCUR+EY*ABCUR*(DMINTB+CDELBP))/ 
X (EY*(DMINT1+CDELßP)))*CUELBP 
R BCCR, KL=DELAY3(RCSR. JK, CDELßP) 
C CDELE3P=43,2694 
L VCCAPOR, K=VCCAPOR, J+DT*(VCCSR, JK-VCCCR, JK) 
N VCCAPOR=(((NVC-EVCCAP)/MFCUR+AVCCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELVC))/ 
X (DMINTIF+CDELVC))*CDELVC 
R VCCCR, KL=DELAY3(VCCSR. JK, CDELVC) 
C CUELVC=31,6288 
L SCAPOR, K=SCAPOR. J+DT*(SCSR. JK-SCCR, JK) 
N SCAPUR=(((NS-ESCAP)/t'IFCUR+ASCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELS))/ 
X (DMINTIF+CDELS))*CDELS 
R SCCR, KL=DELAY3(SCSR, JK, CDELS) 
C CDELS=31.6729 
A ICAPOR, K=VCCAPOR, K+SCAPOR. K 
R ICCR, KL=VCCCR. KL+SCCR. KL 
L LDCAPOR. K=LDCAPOR, J+DT*(LDCSR, JK-LDCCR. JK) 
N LDCAPOR=(((NLD-ELDCAP)/IIFCUR+ALDCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELLD))/ 
X (D14INTIF+CDELLD))*CDELLD 
R LDCCRgKL=DELAY3(LDCSR. JK, CDELLD) 
C CUELLU=31,6794 
L HDCAPOR, K=FIDCAPOR. J+DT*(HDCSR, JK-HDCCR. JK) 
N HDCAPOR=(((NHD-EHDCAP)/MFCUR+AHDCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELHD))/ 
X (Dt"1INTIF+CDELHD))*CDELHD 
R HDCCR, KL=DELAY3(HDCSR, JK, CDELHD) 
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C CDELHD=31.5143 
"L PVCAPOR. K=PVCAPOR, J+DT*(PVCSR, JK-PVCCR. JK) 
N PVCAPOR=(((NPV-EPVCAP)/I1FCUR+APVCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELPV))/ 
X (DMINTIF+CDELPV))*CDELPV 
R PVCCR, KL=DELAY3(PVCSR. JK, CDELPV) 
C CDELPV=31,6372 
L PSCAPOR, K=PSCAPOR. J+DT*(PSCSR. JK-PSCCR. JK) 
N PSCAPOR=(((NPS-EPSCAP)/MFCUR+APSCDR"*(DMINTIF+CDELPS))/ 
x (DMINTIF+CDELPS))*CDELPS 
R PSCCR, KL=DEt. AY3(PSCSR. JK, CDELPS) 
C CDELPS=31.8519 
L PPCAPOR, K=PPCAPOR. J+DT*(PPCSR. JK-PPCCR. JK) 
N PPCAPUR=(((NPP-EPPCAP)/F1FCUR+APPCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELPP))/ 
X (DMINTIF+CDELPP))*CDELPP 
it PPCCR, KL=DELAY3(PPCSR, JK, CDELPP) 
C CDELPP=31,21b? 
A FCAPOR, K=LDCAPOR, K+HDCAPOR. K+PVCAPOR. K+PSCAPOR. K+PPCAPOR, K 
R FCCR. KL=LDCCR. KL+HDCCR. KL+PVCCR, KL+PSCCR. KL+PPCCR, KL 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE *********************************************************** ******** 
NOTE PRICES , AMORTIZATION AND RETURN , AND PRODUCTION COSTS SECTOR 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A DIFF, K=BY*(PB, K-MKTPEI. K)/(EY+PY) 
A PE, K=BPE*(FE*COPI. K+(ONE-FE)*OII. K) 
C BPE=9OO 
C ONE=1 
C FE= .5 
A PPE, K=ETOEP*(FWDV*(WDVC. K+AWCAPRB. K)+DEPPC *WDDVC, K)/(EI3CAP. K*EY) 
N ETOEP=EY/(EY+PY) 
A CPTE, K=PE. K+DIFF, K-PPE. K 
A PPR. K=BPP*(FP*COPI, K+(ONE-FP)*OII, K) 
C BPP=648 
C FP=, 5 
A PPPR. K=(ONE-ETOEP)*(FWDV*(WDVC. K+AWCAPRB, K)+DEPPC*WDVC. K)/(EBCAP. K*NY 
X) 
A CPTP, K=PPR. K+DIFF. K-PPPR. K 
A PB, K=BPB*(FB*COPI. K+(ONE-Fß)*OII. K) 
C BP6=792 
C FI3=. 5 
A MKTPB, K=PB. K*PMB. K 
A APG. K=BPG*COPI, K 
C BPG=3134 
A APLPG. K=BPLPG*COPI, K 
C BPLPG=360 
A APF. K=BPF*COPI, K 
C BPF=192 
A PVCM, K=BPVCM*(FVCM*COPI. K+(ONE-FVCM)*OII. K) 
C RPVCM=792 
C FVCM=. 35 
A PPVCM, K=(FWDV*(WDVVCM. K+ACPTVC. K*VCTPUT. K*COVER)+DEPPC*WUVVCM, K) 
X /EVCCAP. K 
N PPVCM=(FWDV*(WDVVCM+PVCM*VCTPUT*COVER)+DEPPC*WDVVCM) 
X /(EVCCAP+FWDV*VCTPUT*COVER) 
A CPTVCNI. K=PVCM. K-PPVCM. K 
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N 
x 
A 
L 
N 
A 
C 
C 
A 
x 
N 
x 
A 
L 
N 
A 
C 
C 
A 
ACPTVC, K=ACPTVC. J+(DT/TAC)*(CPTVCt"i, J-ACPTVC, J) 
ACPTVC=CPTVCM 
TAC=2 
pST, K=ßPS*(FS*COPI, K+(0NE-FS)*OII. K) 
t3PS=1 008 
FS=. 4 
ppST, K=(FWDV*(WDVS, K+ACPTS. K*STPUT, K*. CUVER)+DEPPC*WDVS, K) 
/ESCAP. K 
PPST=(FWDV*(WDVS+PST*STPUT*COVER)+DEPPC*WDVS) 
/(ESCAP+FWDV*STPUT*COVE: R) 
CPTS, K=PST, K-PPST. K 
ACPTS, K=ACPTS, J+(DT/TAC)*(CPTS, J-ACPTS. J) 
ACPTS=CPTS 
PLDPE, K=ßPLDPE*(FLDPE*COPI. K+(ONE-FLDPE)*OII, K) 
BBPLI)PE=1512 
FLDPE=. 29 
PPLUPE, K=(FWDV*(WDVLDPE. K+ACPTLD, K*LDTPUT, K*COVER)+DEPPC*WDVLUPE. K) 
/ELDCAP, K 
PPLDPE=(FWDV*(WDVLDPE+PLDPE*LDTPUT*COVER)+DEPPC*WDVLDPE) 
/(ELDCAP+FWDV*LDTPUT*COVER) 
CPTLDPE, K=PLDPE. K-PPLDPE. K 
ACPTLD. K=ACPTLD. J+(DT/TAC)*(CPTLDPE, J-ACPTLD. J) 
ACPTLD=CPTLDPE 
PHDPE, K=BPHDPE*(FHDPE*CUPI. K+(ONE-FHDPE)*UII, K) 
BPHDPE=1.584 
FHDPE=, 29 
PPHDPE_, K (FWDV*(WDVHDPE. K+ACPTHD, K*HDTPUT. K*COVER)+DEPPC*WDVHDPE. K) 
/EHDCAP, K' 
PPHDPE=(FWDV*(WDVHDPE+PHDPE*HDTPUT*COVER)+DEPPC*WDVHDPE) 
/(EH0CAP+FWDV*HDTPUT*C0VER) 
CPTHDPE, K=PHDPE. K-PPNDPE. K 
ACPTHD, K=ACPTHD. J+(DT/TAC)*(CPTHDPE, J-ACPTHD, J) 
ACPTHD=CPTHDPE 
PPVC, K=BPPVC*(FPVC*COPI. K+(ONE-FPVC)*OII, K) 
RPPVC=1272 
FPVC=. 2tß 
PPPVC, K=(FWDV*(WDVPVC. K+ACPTPV. K*PVTPUT. K*COVER)+DEPPC*WDVPVC, K) 
/EPVCAP. K 
PPPVC=(FWDV*(WDVPVC+PPVC*PVTPUT*C0VER)+DEPPC*WDVPVC) 
/(EPVCAP+FWDV*PVTPUT*COVER) 
CPTPVC, K=PPVC, K-PPPVC. K 
ACPTPV. K=ACPTPV. J+(DT/TAC)*(CPTPVC, J-ACPTPV. J) 
ACPTPV=CPTPVC 
PPS. K=BPPS*(FPS*COPI. K+(ONE-FPS)*UII, K) 
BPPS=1440 
FPS=, 28 
PPPS, K=(FWDV*(IW)DVPS. K+ACPTPS. K*PSTPUT, K*CUVER)+DEPPC*WDVPS. K) 
/EPSCAP, K 
PPPS=(FtW)DV*(WDVPS+PPS*PSTPUT*CDVER)+DEPPC*WDVPS) 
/(EPSCAP+FWDV*PSTPUT*COVER) 
CPTPS, K=PPS, K-PPPS, K 
ACPTPS", K=ACPTPS. J+(DT/TAC)*(CPTPS. J-ACPTPS. J) 
ACPTPS=CPTPS 
PPP. K=BPPP*(FPP*COPI. K+(0NE-FPP)*OII, K) 
BPPP=1512 
FPP=, 29 
PPPP, K=(FWDV*(WDVPP. K+ACPTPP. K*PPTPUT, K*COVER)+DEPPC*WDVPP, K) 
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X /EPPCAP, K 
N PPPP=(FWDV*(WDVPP+PPP*PPTPUT*COVER)+DEPPC*WDVPP) 
X /(EPPCAP+FWDV*PPTPUT*COVER) 
A CPTPP, K=PPP. K-PPPP, K 
L ACPTPP, K=ACPTPP. J+(DT/TAC)*(CPTPP, J-ACPTPP, J) 
N ACPTPP=CPTPP 
L CUPI, K=COPI. J+DT*(COPI, J*COPR) 
N COPR=, 11/12 
N CUPI=1 
L OII. K=0I1. J+DT*(OII. J*OIR) 
N OIR=, 11/12 
N 01I=1 
N FWDV=, 17/12 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE PRODUCTION PLANNING SECTOR 
NOTE *****************************************************, ý************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A BTPIJT, K=MIN(CLIP(ED. K, EPRAT*PD, K, EPRAT, ED, K/PD, K)/EY, EUCAP. K) 
A EOCU, K=TYEPB*BTPUT, K/EICAPE. K 
A VCTPUT, K=MIN(CLIP(VCMD, K, CLIP(PVCD, K*VCTOPV+(BVCMD*ETOVC/(BVCMD* 
X ETOVC+BSD*ETOS))*(BTPUT. K*EY-TERP, K)/ETOVC, ((PVCD, K* 
X VCTOPV*ETOVC/TERP. K)*BTPUT, K*EY)/ETOVC, BTPUT. K*EY, 
X TERP, K), BTPUT. K*EY, ED. K-BED*ADGF, K), EVCCAP. K) 
A STPUT, Y. =MIN(CLIP(SD. K, CLIP(SD. K*STOPS+(RSD*ETOS/(E3VCMD*ETOVC+ 
X BSD*ETOS))*(BTPUT. K*EY-TERP, K)/ETOS, ((PSD, K*STOPS* 
X ETOS/TERP, K)*BTPUT. K*EY)/ETOS, BTPUT. K*EY, TERP, K), 
X BTPUT, K*EY, ED. K-BED*ADGF. K), ESCAP, K) 
A ITPt1T, K=VCTPUT. K+STPUT. K 
A EICU, K=ITPUT. K/EICAP, K 
A LDTPUT, K=14IN(MIti((LDPED. K*ETOLD/TERP, K)*BTPUT. K*EY/ETOLD, 
X LDPED. K), ELDCAP, K) 
A HDTPUT, K=MIN(MIN((HDPED. K*ETOHD/TERP, K)*BTPUT. K*EY/ETOHD. 
X HDPED. K), EHDCAP. K) 
A PVTPUT, K=MIN(MIN(VCTPUT. K/VCTUPV, PVCD. K)ºEPVCAP. K) 
A PSTPUT, K=MIN(MIN(STPUT. K/STOPS, PSD, K), EPSCAP. K) 
A pPTPUT, K=MIN(MIN(ETPUT, K*pY/PTOPP, PPD, K), EPPCAP, K) 
A FTPIJT, K=LDTPUT, K+HDTPUT. K+PVTPUT, K+PSTPUT, K+PPTPUT, K 
A EPCU, K=FTPUT. K/EFCAP, K 
A CHECKM, K=(BTPUT. K*EY-(ESOLD. K+VCSOLD, K*ETOVC+SSOLD, K*ETUS+LDT*PUT, K 
X *ETOLD+HDTPUT. K*ETOHD+PVTPUT. K*VCTOPV*ETOVC+PSTPUT, K* 
X STOPS*ETOS))+(BTPUT. K*PY_(PSOLD, K+PPTPUT, K*PTOPP)) 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE WORKING CAPITAL AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION SECTOR 
NOTE *******************************************k************************ 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L WCAP. K=WCAP, J+DT*(ARWC. J-RRWC. JK) 
N WCAP=WCAPR 
A WCAPRB, K=(CPTE, K*EY+CPTP, K*PY+MKTPI, K*BY 
X +APG, K*GY+APLPG. K*LPGY+APF. K*FY)*BTPUT. K*COVER 
N WCAPRB=((EY*(PE+DIFF)+PY*(PPR+DIFF)-WDVC*(FWDV+DEPPC)/EBCAP 
X +MKTPB*ßY+APG*GY+APLPG*LPGY+APF*FY)*BTPUT*COVER)/(1+ 
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X FWDV*BTPUT*COVER/EBCAP) 
L AWCAPRB, K=AWCAPRB, J+(DT/TAW)*(WCAPRB, J-AWCAPRB, J) 
N AWCAPRB=WCAPRB 
C TAW=2 
A WCAPR, K=WCAPRB, K+((CPTVCM. K*VCTPUT, K+CPTS. K*STPUT. K)+(CPTLDPE, K 
X *LDTPUT. K+CPTHDPE, K*HDTPUT, K+CPTPVC, K*PVTPUT. K+ 
X CPTPS, K*PSTPUT. K+CPTPP. K*PPTPUT. K))*COVER 
C COVER=2 
A WCRAT, K=WCAP, K/WCAPR. K 
R RRWC. KL=((WCAP, K-WCAPR. K)/TRWC)*CLIP(ONE, O, WCRAT, K, WCRCV) 
C WCRCV=1,2 
C TRWC=3 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE SALES, PROFIT AND CASHFLUW SECTOR 
NOTE **************************, **************************************** 
NOTE' 
NOTE 
A F. SOLD, K=IIIAX(U, BTPUT. K*EY-(LDTPUT. K*ETOLD+HDTPUT. K* 
X ETOHD+VCTPUT. K*ETOVC+STPUT, K*ETOS)) 
A PSOLD. K=MAX(U, 3TPUT. K*PY-PPTPUT, K*PTOPP) 
A VCSOLD. K=MAX(O, VCTPUT. K-PVTPUT. K*VCTOPV) 
A SSOLD, K=MAX(U, STPUT. K-PSTPUT. K*STOPS) 
A PME. K=TABHL(TPME, (TBDY. K*EY/TYEPB)/(BCAP, K*EY),. 5,1,1,, 1) 
T TP14E=0/, 77/, 97/1/1,03/1. Z3/2 
A PMP. K=TABHL(TPMP, (TBDY. K*PY/TYEPB)/(BCAP, K*PY),, 5,1,1,, 1) 
T TPt1P=U/, 57/, 87/1/1,13/1.43/2 
A PMß. K=TABHL(TPt"iß, (TBDY. K*BY/TYEPB)/(BCAP, K*BY),, 5,1.1,, 1) 
T TPt-1B=. 8/. 854/. 92/1/1.08/1.146/1,2 
A PMVCM, K=TABHL(TPMVCht, VCt1D. K/VCCAP. K,, 5,1,1,, 1) 
T TPMVCM=U/. 57/, 87/1/1.13/1.43/2 
A PMS. K=TABHL(TPtIS, SD. K/SCAP. K,. 5,1,1,, 1) 
T TPNIS=U/, 27/, 6/l/1,4/1.73/2 
A Pt1LDPE, K=TABHL(TPtILDPE, LDPED. K/LDCAP, K,. 5,1,1,, 1) 
T TPMLDPE=0/. 67/. 9/1/1.1/1.33/2 
A PtiHDPE, K=TAßHL(TPt"1HDPE, HDPED. K/HDCAP, K,. 5,1.1,. 1) 
T TPt1HUPE=0/. 67/, 9/1/1.1/1.33/2 
A PMPVC, K=TABHL(TPMPVC, PVCD. K/PVCAP. K,, 5,1.1,. 1) 
T TPt1PVC=0/. 67/. 9/1/1.1/1.33/l 
A PMPS, K=TAßHL(TPMPS, PSD. K/PSCAP, K,. 5,1,1,, 1) 
T TPMPS=0/. 67/, 9/1/1,1/1,33/2 
A PMPP, K=TABHL(TPMPP, PPD. K/PPCAP. K,. 5,1,1,, 1) 
T TPNPP=0/. 67/. 9/1/1,1/1.33/2 
A GME, K=PPE. K*PME. K 
A GMP. K=PPPR, K*Pt9P, K 
A GMVCt4, K=PPVCM, K*PMVCM, K 
A Gt"1S. K=PPST, K*PMS. K 
A GMLDPE, K=PPLDPE. K*Pt"1LDPE. K 
A GMHDPE, K=PPHDPE. K*PMHDPE, K 
A GMPVC, K=PPPVC. K*PMPVC. K 
A GMPS, K=PPPS, K*Pt-1PS, K 
A GMPP, K=PPPP, K*PMPP. K 
R PR, KL=t31 PU1 , K*kY*GME. r. +UTPUT. K*PY*Gt. IP. K+VCTPUT. K*GMVCri. K+ 
X STPUT, K*GMS, K+LDTPUT. Y*GMLDPE, K+HDTPUT. K*Gt111»PE. K+PVTPUT. K* 
X GMPVC, K+PSTPUT. K*Gi4PS. K+PPTPUT. K*GMPP. K+IR*(CASH. K+MCNP. K) 
N IR=. 15/12 
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L CPGP, K=CPGP, J+DT*PR. JK 
N CPGP=U 
L APL. K=APL, J+(DT/TAP)*(PR. JK-APL, J) 
N APL=PR 
C TAP=3 
A RP, K=MAX(O, (ONE-TAXDIV)*(PR, KL-DCFL. K)) 
C TAXDIV=. 3 
L ARP. K=ARP. J+(DT/TARP)*(RP. J-ARP, J) 
N ARP=RP 
C TARP=3 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE CASH GENERATION SECTOR 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A DCFL, K=MAX(U, CI, IP(DEPPC*WUV. K, PR, KL, PR, KL-DEPPC*WDV, K, U)) 
N DEPPC=1/120 
L CDCFL, K=CDCFL. J+DT*(DEPPC*WDV, J-DCFL, J) 
N CDCFL=O 
L ADCFL, K=ADCFL, J+(DT/TADCFL)*(DCFL. J-ADCFL. J) 
N ADCFL=DCFL 
C TADCFL=3 
A ACGR, K=ARP. K+ADCFL. K 
L CACG, K=CACG, J+DT*ACGR, J 
N CACG=O 
A ARS. K=(MAXIPC, K+FREXP. K)-(ARWC. K+ECP, K) 
A MAXIPC, K=MAXIPC80*OII. K 
N MAXIPC80=5E8/12 
A MINCASH, K=PC*WCAPR, K 
C PC=, 3 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE CAPITAL COST OF PLANTS SECTOR 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
C CCC=7680 
C CCVCMC=3960 
C CCSC=2760 
C CCLDPEC=6U00 
C CCHDPEC=6000 
C CCPVCC=4560 
C CCPSC=4800 
C CCPPC=9960 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******************************************************************** 
NOTE VALUATION OF THE COMPANY SECTOR 
NOTE *******************************************************************: " 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A TL, K=IPC. K+CRP, K 
L 1PC. K=IPC, J+DT*RIPC. JK 
N IPC=4E9 
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CRP. K CRP, J+DT*RP, J 
CRP=ZE9 
MCNP, K=MCNP, J+DT*(RCh1TNP. J+ECP. J-RAVP. JK) 
MCNP=RtiICNP 
RMCNP, K=(BCAPOR. K*EY*CCC+(VCCAPOR. K*CCVCMC+SCAPOR, K*CCSC)+ 
(LDCAPOR. K*CCLDPEC+HDCAPOR. K*CCHDPEC+PVCAPOR. K*CCPVCC 
+PSCAPOR. K*CCPSC+PPCAPOR. K*CCPPC))*OII. K 
WDV. K=WDVC, K+WDVVCM. K+WDVS. K+WDVLDPE. K+WDVHDPE, K+t1DVPVC. K 
+WDVPS, K+WDVPP. K 
RAVP, KL=RAVC, KL+RAVVCMP. KL+RAVSP. KL+RAVLDPEP. KL+RAVHDPEP, Y, L+ 
RAVPVCP. KL+RAVPSP. KL+RAVPPP. KL 
_ WDVC, K=WDVC. J+DT*(RAVC. JK-WDVC, J*DEPPC) 
WDVC=BCAP*EY*CCC 
RAVC, KL=BCCR. KL*EY*CCC*OII. K 
WDVVCM, K=WDVVCM. J+DT*(RAVVCMP, JK-WDVVCNI. J*DEPPC) 
WDVVCM=VCCAP*CCVCMC 
RAVVCMP, KL=VCCCR. KL*CCVCMMC*OII. K 
WDVS, K=WDVS. J+DT*(RAVSP. JK4JDVS, J*DEPPC) 
WDVS=SCAP*CCSC 
RAVSP, KL=SCCR, KL*CCSC*OII. K 
WDVLDPE, K=WDVLDPE, J+DT*(RAVLDPEP. JK-WDVLDPE, J*DEPPC) 
WI)VLDPE=LDCAP*CCLDPEC 
RAVLDPEP, KL=LDCCR. KL*CCLDPEC*OII. K 
WDVHDPE. K=WDVtIDPE, J+DT*(RAVHDPEP. JK-WDVHDPE, J*DEPPC) 
WDVFiDPE=HDCAP*CCHDPEC 
RAVHDPEP. KL=HUCCR, KL*CCLDPEC*OII. K 
WDVPVC, K=WDVPVC. J+DT*(RAVPVCP, JK_WDVPVC. J*DEPPC) 
WDVPVC=PVCAP*CCPVCC 
RAVPVCP, KL=PVCCR. KL*CCPVCC*OII, K 
WDVPS, K=WDVPS, J+DT*(RAVPSP, JK^WDVPS, J*DEPPC) 
WDVPS=PSCAP*CCPSC 
RAVPSP, KL=PSCCR. KL*CCPSC*OII. K 
WDVPP. K=WDVPP, J+DT*(RAVPPP. JK-WDVPP, J*DEPPC) 
WDVPP=PPCAP*CCPPC 
RAVPPP, KL=PPCCR. KL*CCPPC*OII. K R 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ********************, ******, r***********************, r**************, ý* 
NOTE BALANCE SHEET SECTOR 
NOTE ********************, *************, r********************************* 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A FREXP, K=ACGR. K+(CASH. K"MINCASH. K)/PHOR 
R RSC. KL=RCMTNP, K+ARWC. K+ECP. K 
L CASH, WASH , J+DT*(RP, J+DCFL. J+RRWC, JK+RIPC. JK-RSC, JK) 
N CASH=TL-(WDV+WCAP+MCNP) 
A SCDIFF, K=RSC, KL-FREXP. K 
A TA, K=WDV. K+WCAP. K+CASH. K+MCNP. K 
A CHECKF, K=TA, K+CDCFL. K-TL. K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
**********, t*********, ************************************, r******* *, t NOTE 
NOTE PERFORMANCE INDEX SECTOR 
NOTE *******, t***************, r***********, *****************, r******, r, r****** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A RUI. K=((APL, K-ADCFL. K)*MPY)/TA. K 
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C MPY=12 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE *, r**************, a, ***, r******, r************, a*********************** 
NOTE OUTPUT CONTROL SECTOR 
NOTE , r*, t*********, t**, r****, r********************** *+ý********************* 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A PRTPER, K=1+STEP(9,11) 
SPEC DT=, 5/LENGTH=240/PLTPER=1 
PLOT TBDY=6, EBCAPE=I, TID=5, EICAP=I, TFD=5, EFCAP=F(Ur5E5) 
PLOT EOCU=E, EICU=IrEPCU=C(U, 1) 
PLOT RAVP=R(0,6E8)/WCAP=W, CASIi=C, IPC=I(0,25E9)/IFRAT=F(O, 1O) 
X /ROI=Z(Ur. 2) 
PRINT 1)TRU, TBDYrEBCAPE, BTPUT, EBCAP, BCAP, DE, DP, TROBCAP, BCSR, 
X BCCR, BCDR, I3CAPORrTID, ITPUT, EICAP, ICAP, TROICAP 
PRINT 2)ICSR, ICCRrICDRrICAPOR, TFD, FTPUT, EFCAP, FCAP, TRUFCAP, FCSR 
X , FCCR, FCDR, FCAPOR 
PRINT 3)PR, APL, RP, DCFL, ACGR, ROI, ARSrRRS, FRAT, FF'MULT, RCMTNP, ECP, RMCNP, 
X , MCNP, FREXP, RSCrSCDIFF, RIPC 
PRINT 4)WCAP, WCAPR, RRWC, ARWC, WCRATrIPC, CRP, TL, WDV, RAVP, CASti, CHECKF 
PRINT 5)ESULDrPSOLD, VCSOLD, SSOLUrLDTPUTrHDTPUT, PVTPUT, PSTPUT, PPTPUT, ED, 
X PD, BD, VCMD, SD, LDPED 
PRINT 6)CPTF., PPErGME, PMErCPTP, PPPR, GMP, PMP, PB, MKTPB, DIFF, PMB, CPTVCM, 
X PPVCM, GIIVCM, PMVCM, CPTS, PPST 
PRINT 7)GMSrPMISrCPTLDPE, PPLDPE, GMLDPE, P(IILDPE, CPTHDPE, PPHDPE, GMHDPE, 
X Pt"1HDPE, CPTPVC, PPPVC, GMPVC, PMPVC, CPTPS, PPPS, Gt1PS, PMPS 
PRINT 8)CPTPP, PPPPrGMPP, PMPP, CECP, CRS, CACG, CPGP, IFRAT, CHECKM 
RUN BASIC MODEL 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ***** ** ************************** ******* ****************, r***** 
NOTE VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
NOTE *, t**************, r*******ý******, r**, *******K************, z***, ý** 
NOTE 
NOTE 
D At3CDR=((T/M)/M) AVERAGE RATE OF DECAY OF BASIC PRODUCT CAPACITY 
D ACGR=(S/M) ACTUAL CASH GENERATION RATE 
D ACPTHD=($/T) AVERAGE CPTHDPE 
D ACPTLD=($/T) AVERAGE CPTLDPE 
D ACPTPP=($/T) AVERAGE CPTPP 
D ACPTPS=($/T) AVERAGE CPTPS 
D ACPTPV=($/T) AVERAGE CPTPVC 
D ACPTS=($/T) AVERAGE CPTS 
D ACPTVC=($/T) AVERAGE CPTVCM 
0 ADCFL=($/M) AVERAGE DEPRECIATION CASNFLOW 
D ADGF=(1) ACTUAL PETROCHEMICAL DEMAND GROWTH FACTOR 
D AEBCU=(1) AVERAGE WESTERN EUROPEAN EFFECTIVE BUTADIENE CAPACITY 
X UTILIZATION IN 1979 
D AEECU=(1) AVERAGE WESTERN EUROPEAN EFFECTIVE ETHYLENE CAPACITY 
X UTILIZATION III 1979 
D AEHDCU=(1) AVERAGE WESTERN EUROPEAN EFFECTIVE HIGH-DENSITY 
X POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN 1979 
D AELDCU=(1) AVERAGE WESTERN EUROPEAN EFFECTIVE LOW-DENSITY 
X POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN 1919 
D AEPCU=(1) AVERAGE WESTERN EUROPEAN EFFECTIVE PROPYLENE CAPACITY 
X UTILIZATION IN 1919 
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D 
D 
D 
X 
D 
HSD=(T/tMM) BASE LEVEL OF NON-CAPTIVE DEMAND FOR STYRENE IN 1980 
BTPUT=(T/M) THROUGHPUT IN BASIC PRODUCT SECTOR 
BVCMD=(T/M) BASE LEVEL OF NON-CAPTIVE DEMAND FUR VINYL CHLORIDE IN 
1980 
BY=(1) BUTADIENE YIELD PER TON OF NAPHTHA CRACKED 
CACG=($) CUMULATIVE ACTUAL CASH GENERATION 
CASH=($) CASH RESERVES OF COMPANY 
CCC=($/(T/M)) CAPITAL COST OF NAPHTHA CRACKER IN 1980 
CCHDPEC=($/(T/t4)) CAPITAL COST OF HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PLANT 
IN 1980 
CCLDPEC=($/(T/M)) CAPITAL COST OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PLANT 
IN 1980 
CCPPC=($/(T/11)) CAPITAL COST OF POLYPROPYLENE PLANT IN 1980 
CCPSC=($/(T/M)) CAPITAL COST OF POLYSTYRENE PLANT IN 1980 
CCPVCC=(S/(T/M)) CAPITAL COST OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE PLANT IN 1980 
CCSC=($/(T/M)) CAPITAL COST OF STYRENE PLANT IN 1980 
CCVCMC=($/(T/M)) CAPITAL COST OF VINYL CHLORIDE PLANT IN 1980 
CDCFL=($) CUMULATIVE DEPRECIATION CASHFLOW UNFULFILLED 
CDELBP=(M) CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN BASIC PRODUCT CAPACITY ADDITIONS 
CDELHD=(M) CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY 
ADDITIONS 
CDELLD=(M) CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY 
ADDITIONS 
CDELPP=(M) CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY ADDITIONS 
CDELPV=(M) CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN POLYVINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY ADDITION 
CDELPS=(t4) CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY ADDITIONS 
CDELS=(11) CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN STYRENE CAPACITY ADDITIONS 
CDELVC=(M) CONSTRUCTION DELAY IN VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY ADDITIONS 
CECP=($) CUMULATIVE ESCALATION IN COST OF PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION 
DUE TO INFLATION 
CHECKF=($) DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TOTAL ASSETS AND TOTAL LIABILITIES 
CHECKM=(T/M) CHECK TO MAKE SURE THAT THE MODEL DOES NOT LEAK OR 
CREATE ANY PETROCHEMICAL MATERIAL 
COPI=(1) CRUDE OIL PRICE INFLATION INDEX 
COPR=(1/M) FORECAST AVERAGE RATE OF CRUDE OIL PRICE RISES 
COVER=(t1) COVER OF PRODUCTION COST REQUIRED 
CPGP=($) CUMULATIVE PRETAX GROSS PROFITS 
CPTE=($/T) COST PER TON OF ETHYLENE PRODUCED 
CPTHDPE=($/T) COST PER TON OF HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PRODUCED 
CPTLDPE=($/T) COST PER TON OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PRODUCED 
CPTP=(S/T) COST PER TON OF PROPYLENE PRODUCED 
CPTPP=($/T) COST PER TON OF POLYPROPYLENE PRODUCED 
CPTPS=($/T) COST PER TON OF POLYSTYRENE PRODUCED 
CPTPVC=($/T) COST PER TON OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE PRODUCED 
CPTS=($/T) COST PER TON OF STYRENE PRODUCED 
CPTVCt"1=($/T) COST PER TON OF VINYL CHLORIDE PRODUCED 
CRP=($) CUMULATIVE RETAINED PROFITS 
CRS=($) CUMULATIVE REQUIRED SPENDING ON NEW CAPITAL PROJECTS 
DC=(T/M) DESIRED NEW BASIC PRODUCT CAPACITY 
I)CFL=($/M) DEPRECIATION CASH FLOW 
DE=(T/M) DESIRED NEW ETHYLENE CAPACITY 
DEPPC=(1/M) FRACTION OF VALUE OF PLANT ALLOWABLE FOR DEPRECIATION 
UHU=(T/I1) DESIRED NEW HIGH-DENSITY POLYETYLENE CAPACITY 
DLD=(T/M) DESIRED NEW LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY 
DIFF=($/T) LOSS OR GAIN OF THE SALE OF BUTADIENE TO BE ADDED TO 
OR SUBTRACTED FROM THE PRICE OF ETHYLENE AND PROPYLENE 
DMINTB=(M) DECISION MAKING INTERVAL FOR BASIC PRODUCT CAPACITY 
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DMINTIF=(M) DECISION-MAKING INTERVAL FOR INTERMEDIATE AND 
FINAL PRODUCT CAPACITY 
DP=(T/M) DESIRED NEW PROPYLENE CAPACITY 
DPS=(T/M) DESIRED NEW POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY 
DPP=(T/(4) DESIRED NEW POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY 
DPV=(T/M) DESIRED NEW POLYVINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
DS=(T/M) DESIRED NEW STYRENE CAPACITY 
DT=(M) SOLUTION INTERVAL IN SIMULATION CALCULATIONS 
DVC=(T/M) DESIRED NEW VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
EBCAP=(T/M) EFFECTIVE BASIC PRODUCT CAPACITY INCLUDING ENERGY PRODUCTS 
CAPACITY 
EBCAPE=(T/M) EFFECTIVE BASIC PRODUCT CAPACITY EXCLUDING ENERGY 
PRODUCTS CAPACITY 
ECP=($/M) ESCALATION IN COST OF PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION DUE TO 
INFLATION 
EDg(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR ETHYLENE 
EFCAP=(T/M) EFFECTIVE FINAL PRODUCT CAPACITY 
EHDCAP=(T/M) EFFECTIVE HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY 
EICAP=(T/M) EFFECTIVE INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT CAPACITY 
EICU=(1) EFFECTIVE INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
ELDCAP=(T/M) EFFECTIVE LOW1-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY 
EOCU=(1) EFFECTIVE OLEFINS CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
EPBTOE=(1) RATIO OF THE TOTAL YIELDS OF ETHYLENE " PROPYLENE AND 
BUTADIENE TO THE YIELD OF ETHYLENE 
EPCU=(1) EFFECTIVE PLASTICS CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
EPPCAP=(T/M) EFFECTIVE POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY 
EPRAT=(1) RATIO OF ETHYLENE TO PROPYLENE PRODUCTION OR CAPACITY 
PERMITTED DUE TO-THEIR YIELD CONSTRAINTS 
EPSCAP=(T/11) EFFECTIVE POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY 
EPTOE=(1) RATIO OF THE TOTAL YIELD OF ETHYLENE AND PROPYLENE 
THE YIELD OF ETHYLENE 
EPVCAP=(T/M) EFFECTIVE POLYVINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
ESCAF'=(T/M) EFFECTIVE STYRENE CAPACITY 
F. SOLD=(T/M) PART OF THE ETHYLENE PRODUCTION WHICH IS SOLD TO 
PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS 
ETOEP=(1) RATIO OF THE YIELD OF ETHYLENE TO THE TOTAL YIELDS. 
ETHYLENE AND PROPYLENE 
ETOHD=(T/T) AMOUNT OF ETHYLENE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE 1 TON OF 
HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
ETOLD=(T/T) AMOUNT OF ETHYLENE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE 1 TON OF 
LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
ETOS=(T/T) A140UNT OF ETHYLENE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE 1 TON OF 
STYRENE 
ETOVC=(T/T) AMOUNT OF ETHYLENE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE 1 TON OF 
VINYL CHLORIDE 
EVCCAP=(T/M) EFFECTIVE VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
EY=(1) ETHYLENE YIELD PER TON OF NAPHTHA CRACKED 
FE3=(1) SHARE OF BUTADIENE PRICE EXPECTED TO VARY WITH CRUDE 
OIL PRICE 
FCAP=(T/M) FINAL PRODUCT CAPACITY 
FCAPOR=(T/M) FINAL PRODUCT CAPACITY ON ORDER BUT NOY RECEIVED 
FCCR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMLETIUN OF FINAL PRODUCT CAPACITY 
TO 
OTHER 
OF 
D FCDR=((T/MM)/M) RArl OF DECAY OF FINAL PRODUCT CAPACITY 
D FCSR=-((T/ICI)/M) RATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF FINAL PRODUCT CAPACITY 
D FE=(1) SHARE OF ETHYLENE PRICE EXPECTED TO VARY WITH CRUDE 
X OIL PRICE 
D FHDPE=(1) SHARE OF HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PRICE EXPECTED TO 
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VARY WITH CRUDE OIL PRICE 
FLDPE=(1) SHARE OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PRICE EXPECTED TO 
VARY WITH CRUDE OIL PRICE 
FNCGF=(1) FORECAST NECESSARY PETROCHEMICAL CAPACITY GROWTH FACTOR 
FP=(1) SHARE OF PROPYLENE PRICE EXPECTED TO VARY WITH CRUDE 
OIL PRICE 
FPMULT=(1) FRACTION OF PLANNED EXPENDITURE ACTUALLY INCURRED 
FPP=(1) SHARE OF POLYPROPYLENE PRICE EXPECTED TO VARY WITH 
CRUDE OIL PRICE 
FPS=(1) SHARE OF POLYSTYRENE PRICE EXPECTED TO VARY WITH CRUDE 
OIL PRICE 
FPVC=(1) SHARE OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE PRICE EXPECTED TO VARY WITH 
CRUDE OIL PRICE 
FRAT=(1) RATIO OF ACHIEVABLE. RATE OF SPENDING AND REQUIRED RATE 
FREXP=(a/M) FEASIBLE RATE OF EXPENDITURE WHICH COULD BE SUSTAINED 
THROUGH COMPANY'S INTERNAL FUNDS 
FS=(1) SHARE OF STYRENE PRICE EXPECTED TO VARY WITH CRUDE 
OIL PRICE 
FTPUT=(T/M) THROUGHPUT IN FINAL PRODUCT SECTOR 
FVCM=(1) SHARE OF VINYL CHLORIDE PRICE EXPECTED TO VARY 
WITH CRUDE OIL PRICE 
FWDV=(1/M) FRACTION OF WRITTEN DOWN VALUE OF PLANTS AND WORKING 
TO COVER THE REQUIRED RETURN ON INVESTMENT WHEN SUPPLY 
AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
FY=(1) FUEL OILJYIELD PER TON OF' NAPHTHA CRACKED 
GY=(1) GASOLINE YIELD PER TON OF NAPHTHA CRACKED 
GME=($/T). GROSS MARGIN ON ETHYLENE SALES 
GMHDPE=($/T) GROSS MARGIN ON HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE SALES 
GMLDPE=($/T) GROSS MARGIN ON LOW-DENSITY-POLYETHYLENE SALES 
GMP=($/T) GROSS MARGIN ON PROPYLENE SALES 
GMPP=($/T) GROSS MARGIN ON POLYPROPYLENE SALES 
GMPS=(ß/T) GROSS MARGIN ON POLYSTYRENE SALES 
GMPVC=($/T) GROSS MARGIN ON POLYVINYL CHLORIDE SALES 
GMS=($/T) GROSS MARGIN ON STYRENE SALES 
GMVCM=($/T) GROSS MARGIN ON VINYL CHLORIDE SALES 
HDCAP=(T/M) HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY 
HDCAPOR=(T/M) HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY ON ORDER BUT NOT 
RECEIVED 
HDCCR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMPLETION OF HIGH DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
CAPACITY 
HDCDR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF DECAY OF HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY 
HDCSR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
CAPACITY 
HDMUL=(1) MULTIPLIER TO REFLECT THE FORECAST CHANGE IN HIGH-DENSITY 
POLYETHYLENE'S SHARE OF TOTAL PLASTICS CONSUMPTION DURING 
1980.1990 
HDMULP=(1) HDMUL VALUE AT THE END OF PLANNING HORIZON 
HDPED=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR HIGH DENSITY POL. YETHYLENE 
HDTPUT=(T/M) HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE THROUGHPUT 
ICAP=(T/M) INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT CAPACITY 
ICAPOR=(T/M) INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT CAPACITY ON ORDER BUT NOT RECEIVED 
ICCR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMPLETION OF INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT CAPACITY 
ICDR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF DECAY OF INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT CAPACITY 
ICSR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT CAPACITY 
IFRAT=(1) INTERNAL FINANCING RATIO 
IPC=($) PARENT COMPANY'S TOTAL INVESTMENT IN ITS PETROCHEMICAL 
SUBSIDIARY 
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IR=(1/M) AVERAGE WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEREST RATE ON CASH RESOURCES 
ITPUT=(T/t4) THROUGHPUT IN INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT SECTOR 
LUCAP=(T/M) LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY 
LDCAPOR=(T/M) LOW-DENSITY CAPACITY ON ORDER BUT NOT RECEIVED 
LDCCR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMPLETION OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
CAPACITY 
LDCDR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF DECAY OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY 
LDCSR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
CAPACITY 
LDMUL=(1) MULTIPLIER TO REFLECT THE FORECAST CHANGE IN LOW-DENSITY 
POLYETHYLENE'S SHARE OF TOTAL PLASTICS CONSUMPTION DURING 
1980-1990 
LDMULP=(1) LDMUL VALUE AT THE END OF PLANNING HORIZON 
LDPED=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
LUTPUT=(T/M) LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE THROUGHPUT 
LENGTH=(M) SIMULATED PERIOD 
LOSS=(1) LOSS PER TON OF NAPHTHA CRACKED 
LPGY=(1) LPG YIELD PER TON OF NAPHTHA CRACKED 
LTPP=(M) LIFETIME OF PETROCHEMICAL PLANTS 
MAXIPC=($/14) PARENT COMPANY'S MAXIMUM MONTHLY INVESTMENT IN 
ITS PETROCHEMICAL SUBSIDIARY 
MAXIPC80=($/M) BASE LEVEL OF PARENT COMPANY'S MAXIMUM MONTHLY 
. 
INVESTMENT IN ITS PETROCHEMICAL SUBSIDIARY IN 19ä0 
MCNP=(S) MONEY COMMITTED TO NEW CAPACITY ADDITION PROJECTS 
MESC=(T/M) ECONOMIC SIZE OF A NAPHTHA STEAM CRACKER 
MESt1D=(T/M) ECONOMIC SIZE OF A HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PLANT 
MESLD=(T/M) ECONOMIC SIZE OF A LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PLANT 
MESPP=(T/M) ECONOMIC SIZE OF A POLYPROPYLENE PLANT 
MESPS=(T/M) ECONOMIC SIZE OF A POLYSTYRENE PLANT 
MESPV=(T/M) ECONOMIC SIZE OF A POLYVINYL CHLORIDE PLANT 
MESS=(T/M) ECONOMIC SIZE OF A STYRENE PLANT 
MESV=(T/M) ECONOMIC SIZE OF A VINYL CHLORIDE PLANT 
t"1FCUR=(1) MAXIMUM FEASIBLE CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
MINCASH-'($) THE LEVEL BELOW WHICH THE COMPANY'S CASH RESERVES 
SHOULD NOT FALL 
MKTPB=($/T) MARKET PRICE OF BUTADIENE 
MPY=(M/Y) MONTHS PER YEAR 
NE=(T/M) NECESSARY ETHYLENE CAPACITY IN 5 YEARS TIME 
NHD=(T/M) NECESSARY HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY IN 5 YEARS 
TIME 
NLD=(T/M) NECESSARY LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE CAPACITY IN 5 YEARS 
TIME 
NP=(T/M) NECESSARY PROPYLENE CAPACITY IN 5 YEARS TIME 
NPP=(T/M) NECESSARY POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY IN 5 YEARS TIME 
NPS=(T/M) NECESSARY POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY IN 5 YEARS TIME 
NPV=(T/M) NECESSARY POLYVINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY IN 5 YEARS TIME 
NS=(T/M) NECESSARY STYRENE CAPACITY IN 5 YEARS TIME 
NVC=(T/M) NECESSARY VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY IN 5 YEARS TIME 
OII=(1) OVERALL INFLATION INDEX 
OIR=(1/M) FORECAST AVERAGE RATE OF INCREASE OF OVERALL INFLATION IN 
WESTERN EUROPE 
ONE=(1) NUMBER 1 
PB=(S/T) PRICE OF BUTADIENE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
PC=(1) THE PROPORTION OF THE VALUE OF THE WORKING CAPITAL TO 
BE KEPT IN CASH BY THE COMPANY 
PD=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR PROPYLENE 
PE=($/T) PRICE OF ETHYLENE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
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D PERD=(M) PERIOD OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
D PHQR=(M) PLANNING HORIZON 
D PHDPE=(S/T) PRICE OF HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
X ARE BALANCED 
D PLDPE=($/T) PRICE OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
'X ARE BALANCED 
D PLTPER=(M) PLOTTING INTERVAL 
D PMB=(1) PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR BUTADIENE 
D PME=(1) PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR ETHYLENE 
D PMHUPE=(1) PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
D P14LDPE=(1) PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
D pMP=(1) PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR PROPYLENE 
D PMPP=(1) PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR POLYPROPYLENE 
D PMPS=(1) PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR POLYSTYRENE 
D PMPVC=(1) PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR POLYVINYL CHLORIDE 
D PMS=(1)'PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR STYRENE 
D PMVCM=(1) PRICE MULTIPLIER FOR VINYLCHLORIDE 
D PPCAP=(T/M) POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY 
D PPCAPUR=(T/M) POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY ON ORDER BUT NOT RECEIVED 
D PPCCR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMPLETION OF POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY 
D PPCDR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF DECAY OF POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY 
D P. PCSR=((T/MMi)/(l) RATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY 
D PPD=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR POLYPROPYLENE 
D PPMUL=(1) MULTIPLIER TO REFLECT THE FORECAST CHANGE IN POLYPROPYLENE'S 
X SHARE OF TOTAL PLASTICS CONSUMPTION DURING 198U-9U 
D PPMULP=(1) PPMUL VALUE AT THE END OF PLANNING HORIZON 
B PPE=($/T) PART OF THE PRICE OF ETHYLENE WHICH COVERS THE REQUIRED 
X AMORTIZATION AND RETURN UN INVESTMENT WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
X ARE BALANCED 
D PPHDPE=($/T) PART OF THE PRICE OF HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE WHICH 
X COVERS THE REQUIRED AMORTIZATION AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
X WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PPLDPE=($/T) PART OF THE PRICE OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE WHICH 
X COVERS THE REQUIRED AMORTIZATION AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
X WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
p PPP=($/T) PRICE OF POLYPROPYLENE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PPPP=(S/T) PART OF THE PRICE OF POLYPROPYLENE WHICH COVERS THE 
X REQUIRED AMORTIZATION AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT WHEN 
X SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PPPR=($/T) PART OF THE PRICE OF PROPYLENE WHICH COVERS THE REQUIRED 
X AMORTIZATION AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
X ARE BALANCED 
D PPPS=(S/T) PART OF THE PRICE OF POLYSTYRENE WHICH COVERS THE REQUIRED 
X AMORTIZATION AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT WHEN SUPPLY AND 
X DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PPPVC=($/T) PART OF THE PRICE OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE WHICH COVERS 
X THE REQUIRED AMORTIZATION AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT WHEN 
X SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PPS=($/T) PRICE OF POLYSTYRENE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PPST=($/T) PART OF THE PkICE OF STYRENE WHICH. COVERS THE REQUIRED 
X AMORTIZATION AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT WHEN SUPPLY AND 
X DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D pPR=($/T) PRICE OF PROPYLENE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PPTPUT=(T/M) POLYPROPYLENE THROUGHPUT 
D, PPVC=($/T) PRICE OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE 
X BALANCED 
D PPVCM=($/T) PART OF THE PRICE OF VINYL CHLORIDE WHICH COVERS THE 
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X REQUIRED AMORTIZATION AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT WHEN SUPPLY 
X AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PR=($/M) RATE OF RECEIPT OF PROFIT FROM PRODUCTION AND CASH 
X RESOURCES 
D PRTPER=(M) PRINTING INTERVAL FOR OUTPUT 
D PSCAP=(T/M) POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY 
D PSCAPUR=(T/M) POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY ON ORDER BUT NOT RECEIVED 
D PSCCR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMPLETION OF POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY 
D PSCDR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF DECAY OF POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY 
D PSCSR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY 
D PSD=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR POLYSTYRENE 
D PSMUL=(1) MULTIPLIER TO REFLECT THE CHANGE IN POLYSTYRENE'S SHARE OF 
X TOTAL PLASTICS CONSUMPTION DURING 1980. -9O 
D PSMULP=(1) PSMUL VALUE AT THE END OF PLANNING HORIZON 
D PSOLD=(T/M) PART OF PROPYLENE PRODUCTION WHICH IS SOLD TO OTHER 
X PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS 
D PST=($/T) PRICE OF STYRENE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PSTPUT=(T/M) POLYSTYRENE THROUGHPUT 
D PTOPP=(T/T) AMOUNT OF PROPYLENE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE 1 TON OF 
X POLYPROPYLENE 
D PVCAP=(T/M) POLYVINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
D PVCAPOR=(T/M) POLYVINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY ON ORDER BUT NUT RECEIVED 
D PVCCR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMPLETION OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
D PVCDR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF DECAY OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
D PVCSR=((T/t1)/M) RATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
D PVCD=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR POLYVINYL CHLORIDE 
D PVCt"1=($/T) PRICE OF VINYL CHLORIDE WHEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND ARE BALANCED 
D PVMUL=(1) MULTIPLIER TO REFLECT THE FORECAST CHANGE IN POLYVINYL 
X CHLORIDE'S SHARE. OF TOTAL PLASTICS CONSUMPTION DURING 
X 19.80-90 
D PVMULP=(1) PVMUL VALUE AT THE END OF PLANNING HORIZON 
D PVTPUT=(T/M) POLYVINYL CHLORIDE THROUGHPUT 
D PY=(1) PROPYLENE YIELD PER TON OF NAPHTHA CRACKED 
D RAVC=($/M) RATE OF ADDING TO VALUE OF NAPHTHA CRACKERS 
D RAVHDPEP=(S/M) RATE OF ADDING TO VALUE OF HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
X PLANTS 
D RAVLDPEP=($/M) RATE OF ADDING TO VALUE OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
X PLANTS 
D RAVP=($/M) RATE OF ADDING TO VALUE OF PETROCHEMICAL PLANTS 
D RAVPPP=($/I1i) RATE OF ADDING TO VALUE OF POLYPROPYLENE PLANTS 
D RAVPSP=($/11) RATE OF ADDING TO VALUE OF POLYSTYRENE PLANTS 
D RAVPVCP=(S/MM1) RATE OF ADDING TO VALUE OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE PLANTS 
D RAVSP=($/[, I) RATE OF ADDING TO VALUE OF STYRENE PLANTS 
D RAVVCMP=($/NI) RATE OF ADDING TO VALUE OF VINYL CHLORIDE PLANTS 
D RC14TNP=($/M) RATE OF COMMITTING MONEY TO NEW PROJECTS 
D RGDM=(1/M) GENERAL RATE OF GROWTH OF DEMAND FOR PETROCHEMICALS 
X. IN THE 1980'S AND THE 1990'S 
D RGDt1EB=(1) MULTIPLIER TO REFLECT ERROR AND BIAS IN FORECASTING 
X RATE OF GROWTH OF DEMAND FOR PETROCHEMICALS 
D RIPC=($/M) ACTUAL RATE OF PARENT COMPANY'S MONTHLY INVESTMENT 
X IN ITS PETROCHEMICAL SUBSIDAIRY 
D R11CNP=($) REQUIRED MONEY TO BE C014MITTED TO NEW CAPACITY ADDITION 
X PROJECTS 
D ROI=(1/Y) RETURN ON INVESTMEIJT 
D RP=($/M) RETAINED PROFIT 
D RRS=($/M) REQUIRED RATE OF SPENDING ON NEW CAPITAL PROJECTS 
D RRSB=($/M) REQUIRED RATE OF SPENDING ON NEW BASIC PRODUCT CAPACITY 
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RRSF=(3/M) REQUIRED RATE OF SPENDING ON NEW FINAL PRODUCT CAPACITY 
RRSI=($/M) REQUIRED RATE OF SPENDING ON NEW INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT 
CAPACITY 
RRWC=($/M) RATE OF REDUCING WORKING CAPITAL IF IT EXCEEDS REQUIREMENTS 
RSC=(S/M) RATE OF SPENDING CASH 
SCAP=(T/M) STYRENE CAPACITY 
SCAPUR=(T/M) STYRENE CAPACITY ON ORDER BUT NOT RECEIVED 
SCCR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMPLETION OF STYRENE CAPACITY 
SCDIFF=($/M) DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND FEASIBLE SPENDING RATES 
SCDR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF DECAY OF STYRENE CAPACITY 
SCSR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF STYRENE CAPACITY 
SD=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR STYRENE 
SSOLD=(T/M) PART OF STYRENE PRODUCTION WHICH IS SOLD TO 
PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS 
STOPS=(T/T) AMOUNT OF STYRENE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE 1 TON 
POLYSTYRENE 
STPUT=(T/M) STYRENE THROUGHPUT 
TA=($) TOTAL ASSETS OF THE COMPANY 
TAC=(M) TIME TO AVERAGE COST PER TON OF PRODUCT PRODUCED 
TADCFL=(M) TIME TO AVERAGE DEPRECIATION CASHFLOW 
TAP=(M) TIME TO AVERAGE PROFIT LEVEL 
OTHER 
OF 
TAPCDR=(M) TIME TO AVERAGE RATE OF DECAY OF PETROCHEMICAL CAPACITY 
TARP=(M) TIME TO AVERAGE RETAINED PROFIT 
TAW=(M) TIME TO AVERAGE WCAPRB 
TAWC=(M) TIME TO ADJUST WORKING CAPITAL POSITION 
TAXDIV=(1) PROPORTION OF PROFIT FLOW LOST IN TAXATION AND DIVIDEND 
PAYMENTS 
TBD=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR BASIC PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS 
I 
TBDY=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR BASIC PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS , TAKING 
INTO ACCOUNT THE YIELD CONSTRAINTS OF NAPHTHA-BASED 
ETHYLENE CRACKERS 
TERP=(T/M) TOTAL ETHEYLENE REQUIRED FUR FURTHR PROCESSING INTO 
X PLASTICS BY THE COMPANY'S PLASTICS DIVISION 
D TFD=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR FINAL PETROCHEMICAL PRODUCTS 
D TFPMULT=(1) TABLE VALUE FOR FINANCIAL POLICY MULTIPLIER FPMULT 
D THDMUL=(1) TABLE VALUES OF HDMUL 
D TID=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR INTERMEDIATE PETROCHEMICAL P RODUCTS 
D TIME=(M) SIMULATED TIME IN MODEL 
D TIMR=(M) TIME TO INCREASE MCNP WHEN IT FALLS BELOW THE RMCNP 
D TIWC=($/M) TARGET RATE OF GROWTH IN WORKING CAPITAL 
D TL=($) TOTAL LIABILITIES OF THE COMPANY 
D _ TLDMUL=(1) TABLE VALUES OF LDMUL 
D TPMB=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PMB 
D TPME=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PME 
D TPMHDPE=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PMHDPE 
D TPMLDPE=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PMLDPE 
D TPMP=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PMP 
D TPMPP=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PMPP 
D TPMPS=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PMPS 
D TPMPVC=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PMPVC 
D TPMS=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PMS 
)D 
TPMVCM=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PMVCM 
D TPPMUL=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PPMUL 
D TPSMUL=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PSMUL 
D TPVMUL=(1) TABLE VALUES OF PVMUL 
D TROBCAP=((T/M)/M) TARGET RATE OF ORDERING BASIC PRODUCT CAPACITY 
D TROFCAP=((T/M)/M) TARGET RATE OF ORDERING FINAL PRODUCT CAPACITY 
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D TROHDCAP=((T/M)/M) TARGET RATE OF ORDERING HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
X CAPACITY 
D TROICAP=((T/M)/M) TARGET RATE OF ORDERING INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT 
,X CAPACITY TROLDCAP=((T/M)'/M) TARGET RATE. OF ORDERING LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE 
X CAPACITY 
D TROPPCAP=((T/M)/M) TARGET RATE OF ORDERING POLYPROPYLENE CAPACITY 
D TROPSCAP=((T/M)/M) TARGET RATE OF ORDERING POLYSTYRENE CAPACITY 
D TROPVCAP=((T/M)/M) TARGET RATE OF ORDERING POLYVINYL CHLORIDE 
X. CAPACITY 
D TROSCAP=((T/M)/M) TARGET RATE OF ORDERING STYRENE CAPACITY 
D TROVCCAP=((T/M)/M) TARGET RATE. OF. ORDERING VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
D TRWC=(M) TIME TO REDUCE WORKING CAPITAL WHEN IT EXCEEDS REQUIREMENTS 
D TYEPB=(1) TOTAL YIELDS OF ETHYLENE i PROPYLENE AND BUTADIENE 
X PER TON OF NAPHTHA CRACKED 
D VCCAP=(T/M) VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
D VCCAPOR=(T/M) VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY ON ORDER BUT NOT RECEIVED 
D VCCCR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMPLETION OF VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
D VCCDR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF DECAY OF VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
D VCCSR=((T/M)/M) RATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF VINYL CHLORIDE CAPACITY 
D VCMD=(T/M) TOTAL DEMAND FOR VINYL CHLORIDE 
D VCSOLD=(T/M) PART OF VINYL CHLORIDE PRODUCTION WHICH IS SOLD TO OTHER 
X PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS 
D VCTOPV=(T/T) AMOUNT OF VINYL CHLORIDE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE 1 
X TON OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE 
D VCTPUT=(T/M) VINYL CHLORIDE MONOMER THROUGHPUT 
D WCAP=(S) WORKING CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
WCAPR=($) WORKING CAPITAL REQUIRED TO SUPPORT PLANNED PRODUCTION 
J WCAPRB=(S) WORKING CAPITAL REQUIRED TO SUPPORT PLANNED BASIC 
X PRODUCTION 
D WCRAT=(1) RATIO OF ACTUAL WORKING-CAPITAL TO THAT REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN. 
X THE PLANNED LEVEL OF PRODUCTION 
D WCRCV=(1) CRITICAL VALUE OF WORKING CAPITAL RATIO , WCRAT ABOVE 
X WHICH REDUCTIONS IN WORKING CAPITAL WILL BE MADE 
D WDV=($) WRITTEN DOWN VALUE OF CAPITAL PLANTS 
D WDVC=($) WRITTEN DOWN VALUE OF NAPHTHA CRACKERS 
D WDVHDPE=(S) WRITTEN DOWN VALUE OF HIGH-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PLANTS 
D WDVLDPE=($) WRITTEN DOWN VALUE OF LOW-DENSITY POLYETHYLENE PLANTS 
D WDVPP=($) WRITTEN DOWN VALUE OF POLYPROPYLENE PLANTS 
D WDVPS=($) WRITTEN DOWN VALUE OF POLYSTYRENE PLANTS 
D WDVPVC=(S) WRTTEN DOWN VALUE OF POLYVINYL CHLORIDE PLANTS 
D WDVS=(S) WRITTEN DOWN VALUE OF STYRENE PLANTS 
D WDVVCM=($) WRITTEN DOWN VALUE OF VINYL CHLORIDE PLANTS 
T****************************************************************************#i 
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APPENDIX B 
LIST, OF COMPUTER PROGRAME OF THE AMENDED SECTORS 
OF THE BASIC MODEL 
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NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ****************+r*********, r*, r*****, t**, r****************************ý 
NOTE FORWARD PLANNING -CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS SECTOR 
******************, r**rr*******rt****, r****, t***************, t********, r NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE 
N EPTOE=(EY+PY)/EY 
C EY=. 31 
C PY=, 16 
C BY=. US 
C GY=. 21 
C LPGY=, 25 
C FY=. U1 
C LOSS=, 01 
C ETOS=, 307 
C ETOVC=, 485 
C ETOLD=1,03 
C ETOHD=1. UZ 
C VCTAPV=1,01 
C STOPS=1,05 
C PT0PP=1,096 
A DE, K=(NE, K-EY*EBCAP. K)/fiFCUR+EY*ABCDR, K*(DMINTU+CDELBP)-EY*ICAPOR. K 
A DP, K=(NP. K-PY*EBCAP. K)/MFCUR+PY*ABCDR. K*(DIIINTB+CDELBP)-PY*BCAPUR, K 
C MFCUR=. ö 
C Dt1I NTß=1 2 
A DC, K=CLIP(DE. K, EPRAT*DP. K, EPRAT, DE, K/DP. K)/EY 
N EPRAT=EY/PY 
A DVC. K=(NVC. KTEVCCAP. K)/IIFCUR+AVCCDR, K*(DMINTIF+CDELVC)-VCCAPOR. K 
'C DMINTIF=24 
A DS, K=(US. K-ESCAP. K)/MFCUR+ASCDR, K*(DMINTIF+CDELS)-SCAPOR, K 
A DLD. K=(NLD, K-ELDCAP. K)/fIFCUR+ALDCDR, K*(DMINTIF+CDELLD)-LDCAPOR, K 
A DHD. K=(NEID. K-EHDCAP. K)/t"IFCUR+AtiDCDR. K*(DMINTIF+CDELI+U)-HHCAPOR. K 
A DPV, K=(NPV, K-EPVCAP. K)/MFCUR+APVCDR, K*(DI1INTIF+CDELPV)-PVCAPOR, K 
A DPS, K=(NPS. K-EPSCAP. K)/IIFCUR+APSCDR, K*(DNINTII'+CDELPS)-PSCAPOR, K 
A DPP. K=(NPP. K-EPPCAP. K)/t1FCUR+APPCDR. K*(DMINTIF+CDELPP)-PPCAPUR, K 
A TROBCAP, K=SAf1PLE((It1T(DC. K/MESC)*MESC)/D("IINTB, Dt"iINTB, 1UUTi1) 
A TROVCCAP. K=SAMPLE((INT(DVC. K/FtESV)*MESV)/DMINTIF, DMINTB, O) 
A TROSCAP, K=SAtIPLE((INT(DS. K/MESS)*MESS)/Dt"1INTIF, DMINTB, U) 
A TROICAP, K=TROVCCAP, K+TROSCAP. K 
A TRUI. DCAP. K=SAMPLE((INT(DLD. f: /FIESLD)*MESLD)/DMINTIF, DMIf1TB, 694,42) 
A TRO[HDCAP. K=SAI. IPLE((INT(DIID. K/MESHD)*MESHD)/DMINTIF, Dt"1INTB, O) 
A TROPVCAP, K=SAMPLE. ((INT(DPV. K/IIESPV)*MESPV)/DMINTIF, DMINTB, 416.67) 
A TROPSCAP. K=SAfIPLE((INT(DPS. K/MESPS)*MESPS)/DMINTIF, DMINTß, O) 
A TROPPCAP. K=SAM"MPLE((INT(DPP. K/MESPP)*IIIESPP)/Df"iINTIF, DMINTß, 347,21) 
A TROFCAP. K=TROLDCAP, K+TROHDCAP, K+TROPVCAP. K+TROPSCAP. K+TROPPCAP. K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ******, r**************, t*******, ******º**********, t********************* 
NOTE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANNING DECISIONS SECTOR 
NOTE ****ýa**, r**, a********, a************. *************************ý********* 
NOTE 
NOTE 
A FRAT, K=ARS. K/(RRS. K+CLIP(O, 1, RRS, K,. 1)) 
A FPMULT. K=TAßtiL(TFPIMULT, FRAT. K, O, 1,. 5) 
N FPI-IULT=1 
T TFPMULT=O/, 65/1 
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A ARWC, K=TIWC, K 
R RIPC, KL=MAX(MIN(SCDIFF. K, MAXIPC, K)'U) 
R RCSR, KL=SAMPLE((INT(DC, K*FPMULT. K/MESC)*MESC)/DMINTB 
X 'DMINTB, 10081) 
C MESC=12U. 967E3 
R VCCSR, KL=SAMPLE((INT(DVC, K*FPMULT, K/MESV)*M[: SV)/DMINTIF 
X 1DMINTB#0) 
C MESV=25E3 
R SCSR, KL=SAMPLE( (INT(DS. K*FPI4ULT. K/MESS)*MESS)/DMINT IF 
X iDMINTB, O) 
C MESS=15E3 
R ICSR, KL=VCCSR. KL+SCSR. KL 
R LDCSR, KL=SAMPLE((INT(DLD, K*FPMULT. K/tMESLD)"*MESLD)/DMINTIF 
X ºDIIINTB, 694,42) 
C . MESLD=8,333E3 R HDCSR, KL=SAMPLE((INT(DI1D. K*FPMULT. K/MESHD)*I1ESHD)/DMINTIF 
Xi DMINTB, U) 
C MESHD=8,333E3 
R PVCSR, KL=SAMPLE((INT(DPV. K*FPr1ULT. K/MESPV)*MESPV)/DMINTIF 
X 'DMINTBr416.67) 
C MESPV=1OE3 
R PSCSR, KL=SA14PLE((INT(DPS. K*FPh1ULT. K/MESPS)*MESPS)/DMINTIF 
X iDMINTB, U) 
C MESPS=8.333E3 
R PPCSR, KL=SAMPLE((INT(DPP, K*FPMULT. K/MESPP)*MESPP)/DI. IINTIF 
X ºDMINTBt347,21) 
C MESPP=8.333E3 
R FCSR, KL=LDCSR, KL+HDCSR, KL+PVCSR, KL+PSCSR. KL+PPCSR, KL 
1A RCMTUP, K=(BCSR, KL*EY*CCC 
X +(SCSR. KL*CCSC+VCCSR. KL*CCVCMC) 
X +(LDCSR, KL*CCLDPEC+HDCSR. KL*CCHDPEC+PVCSR, KL*CCPVCC 
X +PSCSR. KL*CCPSC+PPCSR. KL*CCPPC))*UII, K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ********************************************************************* 
NOTE CAPACITY CONSTRUCTION PIPELINE SECTOR 
NOTE ********************************************************************* 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L BCAPOR, K=BCAPOR. J+DT*(BCSR. JK-BCCR. JK) 
N BCAPOR=((INT((((NE-EY*EBCAP)/MFCUR+EY*ABCDR*(DM"IINTB+CDELBP))/ 
X (EY* (DM"II NTB+CDELBP))) *DMI NTB/MESC) *MESC) / DM114TB) *CDE LBP 
R BCCR, KL=DELAY3(BCSR. JK, CDELBP) 
N BCSR=O 
C CDELBP=43.2694 
L VCCAPOR. K=VCCAPOR. J+DT*(VCCSR, JK-VCCCR, JK) 
N VCCAPUR=((INT((((NVC-EVCCAP)/r"1FCUR+AVCCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELVC))/ 
X (DMINTIF+CDELVC))*DMINTIF/MESV)*MESV)/DMINTIF)*CDELVC 
R VCCCR, KL=DELAY3(VCCSR, JK, CDELVC) 
C CDELVC=31.6Z88 
L SCAPOR, K=SCAPOR. J+DT*(SCSR. JK-SCCR. JK) 
N SCAPOR=((INT((((NS-ESCAP)/(-1FCUR+ASCDR*(DIINTIF+CDELS))/ 
X (DMINTIF+CDELS))*DMINTIF/MESS)*MESS)/DMINTIF)*CDELS 
R SCCR, KL=DELAY3(SCSR. JK, CDELS) 
C CDELS=31.677.9 
A ICAPOR, K=VCCAPOR. K+SCAPOR. K 
R ICCR, KL=VCCCR. KL+SCCR. KL 
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L LDCAPOR. K=LDCAPOR. J+DT*(LDCSR. JK-LDCCR. JK) 
N LDCAPOR=((INT((((NLD-ELDCAP)/MFCUR+ALDCDR*(DM INT IF+CDELLD))I 
X (DMINTIF+CDELLD))*DMIt4TIF/MESLD)*MESLD)/DMINTIF)*CDELLD 
R LDCCR. KL=DELAY3(LDCSR. JK. CDELLD) 
C CDELLD=31.6794 
L HDCAPOR. K=HDCAPOR, J+DT*(HDCSR. JK-HDCCR. JK) 
N HDCAPOR=((INT((((NHD-EHDCAP)/MFCUR+AHDCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELHD))/ 
X (DMINTIF+CDELHD))*DtIINTIF/MESHD)*MESHD)/DMINTIF)*CDELHD 
R HUCCR. KL=DELAY3(HDCSR. JK, CDELHD) 
C CDELI1D=31.5143 
L PVCAPOR, K=PVCAPOR. J+DT*(PVCSR. JK-PVCCR. JK) 
N PVCAPOR=((INT((((NPV-EPVCAP)/MFCUR+APVCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELPV))/ 
X (DMINTIF+CDELPV))*DtiINTIF/MESPV)*MESPV)/DMINTIF)*CDELPV 
R PVCCR, KL=DELAY3(PVCSR. JK, CDELPV) 
N PVCSR=O 
C CDELPV=31.6372 
L PSCAPOR. K=PSCAPOR. J+DT*(PSCSR. JK-PSCCR. JK) 
N PSCAPOR=((INT((((NPS-EPSCAP)/MFCUR+APSCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELPS))/ 
X (DMINTIF+CDELPS))*DI. IINTIF/MESPS)*MESPS)/DMINTIF)*CDELPS 
R PSCCR, KL=DELAY3(PSCSR. JK#CDELPS) 
C CDELPS=31.8519 
L PPCAPOR. K=PPCAPOR, J+DT*(PPCSR, JK-PPCCR. JK) 
N PPCAPUR=((INT((((NPP-EPPCAP)/MFCUR+APPCDR*(DMINTIF+CDELPP))/ 
X (DtIINTIF+CDELPP))*DIIIItITIF/IIESPP)*MESPP)/DMINTIF)*CDELPP 
R PPCCR, KL=DELAY3(PPCSR. JK, CDELPP) 
N PPCSR=O 
C CDELPP=31.2262 
A FCAPUR, K=LDCAPOR, K+IIDCAPOR. K+PVCAPOR, K+PSCAPOR, K+PPCAPOR. K 
R FCCR, KL=LDCCR, KL+HDCCR, KL+PVCCR, KL+PSCCR. KL+PPCCR, KL 
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